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CLUB GOODS AND REGULATORY OPPORTUNISM: TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP AND RULES OF ORIGIN FOR AUTOS
*CAROL M. BAST
INTRODUCTION

The twelve Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)' parties vary widely in
geographical location, level of economic development, political institutions, and
interconnectedness. The parties to the TPP include the three North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 2 parties, the United States, Canada, and Mexico; three
additional developed countries, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand; an advanced
economy, Singapore; two rapidly-growing economies, Vietnam and Peru; a wellto-do economy dependent on gas and oil, Brunei Darussalam (Brunei); and middle
income countries, Malaysia and Chile.3 The United States, Canada, and Mexico
have developed many integrated supply manufacturing chains as a result of
NAFTA.4 For Japan and the United States, TPP is the countries' first bilateral trade
agreement of this depth and breadth.
The twelve countries became signatories to TPP to take advantage of the
benefits that a regional trade agreement offers.6 In a way, being a party to TPP is
similar to joining an exclusive club and receiving the benefits of "club goods." 7
The detriment of not being a TPP member is being discriminated against in not
receiving the benefits of the club goods.8 Non-members may be tempted to use
opportunistic behavior to take advantage of the spillover benefit of the TPP
regulatory system even though they were not the intended recipients of TPP. TPP
members might assume that non-TPP parties will use regulatory opportunism to

*Associate Professor, Department of Legal Studies, University of Central Florida. J.D. New York Law
School 1982, University of Wisconsin, M.A. 1976, Kalamazoo College, B.A. 1974. Many thanks to
Gary N. Horlick for his guidance, comments, and suggestions.
1. Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/3,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc20l6d3 en.pdf.
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1708(14), H.R. Doc. 103-159, 32
I.L.M. 289, 673 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
3. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: LIKELY IMPACT ON THE
U.S. ECONOMY AND ON SPECIFIC INDUSTRY SECTORS 52-54, 56-59, 695-740 USITC Pub. 4607 (May

2016), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4607.pdf [hereinafter INT'L TRADE COMM'N].
4. Id. at 56.
5. Id.
6. See generally Regional Trade Agreements, THE ORGANISATION
OPERATION
&
DEVELOPMENT

FOR ECONOMIC CO(OECD),

http://www.oecd.org/tad/benefitlib/regionaltradeagreements.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
7. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 8.
8.

See infra footnotes 244-57 and accompanying text.
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benefit.9 The hypothesis of this article is that TPP will have an overall positive
effect on the auto and auto parts industry of the TPP parties and that TPP will have
a slightly negative effect on China, a non-member.
Part I of this article reviews the economic, political, and institutional
dimensions of a regional trade agreement. Part II describes the auto industry,
paying special attention to the auto industry in the United States. Part III provides
information on rules of origin in general and TPP rules of origin for autos in
particular. Part IV analyzes the effect of TPP on the auto industry.
I.

THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF A
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT

Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors,
sometimes referred to as the Detroit Three, still have a strong presence in the
United States.10 They have been joined by other car makers who import vehicles
1
into the United States and who manufacture foreign cars in the United States.' In
addition, the Detroit Three manufacture vehicles outside the United States, either
in their own plants or in partnership with foreign car makers, some of which are
imported into the United States.' 2 The global value chain is central to the
automotive sector in that auto components and the parts that make up each
3
component often originate from far-flung locations all over the world.'
A regional trade agreement has economic, political, and institutional
dimensions. TPP is an exercise in balancing domestic needs, which might demand
protectionist provisions, in the face of an increasingly global economy whose
foundation is trade liberalism.' 4 The United States representatives to TPP
negotiations kept interest groups in the United States in mind because of the
potential opposition interest groups could cause in Congress if they did not see
benefits for them under TPP.' 5 This part considers each of the three dimensions in
turn.

9. See infra footnotes 258-66 and accompanying text.
10. See generally Thomas H. Klier, From Tail Fins to Hybrids: How Detroit Lost Its Dominance,

2
PERSP.
ECON.
33
perspectives/2009/2qtr-klier.
11. Id. at 14.
12.

(2Q/2009),

https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/economic-

Timothy J. Sturgeon & Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Crisis and Protection in the Automotive

Industry: A Global Value Chain Perspective 8 (World Bank Pol'y Res. Working Paper No. 5060,
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/357861468315545086/pdflWPS5060.pdf
2009),
[hereinafter Sturgeon & Van Biesebroeck].

13. Id. at 3.
14. World Bank Group, Trade Liberalization: Why So Much Controversy? In ECONOMIC
A
DECADE
OF
REFORM
135-36,
THE
1990s:
LEARNING
FROM
GROWTH
IN

http://wwwl.worldbank.org/prem/lessonsl990s/chaps/05-Ch5_kl.pdf
15. Eric Bradner, How secretive is the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, CNN (June 12, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/11 /politics/trade-deal-secrecy-tpp/.
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The economic dimension

The economic dimension of an international trade agreement ranks just above
the political dimension in criticality.' 6 Valuing the effects of TPP is extremely
difficult, even for economists. Much depends on how TPP is interpreted and
applied into the future. Economists and attorneys may spend many months
working up a regulatory impact assessment of a trade agreement ex ante;'7
however, an ex post regulatory impact assessment may differ significantly.' 8
The auto industry is a multi-national enterprise that is extremely
competitive. As a significant stakeholder, the auto industry will be performing its
own regulatory impact assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
threats. 20 The effect of the TPP on the auto industry has much to do with the rules
of origin.
The United States has both strengths and weaknesses in the automotive
industry; these strengths and weaknesses must be considered when evaluating the
effects that TPP might have on those industries. The United States strengths lie in
research and development, technology innovations, and a workforce with the
advanced skills used in certain phases and sectors of manufacturing.21 Portions of
the auto industry that are high-skilled and high-paying depend on the integration of
the United States auto industry into the global value chain.22
The United States vulnerability lies in lower-skill level manufacturing. 23 One
of the sensitive sectors for the United States is the automotive sector because of the
potential job loss in lower-skill level auto and auto component manufacturing. 24
The fear is that lower-skill level production of autos and auto components will
move to other countries that have lower labor costs. 25 However, well-meaning but
protectionist policies, if instituted by the United States, would likely result in
retaliatory action from international trading partners and loss of foreign direct

16.

SHIHOKO GOTO, THE TPP REMAINS KEY TO U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

(2015), available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-tpp-remains-key-to-us-engagement-theasia-pacific-region.
17. See DIEGO A. CERDEIRO, ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP
(TPP)
ON
LATIN
AMERICA
AND
THE
CARIBBEAN
(LAC)
4,
17-19
(2016),

https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wpl6101.pdf
18. Id. at 19.
1 9. Wagner Cezar Lucato et al., Measure the Degree of Competitiveness for Auto Parts
Manufacturing Companies, 50 INT'L J. PRODUCTION RES. 5508, 5519-20 (2012).
20. Keith Head, How Will the TPP Affect the Auto Industry?, WORLD ECO. FORUM (Nov. 15,
2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/1 1/how-will-the-tpp-affect-the-auto-industry/.
21. Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, How Offshoring and Global Supply Chains
Enhance the US Economy, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECONOMICS 5 (2016).

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. TPP Auto ROO Most Likely To Hurt Makers Of Less Complex Parts: Experts, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE (Jan. 21, 2016), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/tpp-auto-roo-most-likely-hurt-makersless-complex-parts-experts (last visited Jan. 21, 2017).
25. Id.
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investment in the United States.26 As a result of the United States auto industry's
integration into the global value chain, protectionist moves by the United States
would be counter-productive by resulting in the loss of foreign investment and
high-skilled and high-paying auto industry jobs in the United States.2 7
China, a TPP non-party, Japan, and the United States, as TPP parties, all have
significant ties to the automotive industry. 28 A key question is what effect TPP will
have on the automotive industry of the three countries. The table below shows the
importance of total worldwide exports of cars and car parts for China, Japan, and
the United States as far as the top thirty export industries for those countries. 29 For
Japan and the United States, the car and car parts industries were among the top
thirty exporting industries, while only the car parts industry was among the top
thirty exporting industries for China. 30 When comparing exports to imports, one
sees that the exports and imports of car parts for China was nearly equal; 31 for
Japan, car exports were approximately nine times imports, and exports of car parts
were approximately five times imports; 32 for the United States, car exports were a
little more than one-third the amount of imports and car part exports were
approximately four-fifth of imports.3 3

26. Id.
27. Id. at 1-2.
28. ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEGLECTING MANUFACTURING; COMPARED
WITH OTHER NATIONS, U.S. HAS MORE IMPORT COMPETITION IN LEADING EXPORT INDUSTRIES 8, 10,

14 (2015), http://www.epi.org/files/pdf/83495.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id
3 1. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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Trade in cars and motor vehicle parts ranked by value of exports, 2013
(billions of dollars) 34
Country

Rank
of
export
8 of
30

HS
code

Description

export
s

imports

8708

Parts and
accessories for
motor vehicles

$25.5

Japan

1 of
30

8703

cars

Japan

3 of
30

8708

United
States

3 of
30

United
States

4 of
30

China

Import
ratio

$24.2

trade
balan
cc
$1.4

$91.7

$10.6

$81.1

11.6%

Parts and
accessories for
motor vehicles

$35.3

$7.1

$28.8

20.2%

8703

cars

$57.1

$155.7

$98.6

272.5%

8708

Parts and
accessories for
motor vehicles

$42.9

$58.9

$15.9

137.1%

94.7%

The TPP Rules of Origin for autos recognize 3 5 that the automotive industry is
critical for the economies of a number of the parties to the TPP as well as being
critical for non-members. One indication of the criticality of the trade in cars and
car parts is the convoluted nature of the extremely lengthy rules of origin for autos
with all their bewildering cross-references that were heavily debated; 36 another
indication of the critical nature of the auto industry to the economies of several
TPP countries is that the TPP provisions concerning autos were reportedly some of

34. SCoTr, supra note 28, at 8-15.
35. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art. 8.
36. See MARK Wu, TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP ROUNDTABLE ON AUTO MANUFACTURING
SUPPLY CHAIN, PREPARED REMARKS BEFORE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE - COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS, CONVENED BY DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS (January 11, 2016), available at
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/
Wu%20-%20TPP%20Roundtable%20on%20Autos%20-%2OJan%202016.pdf;
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON WAYS & MEANS MINORITY STAFF REPORT 114TH CONGRESS, TPP
ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE IN THE AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURING SUPPLY CHAIN (Jan. 8, 2016),
available
at
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/T
PP%20Issue%20Analysis%20-%2OAutos.pdf [hereinafter TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE]; Reid
Whitten, The Trans Pacific Partnershipand the Auto Industry: Will Six Thousand Pages Pave the Way
for
Increased
Exports?,
GLOBAL
TRADE
LAW
BLOG
(Nov.
12,
2015),
http://www.globaltradelawblog.com/2015/11/12/the-trans-pacific-partnership-and-the-auto-industrywill-six-thousand-pages-pave-the-way-for-increased-exports/.
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the latest agreed upon in the negotiations.
The reason to implement TPP is in part due to its projected economic benefits.
Economists have long thought that integration of the markets of countries with
differences in labor costs, productivity, capital, and natural resources will result in
greater efficiency and growth;3 8 global value chains account for eighty percent of
international trade. 39 United States multi-national enterprises, such as automakers
and auto part suppliers use global supply chains to reduce labor costs, increase
productivity, and expand their shares of the global market. 40 TPP should produce
aggregate economic gains because of the wide variances in labor, capital, and
natural resources among the parties to TPP. 41 Another benefit of a regional trade
agreement may be in reducing non-tariff barriers. 42 The reality is that the welfare
of sensitive sectors of the United States economy, such as the auto industry, must
be balanced against an economically-sound trade system favored by most
43
economists.
B.

The PoliticalDimension

The political dimension is critical because it involves spending political
capital. A trade agreement involves giving up some sovereignty and the question is
to what extent. Each country must provide bargaining chips that can be used to
entice a needed concession from another signatory. A trade agreement can lock-in
domestic reforms; because it operates over the long term, it can provide stability
over many changes in government administration. A trade agreement can provide
shelter to a new government administration against pressure to change a domestic
reform made by a prior government administration; at the same time, a foreign
45
direct investor expects predictability based on the trade agreement.
After the United States becomes a signatory to a trade agreement, it must be
46
ratified by Congress to make it become part of the country's domestic law. The
United States is typically a standard-setter because of its large market share and the
recognition by other signatories that the trade agreement cannot become effective

37. TPP Rule of Origin is 45% for Vehicles, With Caveats; 35-45% for Auto Parts, INSIDE U.S.
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.bilaterals.org/?tpp-rule-of-origin-is-45-for [hereinafter TPP RULE OF

TRADE

ORIGIN is 45%].

38. David H. Autor, et al., The China Shock: Learningfrom Labor Market Adjustment to Large
Changes in Trade (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 21906, 2016),
http://www.ddom.net/papers/Autor-Dom-Hanson-ChinaShock.pdf.
39. Moran & Oldenski, supranote 21.
40. Id.
41.

CERDEIRO, supra note 17, at 8-10.

42. Id. at 10.
43. Id. at 12.
44. John Whalley,

Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE
63, 71 (Jeffrey A. Frankel, ed. 1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c7820.pdf.
45. Id
46. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-PacificPartnership:New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep's
Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27, 44 (2011).
Why

REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY
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without Congressional ratification. 7 A trade agreement is an opportunity with
advantages and disadvantages, but not ratifying can have advantages and
disadvantages as well. For ratification, the overall benefits of the trade agreement
must outweigh the constraints that the trade agreement imposes.
Entering into a trade agreement can involve a political cost. Ratification of a
trade agreement may involve a dominant industry championing the trade
agreement; a dominant industry being convinced not to oppose the trade
agreement; a government leader willing to place political capital at risk; or a
combination. For United States elections, the candidate typically uses rhetoric that
appeals to the ordinary citizen rather than to big business. 4 8 However, once elected,
government officials must keep businesses in mind when implementing policy to
keep the economy thriving; in other words, trade policy usually follows the money
trail. 49 Each member of Congress constantly monitors the member's voter base to
gauge whether the member's constituents are favorably or unfavorably inclined
toward a trade agreement scheduled to come up for a vote in Congress. 50
Politicians are extremely susceptible to pressure from constituents and interest
5

'

groups.
A trade agreement like the TPP stirs up politics in the United States because
of the domestic consequences it can have in restructuring the distribution chain in
the various manufacturing sectors, not the least being the auto industry. 52 An
interesting factor that plays into this is the openness of a country's economy.
Generally, a country has a more closed economy if its exports significantly exceed
its imports.53 China is considered a closed economy, as is Japan, although not to
the degree of China. 54 In contrast, the United States has an open economy, with its
imports exceeding exports in its top thirty export industries, thus leading to a trade
deficit.5 5 The trade deficit of the United States becomes a matter for political
discussion when the voter feels that domestic production is receiving "unfair"
competition from foreign imports and the United States is not exporting more
because of trade barriers erected by the same countries from which the United
47. Id. at 39.
48. New Survey Shows Majority Of Clinton Supporters Favor TPP, INSIDER TRADE (2016),
http://insidetrade.com/trade/new-survey-shows-majority-clinton-supporters-favor-tpp. For example, at
one campaign stop Hillary Clinton declared: "My message to every worker in Michigan and across
America is this. I will stop any trade deal that kills jobs or holds down wages, including the TransPacific Partnership." Id.
49. The Benefits of International Trade, THE U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
https://www.uschamber.com/intemational/intemational-policy/benefits-intemational-trade-0
(last visit
Dec. 5, 2016).
50. BRT: Anti-Trade Campaign Rhetoric Impacts Congressional Support For TPP, INSIDER
TRADE
(2016),
http://insidetrade.com/daily-news/brt-anti-trade-campaign-rhetoric-impactscongressional-support-tpp.
51.

52.
(Sep. 30,
53.
54.
55.

See generally INTN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3

Robert Scott, Trading Away the Manufacturing Advantage, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE
2013) http://www.epi.org/publication/trading-manufacturing-advantage-china-trade/.
ScOrr, supranote 28.
Id.
Id. at 3.
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56
States is receiving a high volume of imports. One economist opines that the trade

deficit in the United States "is a consequence of its toleration of massive currency
manipulation over many years by China, Japan, and about 20 other countries, the
failure to eliminate widespread tariff and nontariff barriers to U.S. exports, and the
57
failure to develop effective strategies for rebuilding U.S. manufacturing."
United States national politics is always woven through the fabric of a trade
agreement in that a politician is conscious of how constituents in the politician's
district will react to the trade provisions that have an impact on the district. A
danger in the United States is that the average voter is not particularly wellinformed about international trade agreements and most of the information that the
58
average voter does have is from the sound-bytes captured by the news media.
These sound-bytes tend to oversimplify the potential effects of an international
trade agreement and characterize the agreement in positive or negative terms. One
simplification derived from the media is that, for the United States, domestic
production and export of United States-manufactured goods provides a benefit to
the country;59 another simplification from the media is that it is detrimental to the
United States' economy to import goods that compete with domestically-produced
goods, and United States multi-national enterprises that base a portion of their
production outside the United States are depriving the United States of needed
employment opportunities.60
A voter's task in understanding an international trade agreement is an onerous
one. TPP is no exception to this generalization. TPP is a massive document of
more than 600 pages, not including annexes, appendixes, and side letters, and its
effect is wide in its coverage of various subject matters.6 While trade liberalism
should result in gains, one might be a little cautious when analyzing the potential
effects of the new rules of origin for autos; the ex post effects are dependent on the
varying economic strengths of the various TPP signatories and the ability of auto
and auto component producers to utilize the extremely complicated rules of
origin.62
Members of Congress have available to them research services and can hear
from experts so that they can be advised on the effect of an international trade
agreement. Given that members of Congress are politicians, it is not unheard of
56.

Douglas Irwin, InternationalTrade Agreements, THE LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS & LIBERTY,

http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/IntemationalTradeAgreements.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2016).
57. Id.
58.

Michael Tomz, DEMOCRATIC DEFAULT: DOMESTIC AUDIENCES AND COMPLIANCE WITH

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Assoc. (Aug. 29Sept. 1 2002),
4-5 (unpublished), available at https://web.stanford.edu/-tomz/working/apsa02.pdf.
OF
COMMERCE,
CHAMBER
of International Trade, U.S.
Benefits
59. The
(last
https://www.uschamber.com/international/intemational-policy/benefits-international-trade-0
visited Nov. 16, 2016).
60. Moran & Oldenski, supranote 21.
61. See generally Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.
62. See generally TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE supra note 36.
63. See, e.g., WU, supranote 36; TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE supra note 36.
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them to place their own interpretations on the potential effects of a trade
agreement. 4 Thus, what the voters hear may be an extremely partisan assessment
of a trade agreement, perhaps distorted in certain respects.
The United States has long reflected a protectionist stance towards the auto
industry.6 5 The United States' auto industry is a powerful political force in the
country for a number of reasons. The auto industry employs a great number of
people and makes a significant contribution to the economy,6 the auto unions have
been active in politics,6 7 and the car produced by a Detroit carmaker has an iconic
place in the culture of the country.68 However, there is a risk in listening too
closely to those pressing protectionism in light of the participation of the auto
industry in the global value chain.69
C.

The InstitutionalDimension

The third dimension is institutional. The institutional dimension has to do
with the ability of institutions to interpret and apply the provisions of the trade
agreement. 0 Customs authorities may have almost as much difficulty in
interpreting the rules of origin as the businesses wishing to utilize the rules because
customs and business are on a par in receiving sparse legislative guidance. 71 Given
that, the customs authorities may often have to make country of origin
determinations on a case-by-case basis. This interpretation may or may not
coincide with the nation's trade policies or objectives, as political motivations for
trade may vary over time. The businesses affected may claim the country of origin
determinations are subjective and conflict with other determinations, thus offering
scant guidance or predictability. Product processing and assembly methods may
differ from country to country and that may lead customs authorities to assume that
a product was produced by the methods employed by the domestic industry rather
than the methods under which the product was in reality produced.7 2

64. Open argument: The case for free trade is overwhelming. But the losers need more help,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21695879-case-free-trade-

overwhelming-losers-need-more-help-openargument?cidl=cust/ednew/n/bl/n/20160331n/owned/n/n/nwl/n/n/AP/n;
Trade, at what price?:
America 's economy benefits hugely from trade. But its costs have been amplified by policy failures,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21695855-americas-

economy-benefits-hugely-trade-its-costs-have-been-amplified-policy;

Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, The

Questionable Rationale behind Washington's Antitrade Rhetoric, PETERSON
ECONOMICS

INST. FOR INT'L

65. Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 5349 (1995).
66.

SCOTT, supranote 28.

67.

The Political Economy of American Trade Policy 163-66 (Anne 0. Krueger, ed., 1996),

http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8705.pdf.
68. Klier, supranote 10, at 2.

69. See Whalley, supra note 44, at 71.
70. ANNE VAN DE HEETKAMP & RUUD TUSVELD, ORIGIN MANAGEMENT: RULES OF ORIGIN IN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS v-vi (2011).

71. Id. at 122-24.
72.

118.

Importing authorities may visit an exporter's factory to ascertain the production method. Id. at
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Tariffs can be a barrier to international trade. 73 One of the reasons that a TPP
party enters into the trade agreement is the hope that a manufacturer in the country
may be able to take advantage of a lower tariff on the manufacturer's product that
is imported into the country of another TPP member. 74 In other words, trade among
the TPP partners is liberalized by lowering tariffs.75 The regional and global supply
chains are the backbone of today's auto industry.7 6 East Asia is notable in its
development of regional supply chains, a number of which are important to the
auto industry.
An auto is an extremely complex machine often comprised of components
sourced from around the world and firms within the auto industry are located
internationally.7 8 The international auto industry involves both market-seeking
investment and efficiency-seeking investment. 79 Promotion of efficiency-seeking
investment is one of the motivations for entering into a mega-regional trade
agreement.80 The auto, once assembled, is heavy and delicate.8 1 For that reason,
assembly plants are typically located in proximity to large markets with purchasing
power.82 Auto components are lighter and more easily transported than the cars
they comprise.8 3 Auto components suppliers have to keep in mind sequencing of
auto production and be located where they can smoothly fit into the sequence. At
the same time, lower cost inputs may contribute to profitability. Many suppliers
located where they can be more efficient by taking advantage of lower labor and
manufacturing costs.

84

International sourcing of auto components necessarily means cross-border
trade.8 5 The risks associated with trade time delay are often more crucial than trade
costs. 86 Trade patterns may influence countries entering into international trade

73.

John Manzella,

The Impact of Trade Barriers, THE MANZELLA REPORT (Jul.

http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/trade-finance/378-the-impact-of-trade-barriers
Jan. 21, 2016).
74.

1, 2016)

(last visited

1NT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3.

75. Id.
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agreements to safeguard existing supply chains. With lean manufacturing,8 7
certainty of receiving auto components in a timely fashion is extremely important
to an auto manufacturer's profitability.88 In addition, international trade agreements
may cause the auto manufacturer to organize its supply chain across the countries
of the trade agreement. Price elasticity means that a small change in price can have
a big effect on demand and may influence a shift in the composition of the supply
chain.
A trade agreement may influence an auto manufacturer to shift part of its
supply chain from countries outside the trade agreement to countries that are
parties to the trade agreement. 90 A trade agreement can be viewed as a bargaining
device that gives smaller economies the potential of greater participation in global
value chains. Thus, a trade agreement may directly effect a movement in
production and investment. 9' Factors important to the auto industry include
predictability and certainty of market access to countries in which a portion of the
value chain is located. 9 2 Rules of origin for autos and auto components is an
important factor in an auto manufacturer developing supply chains as it permits
export and import of autos and auto components at low or zero tariff. 9
Utilization of a rule of origin is a multi-step process that tends to be
inefficient. 94 A high percentage of preferences go unused because either business
people are unaware that they could benefit or the costs of compliance are too high
in comparison with the potential savings.95 The first step is determining whether a
product qualifies under a trade agreement by assigning a country of origin. 96 The
next step is sustaining the importer's claim that the product meets the rule of
origin.9 7 This step involves the supplier to the manufacturing exporter, the
manufacturing exporter, the importer, and the exporting and importing
authorities.98 There is usually involvement of customs brokers, vendors of trade
documentation software, industry associations, and attorneys. 99 The potential final
step is the one in which an importing authority may perform an audit of the claim
87. Japan pioneered the lean manufacturing production system. The basic elements of this system
are "production quality, speedy response to market conditions, low levels of inventory, and frequent
deliveries of parts." Klier, supra note 86.
88. Id.
89. McKINSEY & COMPANY, THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIER
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that a particular product meets the applicable rule of origin. ' The company's
documentation trail must be sufficient to withstand the audit. 01
The company may feel the consequence of failing an audit, including delay
and added scrutiny of its imports. The most minor consequence is being forced to
pay the difference between the disallowed preferential tariff and the nonpreferential tariff.' 02 Civil penalties may be assessed by customs for noncompliance' 0 3 and may be retroactive, possibly covering a number of years of noncompliance.'0 For a large automobile company, the penalty can be millions of
dollars.
II.

05

THE AUTO INDUSTRY

Currently, multi-national carmakers world-wide compete in the automotive
market. The auto and auto parts industries are integrating themselves into a global
value chain and are some of the industries with the most participation in
international production. 1'0 What has become an international production network
began in the early years with a carmaker, perhaps with a headquarters located in a
"home country," positioning a fragment of the production process in a country
with low labor costs or close proximity and ability to complete certain auto
parts.107 For example, a close relationship between the Detroit, Michigan and
Ontario, Canada car industries was a natural development given the much shorter
distance between southeastern Michigan and Canada than between Detroit and
08
southern states engaged in the car industry, such as Kentucky and Tennessee.
The finished component was shipped back to the home country for further
incorporation into the auto or auto component.1 09 Gradually, the cross-border flow

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 114.

104.
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increased until the production process for the finished vehicle entailed multiple
border crossing." 0 Another gradual change was that the auto components produced
abroad became more sophisticated."'
The global value chain seems to have benefits for all concerned. Countries
with skilled but lower-cost labor benefit from increased employment prospects for
the country.1 1 2 Countries with higher labor costs, often where carmaker
headquarters are located, can outsource auto components to the lower-cost country,
can produce the finished vehicle at a lower cost and can realize higher profit." 3
Consumers benefit by being able to purchase the finished vehicle at a lower price
than possible were the production network limited to a single country. 114
A.

Modern History of the United States Auto Industry

During the first half of the twentieth century, United States automakers
dominated the United States auto industry. "5 From the mid-1950s to 2008, the
tables turned and the United States automakers lost more than forty percent of the
United States market." 6 In the middle of the twentieth century, foreign carmakers
began to introduce smaller cars into the United States.' 17 United States carmakers
could not compete in price because the cost for a United States carmaker of
producing a small car was not lower than that of producing a large car; this
similarity in production cost would have resulted in a smaller profit on the sale of a
small car versus a large car." 8 United States drivers could indulge their taste for
large cars for a while longer because of wider roads, longer driving distances, less
expensive gasoline, and more disposable income.1 9 Those drivers who preferred
smaller cars, such as the Volkswagen Beetle, could buy imports. In the 1970s,
small cars became much more popular because of the two oil crises that the nation
weathered.1 2 0 Congress mandated corporate average fuel economy standards in
1976, with fuel economy standards distorting the car market.'21 Foreign small cars
sold well because of their greater fuel efficiency, competitive pricing, and
perceived quality advantage.1 22 It took until the late 1970s for United States
carmakers to build smaller cars in the United States.' 23
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The United States auto industry wields considerable political power because
the auto industry is a major contributor to the United States economy. With the two
24
gas crises of the 1970s, Japan secured a foothold in the United States market.1
The substitution of imported cars for domestic cars was met with a political
backlash in the United States to rein in car imports.125 As a result of political
pressure and at the request of the United States, Japan implemented a voluntary
export restraint on Japanese cars imported into the United States in May of
1981 .126 Japan's voluntary export restraint did not lessen the demand from the
United States consumer for Japanese cars. To meet this demand, Japanese car
companies established assembly plants in the United States. 127 Within four years
after the voluntary export restraint, Honda had established itself in Marysville,
Ohio and Nissan had begun operations in Tennessee.128 Other Japanese carmakers,
129
including Toyota, Mazda, and Mitsubishi, followed suit.
Japanese carmakers producing cars in the United States had to find suppliers
of auto parts used in car manufacture.1 30 Traditionally, Japanese carmakers
developed long-term and cooperative relationships with their parts suppliers and
were loath to discontinue that relationship and switch to an alternative parts
supplier.'"' For that reason, Japanese carmakers with assembly plants located in the
United States did not immediately begin sourcing parts from United States
companies.1 32 Besides establishing assembly plants, Japanese carmakers began to
use foreign direct investment to develop parts suppliers within the United States. ''3
Japanese carmakers had developed 280 parts suppliers in the United States by
34
1993, with half solely owned by Japanese carmakers and half joint ventures.1
Until the 1990's, the United States auto industry was heavily vertically
integrated.1 35 The industry produced many auto parts in-house; parts manufacturers
in the United States and abroad produced parts not manufactured in-house.'3 The
United States automakers developed detailed specifications on parts and put parts

THE INFLUENCES
ADVANTAGE

OF TECHNOLOGY

IN DETERMINING

a-study.
124. Klier, supra note 86.
125. Sturgeon & Van Biesebroeck, supra note 12.
126. See generally JAMES LEVINSOHN, CARWARS:
FRICTIONS

INTERNATIONAL

INDUSTRIAL

COMPETITIVE

3 (1982), http://www.nap.edu/catalog/291/the-competitive-status-of-the-us-auto-industry-

IN

THE

AUTOMOBILE

AND

TRYING TO MAKE SENSE OF U.S -JAPAN TRADE

AUTOMOBILE

PARTS

MARKETS

(1997),

available at

http://www.nber.org/chapters/c0307.pdf [hereinafter LEVINSOHN].

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at l3-14.

132. Factors that encouraged Japanese carmakers to make the switch included a favorable
exchange rate for United States produced parts, political pressure from the United States and the threat

of domestic content legislation. Id. at 17.
133. Id.atl7.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 13.
136. Id..

2017

CLUB GOODS AND REGULATORY OPPORTUNISM

173

out for bid, hoping to obtain the lowest possible price.' 37 The problems with this
procedure were multifold: the relationship between the part supplier and the
automaker was not a close and cooperative one; the bidding process often did not
result in parts known for their quality; and the bidding process did not encourage
much research and development or capital investment by the part supplier.' 3 8 For
those parts supplied from abroad, an automaker would purchase sufficient
quantities so that production was not impaired by a shipping delay.' 3 9
In the mid-1980s, the automakers began to source out more parts, rather than
produce them in house.1 4 0 That trend continued until, in the late 1990's, GM and
Ford spun off the parts divisions of their firms to create Delphi and Visteon.141
Because the two automakers had a global presence, the two new part supplier
companies also already had a global presence.1 42
B. The North American Auto Industry Today
A consumer restricting certain purchases to those products made in America
may do so because of a sense of patriotism, a desire to preserve jobs in the United
States, or a belief in the quality of the product. 143 Whether a car is "made in
America" is not as easy to discern as it once was when the car components were
produced and the car was assembled in the United States by a carmaker
headquartered in the United States.144 A United States auto consumer may obtain
some information on the origin of a new car being purchased by reviewing the
sticker that United States law requires be attached to the outside of the car.
Another indication of the origin of imported new cars and parts is the importer's
use of a rule of origin to obtain a lower preferential tariff.1 46 Rules of origin for
autos are introduced and reviewed in the following part of this article.
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North America hosts seventy assembly plants, with the plants concentrated in
a north-south swath, nicknamed "auto alley," primarily from Michigan through
Alabama.' 47 From the north end of auto alley, the auto production concentration
extends from Michigan into Ontario, Canada and there is a concentration of
production in central Mexico.1 48 Besides vehicle assembly plants, there are several
thousand plants worldwide that produce the approximately 15,000 parts that
49
become part of a vehicle.1
150 The
Investment in the auto industry is capital and skills intensive.
automotive industry is facing a number of pressures, including increasingly
stringent fuel standards, price increases on materials such as steel, rubber, and
plastic, increased labor costs, and the possibility of newly-mandated safety
features. 5 ' Price elasticity is the responsiveness of the amount of a product
demanded to the change in the price of the product. In other words, a small change
in price may make a large difference in demand for a product, with a lower price
5 2
Price
significantly increasing demand and a higher price decreasing demand.
a
product
for
components
elasticity often is a factor in a manufacturer sourcing
because the manufacturer is often seeking the least expensive cost for a
component, yet not at the sacrifice of quality.' 5 The auto industry has price
54
A
elasticity such that a change in car price can have an impact on sales.
lower-cost
a
new
finds
the
carmaker
carmaker has a potential bump in sales if
supplier and passes the cost saving along to the consumer. 1s Price elasticity may
56
lead to a manufacturer reshuffling its auto component suppliers.'
Lower labor costs, which are dependent on lower wages or benefits or less
rigid work rules, have influenced investment to shift towards the southern United
57
Auto
States, historically not an auto union stronghold, and towards Mexico.'
alley, together with its Canada extension, host approximately seventy-three percent
of North America's auto assembly and sixty-two percent of its parts supplier
plants.' 58 Mexico, the other area with a concentration of auto manufacturing, hosts
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nineteen percent of vehicle assembly plants and twenty percent of parts supplier
plants. 159
Because of the weight, size, and fragility of a finished vehicle as well as the
capital tied up in it, automakers tend to locate assembly plants close to end
markets.1 60 The location of auto alley facilitates a finished car reaching a dealer
showroom in a timely fashion. Within a one-day drive in the United States, a truck
can transport a finished vehicle from an assembly plant in auto alley as far as to
New York, in the far northeast extreme, or to Texas, in the far southwest
extreme.161
The auto parts industry is stratified into vertically arranged tiers.' 62 This
vertical structure places automakers at the top, first-tier suppliers below the
automakers, second-tier suppliers below first-tier suppliers, and third-tier suppliers
below second-tier suppliers.' 63 First-tier part suppliers supply the automakers,
second-tier parts suppliers supply first-tier parts suppliers, and third-tier parts
suppliers supply second-tier parts suppliers.1 64 The parts industry is extremely
dynamic and constantly subject to quick change because of competition among the
parts suppliers and the innovation knowledge that diffuses among the automaker
and parts suppliers.' 65
First-tier part suppliers produce specialized units.'1 Specialized units include
transmissions, engines, cockpit assemblies, and rolling chassis, which are also
heavy and bulky.' 67 To cut transportation costs and ensure timely delivery,
suppliers of specialized parts typically are clustered near auto assembly plants.1 68
As high as three-quarters of the specialized parts suppliers are located within a
one-day drive of an auto assembly plant.' 6 9 Some specialized parts suppliers,
including those who contribute seats, stamping, and trim, are located within an
hour drive.170
Second-tier and third-tier part suppliers produce sub-units and parts.' 7 ' More
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72
generic parts, such as tires, batteries, and harnesses, are lighter.' A supplier of
this type of part can provide product to multiple automakers because a single
73
standardized part may function in vehicles of a number of different automakers.1
Suppliers of those more standardized parts can be located at more distant locations
74
to take advantage of lower labor costs and economies of scale.'

The relationship between the automakers and first tier suppliers, on one hand,
and down-stream suppliers of more standardized parts, on the other hand, is
distinct. Automakers have an ongoing relationship with their first-tier suppliers
that produce specialized parts and have to coordinate their activities closely with
the automakers.' 7 5 Specialized parts suppliers may be larger firms with more of a
76
global presence in that they have subsidiaries located around the world.' Lowertier suppliers of more generic parts generally do not have as close a relationship
with the automakers; in addition, they may be smaller firms, and their presence
77
Because of these factors, lower-tier
may be more local or regional than global.
out for suppliers who can
switched
suppliers may be more vulnerable to being
cost.1
a
lower
at
parts
supply the generic
The Detroit Three carmakers continue to be important in politics, with
79
politicians paying much more attention to the automakers than to their suppliers.1
This bargaining power of the automakers means that they can force domestic parts
80
suppliers to compete against foreign parts suppliers.' A lower-tier parts supplier
is especially fearful of being switched out for a foreign parts supplier that can offer
the same quality parts at a lower price.
C. The Relationship of Canadaand Mexico to the United States Auto Industry
NAFTA has encouraged Canada and Mexico to play a significant role in the
82
Canada produced 12.6 percent of North
North American auto industry.1
(including light trucks) in the first three
manufacturing
American light vehicle
percent in 2007, and in the first three
seventeen
from
quarters of 2015, reduced
of North American light vehicle
19.5
percent
produced
quarters of 2015, Mexico
84
83
in that their participation in
similar
are
and
Mexico
Canada'
manufacturing.'
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the auto manufacturing process has been dependent on foreign firms locating
operations in Canada and Mexico.' 8 5
The United States and Canada have run an integrated auto production
operation since the 1960s.' 86 The operation was centered in the Great Lakes region
and included Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Ontario, and Wisconsin.'1 7 Auto
production coordination began in 1965 when the United States and Canada signed
the Automotive Products Trade Agreement, commonly referred to as the "Auto
Pact."'88 Since then, Canada has run a negative trade balance with the United
States on auto parts and a positive trade balance with the United States on finished
vehicle.1 89 Those trade balances are an indication that many auto parts were
imported into Canada from the United States, primarily and, from those imported
parts, Canada produced many cars of a limited number of models, a substantial
portion of which were exported to the United States.' 9 0
The health of the Canadian auto industry has been variable from 1990 to the
present. The 1990s was a good decade for the Canadian auto industry, with the
peak in 1999.'9' From 2000 to 2007, there was a decline in Canada in new vehicle
production, which hit bottom in 2009 with the economic crisis.192 Canadian new
vehicle production started to pick up after the crisis but then began to decline again
because of loss of production facilities to the United States and Mexico and the
loss of a Canadian vehicle assembly plant.' 9 3 The year 2008 was significant for the
Canadian auto industry because Canadian auto production fell back to the level of
1987 at fourteen percent of North American production.1 94 In that same year, the
percentage of Mexican auto production in North America, at twenty percent, first
exceeded that of Canada.' 95
Statisticians monitoring Canadian auto and auto parts industries keep close
watch on Canada's balance of trade with its trading partners. Since 2009, the
Canadian positive automotive balance of trade within North America has declined,
mostly due to Mexican autos and auto parts being imported into Canada.19 6
Canada's largest trading partners in autos and auto parts other than in North
America are the European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea.1 97 As far as both
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autos and auto parts are concerned, Canada runs a negative trade balance with each
of these four trading partners.198 Between 1998 and 2008, Canada's negative trade
balance in finished vehicles was impacted heavily by Japanese imports and later by
imported finished vehicles from the European Union and South Korea.' 99 Since
2004, Canada's negative trade balance in auto parts has been negatively impacted
by an increase in auto parts imports from Korea and a sharp increase in auto parts
imports from China. 2 00 Significantly, Canada's negative automotive trade balance
with countries outside of NAFTA was greater in 2013 and 2014 than Canada's
positive trade balance with the United States. 201
Early on, the Mexican auto industry was an import substitution industry.202 In
1962, Mexico adopted a protectionist auto policy that had a significant impact on
the country. 203 The 1962 policy:
1) banned imports of auto engines and certain other auto parts;
2) banned imports of completed autos;
3) mandated that sixty percent of the auto parts used in autos
manufactured in Mexico be of domestic origin; and
4) mandated that auto parts suppliers have at least sixty percent
Mexican ownership.204

The objective of the 1962 policy was to attract the auto industry to Mexico to
sell vehicles to the growing Mexican market. 205 By the mid-1960s, VW and Nissan
had established a presence in Aguascalientes and Puebla, both located in proximity
206
to Mexico City.

The Mexican auto industry saw further changes in the 1980's and 1990's. In
the 1980's, GM and Ford located plants in northern Mexico to produce autos
destined for the United States.2 07 NAFTA made a substantial change in the
208
With
Mexican auto industry because Mexico loosened its prior restrictions.
NAFTA, the twenty percent import duty that Mexico charged on light vehicles was
9
reduced to zero over ten years for Canadian and United States imports.20 The
minimum content of Mexican content for Mexican-produced cars was reduced
0
from between thirty-four and thirty-six percent to zero over ten years. 2' After
2004, 62.5% of the content had to be from a NAFTA country for duty-free export

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 6.
Id
Id.
Id. at 7.
HOsHINO, supra note 122, at 5.
Klier & Rubenstein, supra note 108, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 2.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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from Mexico to another NAFTA country. 211
Prior to NAFTA, the Mexican auto industry had begun to transition from an
import substitution industry to an export industry.2 1 2 Five automakers, Chrysler,
Ford, GM, Nissan, and VW, had already established a presence in Mexico. 2 13
Those five automakers had a head start when NAFTA took effect and encountered
lower barriers to taking advantages to the NAFTA provisions concerning autos. 2 14
Subsequently, Honda and Toyota established a production presence in Mexico.
Mazda and Audi have either established a presence in Mexico or announced plans
21
to do so.215 Lower labor cost encourages certain auto industry production in
216
Mexico.
For example, Mexico can still make a profit, albeit slim, on subcompact cars and compact cars, and is attractive to manufacture that is labor
217
intensive.
Mexico's auto industry is primarily an export market. 2 1 8 In 2012, Mexico
ranked fourth in the world in auto exports behind Germany, Japan, and South
Korea. 21 9 There are several factors in Mexico's favor.220 Lower labor costs make
Mexico an attractive location;221 fairly low shipping costs make exports of cars
from plants located in northern Mexico to the United States feasible; 222 location of
auto plants near the Pacific Ocean facilitates export of Mexican-manufactured cars
to Asia;223 and Mexico has signed free trade agreements with over forty countries,
including those with the European Union and Japan. 224
III.

RULES OF ORIGIN FOR AUTOS

Application of the TPP rules of origin determines the derivation country of a
product, such as an auto or an auto component, and the TPP rules of origin are
designed to confine the benefit of the reduced preferential tariff under TPP to those
autos and auto components manufactured and whose input is from the TPP
225
parties.
Under TPP, the tariff is generally reduced for autos and auto
components exported into one of the TPP countries so long as the exporter meets
the requirements of TPP rules of origin and the importer has the appropriate
supportive documentation. 226 The purpose of the rules of origin is to limit the

211. Id.
212. HOSHINO, supra note 122, at 5.

213.
214.
215.
216.

Klier & Rubenstein, supra note 108, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.

217.

HOLMES, supranote 186, at 4.

218.
219.
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221.
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benefits of a preferential trade agreement, like TPP, to the parties to the trade
agreement.
A. TariffReduction Schedules
Tariff reduction schedules are important in that they specify the time period
over which tariffs on autos and auto parts will be reduced and in what amounts.227
Neither tariff reduction schedules nor the present tariff rates are uniform among the
various TPP parties. 228 For the countries that already have a free trade agreement
with the United States, there would be a zero tariff on imports of United States cars
into those countries. 229 With certain countries, the tariff reductions extend over a
period of time and can be back loaded. For example, the tariff reduction period on
cars imported from Japan into the United States spans twenty five years and the
reduction begins in year fifteen.230 Brunei and New Zealand will reduce tariffs on
imports of United States cars over ten years, as will Malaysia and Vietnam for
certain tariff classifications.231 For Malaysia and Vietnam, the tariff on certain
tariff classifications will not be reduced until TPP has been in force for thirteen
232

years.
2 33
The tariff reduction schedule for some countries has received discussion.
234
which is
The tariff reduction schedule for chapter 87 of the harmonized system,
235
The lengthy and
the automotive chapter, is viewed in an overall positive light.
back-loaded nature of the tariff reduction schedule was welcomed by some
2 36
because of Japan's past unwillingness to open its auto industry to competition.
Some are disappointed that the full tariff reduction for Malaysia and Vietnam for
237
The
some of the most important tariff classifications extends over thirteen years.
United States automotive industry may see a decrease in exports to Canada when
Canada eliminates tariffs on Japanese cars in year six.238
239
and blatantly
Rules of origin are meant to rectify the "free-rider" problem

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 238-39, tbl.4.11.
Each TPP party's commitment to eliminate tariffs is specified on its Schedule to Annex 2-D.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 238.
Id. at 238-39, 239 tbl.4.11.
Id. at 238-39, 239 tbl.4.1 1.
Id. at 238-40, tbl.4.1 1, tbl.4.12.

233.
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PARTNERSHIP TRADE AGREEMENT 5 (2015), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/ITAC-2-AutomobileEquipment-and-Capital-Goods.pdf [hereinafter INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM.).
234. Trans-Pacific Partnership Annex 3-D, at 15765.
235.

INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 233, at 5.

236. Id.
237. Id.
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INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 232.

239. One reason for a country to become a party to TPP is to have autos and auto components
produced in the TPP-member country benefit from preferential tariff rates. An auto component supplier
located in a non-TPP country might still indirectly benefit, in other words become a free-rider, if the
component was incorporated into an auto that received a preferential tariff. See Chris Brummer,
Regional Integration and Incomplete Club Goods: A Trade Perspective, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 535, 536,
548-49 (2008).
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discriminate against other, non-TPP, countries benefitting from the lower tariffs
under TPP.240 For example, without the rules of origin, a non-TPP country could
try to free-ride on the lower TPP tariff and circumvent TPP by shipping a product
to a TPP country and, from there, shipping the same product to another TPP
country. For that reason, the rules of origin are extremely politically protectionist
and are reflective of the nationalist tendencies of the parties to the trade
agreement. 24 1
One might take Australia as an example. Australia receives a significant
volume of imported finished cars and complex parts from the United States and
Japan.2 4 2 To take advantage of the reduced preferential tariff offered by Australia
under TPP, the United States and Japan will have to be cognizant of and meet the
limits on non-originating components under TPP for those cars and car
components imported into Australia.2 4 3
B. Club Goods
In considering the rules of origin for autos under TPP, benefits of a regional
trade agreement could be considered club goods. 2 44 The idea of club goods is an
economic theory245 that views the members of the trade agreement like members of
a private club. Part of the attraction of the private club is that it is exclusive in that
members are admitted to the club based on certain preconditions and non-members
are discriminated against in not receiving the advantages available to club
members.2 46 Joining the club is enticing with the prospect of participating in new
opportunities. There is also fear of being excluded from the popular group if one
does not join.2 47
Central to the TPP are reciprocal trade concessions from the twelve TPP
parties in which each party lowers certain tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade in
exchange for concessions from other parties so as to open market access among the
parties. 2 4 8 The hope is that all parties will benefit, but the benefit varies from party
to party and from sector to sector. There are several club goods effects of TPP.
One club goods effect is that TPP parties obtain access to new markets at a lower
tariff rate than previously. 249 For example, Malaysia and Vietnam presently have
tariffs on auto components that can reach the high of seventy percent. 25 0 To tariff
"jump" or "hop" the high tariff, some multi-national companies in the automotive
240. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 238-39.
241. INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM., supranote 233, at 3-4, 6-7.
242. WU, supra note 36, at 1. In the past, Australia was an auto manufacturer. However, Ford,
Holden, and Toyota will be ceasing auto manufacturing in Australia. ECONOMICS REFERENCES
COMMITTEE, FUTURE OF AUSTRALIA'S AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY: INTERIM REPORT 57 (2015).

243. Wu, supranote 36, at 2-3.
244. Brummer, supranote 239, at 536-37.
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247.
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249.
250.

Id.
Id. at 540-41.
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Whalley, supranote 44, at 69-70.
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Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

182

VOL. 45:2

industry located production in those countries. 2 51 With a lower tariff under TPP,
those companies that are in the mode of consolidating their interests may rethink
whether they want to keep production there. 252 Another club goods effect is that
TPP parties can use cheaper auto parts from some TPP countries in the auto
manufacturing process.253 For example, a number of Japanese part suppliers rely
254
on cheaper inputs from Malaysia and Vietnam.
Sometimes the club members are unsuccessful in keeping club goods to
themselves and non-club members reap an indirect benefit when the benefits of the
club spillover to the benefit of non-members. A spillover effect in the auto industry
is where automakers or auto parts suppliers are able to incorporate parts from nonTPP countries, yet still comply with the rules of origin. 255 A firm would do this if
56
use of parts from non-TPP countries result in a cost savings for the firm.2
Whether a spillover effect is advantageous or not is dependent on a firm's
geographical location and the tier at which the firm is situated in the auto
industry.

257

C. Regulatory Opportunism
A country that is not a member of a trade agreement may attempt to take
advantage of club goods that spillover from the closed circle of parties to the trade
agreement. The action of a non-member taking what members of the trade
agreement likely view as an unfair advantage may be seen as opportunistic because
the trade agreement was established to restrict the benefit of club goods to the
member of the club.2 58 Parties to the trade agreement may view outsiders as
untrustworthy and trade agreement parties may fear that outsiders are acting out of
ulterior motives. 259 One of the goals of the regulations within a trade agreement is
to reduce opportunistic behavior. 260 The spillover effect may mean that a non-TPP
member is engaging in regulatory opportunism. However, regulatory restrictions,
such as rules of origin, are not fool-proof and regulatory opportunism may be a
product. The distrust held by TPP members may raise a perception that a nonmember is thus gaining an advantage that was not negotiated by the nonmember.

26 1

The countries most worrisome at this point in receiving spillover benefits
from TPP appear to be China and Thailand, but other countries in Asia could be of
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Wu, supra note 36, at 2-3.
258. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model 2 (Nat'I
Bureau of Econ. Research No. 18227, 2012).
259. Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18257; Id.
260. Beth V. Yarbrough & Robert M. Yarbrough, Economic Integration and Governance: The
Role of PreferentialTrade Agreements, 5 J. INT'L EcON. INTEGRATION No. 2, 1, 1 (1990).
261. Acemoglu & Wolitzky, supra note 258, at 1.
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concern in the future. China and Thailand are worrisome because they can produce
auto parts at a cost savings over other countries. 262 An example of the potential
spillover effect of the rules of origin is that Japan could use parts from non-TPP
countries, such as China and Thailand, in its manufacture of autos and auto parts,
yet still comply with the TPP rules of origin. Currently, China supplies the most
auto body parts, airbags, and miscellaneous auto parts to Japan as well as
supplying the most brakes and wheels to Japan and the United States. 263
Of course, use of Chinese and Thai parts is not limited to Japan and the
United States is not the only country concerned whether the lower mandated
percentages under the TPP rules of origin will result in a spillover effect. 2 64
Canadian auto parts producers located in Ontario, Canada that currently sell to the
Canadian or United States auto industries may be replaced by suppliers of lowercost imports from China and Thailand.265 On the other hand, Canadian automakers
could benefit by switching from higher cost Canadian parts to lower-cost Chinese
and Thai parts.2 6
D. SubstantialTransformation
Historically, the concept of "substantial transformation" 267 was the key in the
United States for determining whether a product originally from a foreign
jurisdiction has undergone a process domestically such that it could be considered
as originating domestically. 268 An understanding of the term helps one understand
some of the methods commonly used in various rule of origin schemes, including
TPP.269 When considering application of a preferential tariff under a preferential
trade agreement, one step in the process is to distinguish between an originating
and non-originating product by examining if the manufacturing process has
substantially transformed the non-originating input to the product. 270
The genesis of the transformation concept was dependent on two United
States Supreme Court cases. The first case, Hartranftv. Wiegmann,271 was decided
in 1887 and the second case, Anheuser-Busch Brewing Association v. United
States, 272 was decided in 1908. In Hartranft, the issue was whether a

262.

TPP ISSUE ANALYSIS: TRADE, supra note 36, at 18.

263. Matthew Schewel, TPP Auto ROO Most Likely To Hurt Makers Of Less Complex Parts:
Experts (2016), INSIDE TRADE, http://insidetrade.com/share/152178 (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
264. Noakes, supra note 183.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. The test to determine whether substantial transformation has taken place "is whether the good
has emerged from a given process with a 'distinctive name, character or use' in a particular state."
Joseph A. LaNasa III, Rules of Origin under the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Substantial
Transformation into Objectively Transparent Protectionism, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. No. 2, 381, 384
(1993) (quoting Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. UnitedStates, 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908)).
268. Id. at 384-85.
269. VAN DE HEETKAMP & TUSVELD, supra note 70, at 74-75.
270. Id.
271. Hartranftv. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 609-611 (1887).
272. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. US., 207 U.S. 556, 562 (1908).
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manufacturing operation had been performed on a product such that customs
273
The Court formulated the
authorities would impose a higher duty on the product.
idea that the product must be changed in character for customs to conclude that the
product had been manufactured.274 In this case, the Philadelphia customs district
had charged J. H. Wiegmann & Son a thirty-five percent ad valorem duty when the
firm imported shells into the United States from London on the basis that they fell
275
The firm's position was that no duty
into the category of manufactured shells.
276
The firm stated: "These
was owed because the shells were not manufactured.
shells have [simply] had the outer layer ground off so as to exhibit the beautiful
inner layer. That has been done by the application of a wheel, and afterwards by
polishing."2 7 7 The United States Supreme Court sided with Wiegmann, the
importer, and found that the shells did not fall into the category of manufactured
shells. 278 The Court stated: "They were still shells. They had not been
manufactured into a new and different article, having a distinctive name, character,
279
or use from that of a shell."
The United States Supreme Court relied on the reasoning of Hartranfit when
the Court used the word "transformation" in 1908 in Anheuser-Busch Brewing
Association v. United States.2 80 In that case, Anheuser-Busch had paid a duty when
28
it imported cork from Spain to use in bottling beer. 1 The beer bottled using the
corks originating from Spain was later exported and the case arose after the beer
was exported.2 8 2 The brewer wanted to use a "drawback" provision of customs
regulation that would have permitted the brewer to obtain a refund of the customs
28 3
The brewer's
duty paid when the cork was originally imported from Spain.
perfonned a
had
brewer
the
because
due
was
the
refund
that
argument was
process
bottling
in
the
it
for
use
prepare
cork
to
on
the
operation
manufacturing
and the cork was subsequently re-exported.2 84 For the time period, the potential
refund was the quite sizable amount of $10,995 USD paid on 73,299.78 pounds of
imported cork.285 The Court disagreed with the brewer and found that the brewer
was not due the refund because the cork had not undergone a manufacturing
operation as required under the customs regulation: "There must be transformation;
a new and different article must emerge, 'having a distinctive name, character, or
2 86
use.' This cannot be said of the corks in question."
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The substantial transformation rule has not necessarily been applied over the
years in a consistent, predictable, or coherent fashion, perhaps because of the
subjectivity necessarily inherent in the test. 287 One reason for including detailed
rules of origin in a preferential trade agreement is to make determination of
whether a product is originating or non-originating more consistent and to avoid
problems encountered in administering the rules of origin in prior trade
agreements. 2 88 Although detailed rules of origin may lead to more consistent
application, the rules of origin in recent preferential trade agreements have become
so complicated that their utilization may require teams of attorneys and
professionals trained in customs matters to interpret them. 289 Some of the
complication may come from the fact that individual provisions of the rules of
origin are the result of lobbying by some industry of a particular country to draw
intricate lines carving out benefits for itself There are some common principles
running through the rules of origin in the various preferential trade agreements; 290
however, there is not a match between the differing rules of origin schemes of the
many trade agreements.
E.

Basic Principleson Rules of Originfor Autos

Prior to delving into the complicated specifics of the TPP rules of origin, it
might be helpful to provide some principles common to rules of origin. Rules of
origin are designed to handle multi-country transactions in which various
components of a manufactured item and its assembly take place in different
locations around the globe. 291 A preferential trade agreement, like TPP,
distinguishes between "originating" goods, which come from a country within the
preferential trade agreement, and "non-originating" goods, which come from a
country outside the preferential trade agreement. 292 Even if material or a part is
non-originating because it was imported into a TPP country from a non-TPP
country, it could be deemed originating if it were substantially transformed in a
country within the preferential trade agreement.293
Rules of origin for autos are extremely complicated and the complication is
meant to draw fine lines to distinguish between originating and non-originating
goods so that TPP countries achieve the bargained-for protection for sensitive
industries. 294 Complying with the rules of origin is a huge expense for a company
and the company may have a whole staff to deal with the documentation from the
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https://www.donaldson.com/en/supplier/compliance/origin.pdf.
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289. Id. at 417-19.
290.
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295
TPP Articles 3.20 through 3.26 concern the certificate of
product components.
296
Article 3.27 concerns verification of the certificate of origin
origin requirements,
297
Articles 3.28 through 3.29
by the country into which the good is imported,
2 98
Article 3.30 concerns penalties, 299 and Article 3.31 concerns
concern claims,
confidentiality.30 0 The advantage of using the rules of origin can be sizable for a
big company such as an automaker. 3 01 A big company cumulating a very low drop
in cost for each of a high number of products can still find using the rules of origin
profitable because the cost saving in tariff exceeds the cost spent in utilizing the
rules of origin.302 For a big car company, the company can make good use of the
rules of origin for cost saving.
Some producers fail to use rules of origin even though their use would
303
As more fully
decrease the amount of tariff paid to have a product clear customs.
can be
agreement
of
a
trade
origin
rules
of
described below, implementing the
3
rules
of
utilization
The
quite complicated and require keeping detailed records.
higher
being
of
origin
the
rules
with
of origin is based on gains from complying
than the total of: a) costs of complying with the rules of origin; and b) the
305
reduction in tariffs.
Three principles provide the foundation for the multi-country rules of origin.
The three principles are:

1) tariff shift;
2) value percentage criteria; and
3) specified process.

306

These three principles are tools used to determine whether substantial
transformation has occurred.307
A good within a particular tariff classification may shift to fall into a different
tariff classification after undergoing processing or manufacture. The tariff shift
principle permits a good originating outside any TPP country to be considered
originating in a TPP country if the non-originating good was substantially
transformed in the TPP country. 308 The value percentage criteria is based on a

295. Kovatch, supra note 288, at 417-19.
296. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, arts. 3.20-3.27, Nov. 12,
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297. Id. ch. 3, art. 3.27.
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304. Id. at 417-18.
305. Id. at 417-19.
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306. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 236-37.
307. David Palmeter, THE WTO AS A LEGAL SYSTEM ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
AND POLICY, 154-55 (2003).
308. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 226.
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comparison between the domestic and foreign content of a good. 3 0 It requires that
the imported good either contain a minimum percentage of originating content or
that the imported good not exceed a maximum non-originating content. 310 The
specified process principle permits a good that was originally non-originating to be
considered originating if the non-originating good underwent a process in a TPP
country that substantially transformed it.311
Although use of one of the three principles would seem to provide clarity not
inherent in the determination of whether a substantial transformation has occurred,
none of the three principles is entirely foolproof in producing coherent results.3 12 In
addition, a particular rule of origin for a particular industry may combine the use of
two or more of the three principles described in this section.3 13
The use of a tariff shift is dependent on the intersection between the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, often referred to as the
Harmonized System, and the rules of origin of a particular trade agreement. 314 The
elaborate nature of the Harmonized System, more fully described in the following
section, might make one think that use of tariff shift provisions leads to consistent
and predictable results. 31 5 The purpose of the Harmonized System was to be able to
classify a wide range of imported products and generate import statistics; however,
the purpose of the Harmonized System was not to enable determination of when a
preferential tariff should be applied. 1 One problem is that different customs
authorities may classify different goods differently and thus assign different tariff
codes to the same good. 1 The tariff codes may not be sufficiently detailed for
some products in that substantial processing of a particular product may not result
in a tariff shift. This happens when a processed product continues to be classified
under the same tariff code as the inputs for the product.
There is another problem with the tariff shift principle. The rules of origin in a
trade agreement are typically negotiated with the purpose of protecting certain
sensitive industries.3 18 To do so may considerably lengthen the rules of origin
because the negotiators must include tariff shift schedules comprised of tables of
various tariff codes, often with reference to detailed exceptions.3 9 Deciphering the
effect of tariff shift schedules requires knowledge of the Harmonized System and
some experience working with it.
The value percentage criteria is not without its problems. Determining value
percentage requires an intensive accounting exercise, yet accounting methods are
309. David Palmeter, supra note 307.
310. Id. at 236-37.
311. Id.
312.

VAN DE HEETKAMP & TUSVELD, supra note 70, at 122-24.
See, e.g., INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 236-37.

313.
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316.
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0
not consistent throughout the world. 32 The elaborate accounting exercise must be

backed up with documents to protect the importer should the customs
administration decide to audit the cost of materials and production on which the
customs declaration was based. 321 The results of the calculation are not necessarily
consistent, given that the currency exchange rates and prices of inputs likely vary
over time and labor and other production costs vary from country to country.322
The specified process principle seems to be more straightforward at first
glance. It is designed to distinguish a process that substantially transforms a good
from a process that is minimal or that can be done easily with minimal equipment,
such as a screwdriver. 323 One drawback is that the principle lengthens the rules of
origin because the covered processes must be stated in sufficient detail so that
there can be an understanding of what a particular process means.324 There still
may be a disagreement between the customs authorities and the firm claiming the
preferential treatment as to whether the operation performed falls within a
particular process category specified in the rule of origin. 325 Another drawback is
that future technology may not be adequately covered in the rules of origin because
the technology was non-existent when the trade agreement was negotiated.
F.

The HarmonizedSystem Description and Coding System

The tariff shift principle requires an understanding of tariff schedules. The
327
which
World Customs Organization 32 6 developed the Harmonized System,
classifies roughly 5,000 commodity groups and identifies each group by a six-digit
code. 328 More than 200 countries use the system for its original purpose of tracking
trade passing across international boundaries; 32 9 however, the system was not
originally developed as a tool for duty classification nor determination of country
of origin. 330 TPP requires use of the Harmonized System to determine rules of
origin and tariffs imposed on an auto or auto component imported into a TPP
country when the importer relies on a tariff shift provision of TPP. 331
The Harmonized System is comprised of six-digit codes. 332 The first two
digits are referred to as the chapter, the first four digits are referred to as the
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heading, and the entire six digits are referred to as the subheading.333 Countries
that want more detail are at liberty to add additional digits, but any digits above six
are country-specific.334
Certain portions of the Harmonized System are critical to the auto industry.33 5
Subheadings 8407.33 and 8407.34 corresponds to vehicle engines; 336 subheading
8544.30 corresponds to wire harnesses.337 Heading 8703 corresponds to passenger
vehicles.3 3 8 A number of subheadings within heading 8708 are important to the
automotive industry; these include 8708.29 (vehicle body parts);33 9 8708.30
(brakes and parts); 340 8708.40 (transmissions); 341 8708.70 (road wheels and
8708.99
parts); 342 8708.94 (steering wheels); 34 3 airbags (8708.95);"
(miscellaneous motor vehicle parts). 345 An example of product-specific rules of
origin that is provided later in this Part references some of these tariff lines.
G. Basic TPP Provisions ImpactingRules on Origin
Rules of origin are obscure and technical in nature. Determining if an auto or
auto component meets the TPP rules of origin is an exercise of patience. Under
TPP, 346 one must consider: 1) Chapter 3; 2) Annex 3-D (to Chapter 3); and 3)
Appendix 1 (to Annex 3-D). 347
Chapter 3 of TPP encompasses rules of origin basic provisions. 348 Section A
of Chapter 3 (Articles 3.1 through 3.18) comprises substantive provisions; 349 and
Section B of Chapter 3 (Articles 3.19 through 3.32) comprises procedures. 350
Annex 3-D to Chapter 3, which is 212 pages in length, contains the productspecific rules of origin. 351 The product-specific rules of origin of Annex 3-D are
based on the principles of tariff shift and regional value content. 352 An example of
portions of this Annex is included later in this part.3 53 Appendix 1 to Annex 3-D

333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

Id.
Id.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D, at 96-97, 154, 157-65.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 96-97, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 2-3.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D, at 154.
Id. at Annex 3-D, at 157.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 158, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 2.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 159, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 3.
Id.
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D, at 159.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 160, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 3.
Compare Annex 3-D, at 161, with Annex 3-D app. 1, at 3.
Id.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, https://ustr.gov/tpp/.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, Annex 3-D, Annex 3-D app. 1.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3 Exec. Summary.
Id. at 3.1-3.18.
Id. at 3.19-3.31.
Id Annex 3-D.

352.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 226.

353.

Infra note 392 and accompanying text.
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has provisions that directly relate to autos and auto parts.354 Appendix 1 is only
three pages long, but it contains three tables, designated as tables A, B, and C. 355
356
Table B is based on specific processes, the third principle of rules of origin.
Autos and auto components meet the TPP rules of origin if they fall into one
of three categories (TPP Article 3.2) and otherwise comply with chapter 3.5 TPP
Article 3.6 permits a material originating from a non-TPP country to be considered
originating when it undergoes a substantial transformation. 3"s TPP Article 3.10, the
accumulation provision, permits an originating product from any TPP country to
count toward the threshold. 3
When reviewing the three categories of TPP Article 3.2, the first and the
3 60
In
second categories seem to be the easiest to understand and comply with.
simple terms, the first category is comprised of raw materials, including minerals,
mined from a TPP party; the second category is comprised of products
manufactured within a TPP party from materials originating within a TPP party,
but the materials may contain materials sourced from a non-TPP country. 3 For
example, a TPP country could import pig iron that the country processes into cast
iron, which is used to make the auto engine. 362 The cast iron portion of the auto
363
For the finished auto engine to fall within the
engine would be originating.
second category, every other part in the engine besides that cast iron portion must
be originating.3 6 The third category is satisfied if the product meets the productspecific rules of origin.365 Because of the multi-country nature and complexity of
the manufacturing involved in the automobile industry, chances are that producers
in the industry will have little occasion to use either of the first two categories of
the rules of origin with the exception, perhaps, of second-tier or third-tier suppliers
of very basic auto components.366
The third category of rules of origin will be crucial to the automotive industry
in claiming preferential tariff treatment and is the category most often used by the
auto industry.36 7 The two basic divisions within the third category are tariff shift,
meaning that the tariff classification for a good has changed, and regional value
content. 368 To use regional value content, a producer must have at least a minimum

354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D app. 1.
Id. at 1-3.
Id at 2.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.2.
Id. art. 3.6.
Id. art. 3.10.
Id. art. 3.2(a), (b).

361.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 225-26.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 225-26.
Id. at 236.
Id.
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regional value content by performing a quantitative analysis. 369 This means that at
least a certain portion of the product must come from TPP countries (TPP
originating materials) and limits the amount of materials coming from countries
outside TPP (non-originating materials). 370
The quantitative analysis required to determine regional value content is an
accounting exercise. In this exercise, elements such as the value of goods used in
production, labor, overheads, and other costs are examined to determine if they
meet a particular threshold percentage. 371 TPP regional value content comprises
four separate methods, any one of which may be used in calculating a product's
regional value content as long as it is one of the methods specified for a good of a
particular tariff classification.372 TPP article 3.5 contains the formulas for
calculating the focused value method, the build-down method, the build-up
method, and the net cost method.3 73
Someone who wants to use regional value content to qualify a product under
the TPP rules of origin would determine which method of the methods allowable
would be most beneficial.37 4 A further description of each of the four formulas is
useful here. The focused value method is a new method for calculating regional
value content beyond the methods included in NAFTA. 375 The method is
"focused" in that the calculation is based only on the value of the non-originating
materials specified in the product specific rules of Annex 3-D. 3 76 The build-down
method requires the regional value content to be calculated based on the value of
all non-originating materials.3 77 The build-down method is the one that Japan
reportedly prefers.378 One notices that both the focused value method and the
build-down method require a calculation of the value of non-originating
materials.3 7 9 This calculation may be simpler than other calculations if the customs
valuation of the imported materials is available; however, other costs associated
with the imported materials, such as transportation, might also figure into the
calculation. 38 0 The build-up method requires the regional value content to be
calculated based on the value of originating materials.3 8 The net cost method
compares the net cost of the good, less the value of non-originating materials, as

369. Id.
370. TPP art. 3.11 does permit a de minimis inclusion of non-originating goods if not more than
10%. See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch.3, art. 3.11.
371. See U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, Rules of Origin, A Regional Value Content Rule,

EXPORT.Gov, http://2016.export.gov/FTA/korea/eg main 048793.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2016)
[hereinafter U.S. -Korea Free Trade Agreement].

372.
373.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5.
Id.

374.

INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 236-37.

375. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5(a).
376. Id.
377. Id. art. 3.5(b).
378.

TPP RULE OF ORjGIN is 45%, supra note 37.

379.

Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5(a), (b).

380.
381.

See US.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, supra note 371.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 3, art. 3.5(c).
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compared to the net cost of the good.382
Appendix 1 to Annex 3-D adds another layer of complexity to the already
complicated rules of origin for autos.383 Appendix 1 is referenced in a footnote to
384
Appendix 1 contains
the table included in the following section of this part.
3
types
of safety glass, two
Tables A, B, and C. " Table A lists seven auto parts: two
386
Table B lists
types of vehicle bodies, bumpers, door assemblies, and drive-axles.
die or other
welding,
eleven processing operations: complex assembly, complex
casting, extrusion, forging, heat treatment, laminating, machining, metal forming,
388
The
molding, and stamping.38 Table C lists certain key auto components.
considered
material and parts used in producing those key components are
originating if they meet their own regional value content or are produced using at
389
However, if a processing method
least one of the processes listed on Table B.
from Table B is used in production, Table C specifies a maximum on the value of
the materials and parts that can be deemed originating content under the value
(build-up / build-down) or net cost methods of calculating regional value
content. 390 Some of the auto parts and the applicable percentages shown on Table
C include: engines (8407.33 and 8407.34)(10%); bumpers, brakes, and
transmissions (10%); airbags and other vehicle parts (8707.99)(5%).39'
H.

An Example ofProduct-Specific Rules of Origin

The third category of rules of origin encompasses more and is much more
detailed than one might initially anticipate. One way to gain some understanding of
the complexity of product-specific rules of origin is to review portions of TPP that
are closely connected to the auto and auto parts industries. A glance at selected
392
portions of TPP Annex 3-D shows the following information:

382. Id. art. 3.5(d).
INDUST. TRADE ADvISORY COMM., supra note 233, at 7.
384. Infra note 397 and accompanying text.
385. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Annex 3-D app. 1.
386. Id. at 2.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 2-3.
389. Id. at 1, 1.
390. Id at 1, IM 2-3.
391. See Whitten, supra note 36 (discussing the application of this appendix to the manufacture of
a car body from steel imported from China).
392. Trans-Pacific Partnership Annex 3-D, at 96-97, 154, 157-61.
383.
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Classification

Classified product

Product-Specific Rule of Origin

8407.33t393

Spark-ignition
reciprocating piston
engines of a kind used for
the propulsion of vehicles
of Chapter 87 : Of a
cylinder capacity
exceeding
250 cc but not exceeding
1,000 cc

No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8407.33 through 8407.34,
provided there is a regional value content of not

8407.34tN

less than:
(a) 45 per cent under the build-up method;
or
(b) 45 per cent under the net cost method; or
(c) 55 per cent under the build-down method.
h

eSpark-ignition See above

reciprocating piston
engines of a kind used for
the propulsion of vehicles

of Chapter 87 : Of a
cylinder capacity
exceeding 1,000 cc
8544.30

Wire harnesses

A change to a good of subheading 8544.30

from any other subheading, except from
heading 74.08, 74.13, 76.05, 76.14 or
subheading 8544.11 through 8544.20 or

8544.42 through 8544.60; or
No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8544.30, provided there is
a regional value content of not less than:
(a) 35 per cent under the build-up method;

or
(b) 45 per cent under the build-down
method; or
(c) 60 per cent under the focused value
method taking into account only the nonoriginating
materials of heading 74.08, 74.13,
76.05, 76.14 and subheading 8544.11 through
8544.60.
870.02-87.95t

Cars

No change in tariff classification required for a

good of heading 87.02 through 87.05, provided
there is a regional value content of not less

than:
(a) 45 per cent under the net cost method; or
(b) 55 per cent under the build-down method.

393. Id.
394. Id.
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Bodies for the motor
vehicles of heading 8703
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A change to a good of subheading 8708.10
through 8708.21 from any other subheading; or
No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8708.10 through 8708.21,
provided there is a regional value content of not
less than:
(a) 45 per cent under the build-up method;
or
(b) 45 per cent under the net cost method; or
(c) 55 per cent under the build-down method.

8708.70396

397

Road wheels and parts

A change to a good of subheading 8708.70
from any other subheading; or
No change in tariff classification required for a
good of subheading 8708.70, provided there is
a regional value content of not less than:
(a) 35 per cent under the build-up method;
or
(b) 35 per cent under the net cost method; or
(c) 45 per cent under the build-down method.

'

Review of the above information indicates that a finished car imported into
Australia need only satisfy regional value content to receive a preferential tariff
under TPP.39 8 In contrast, all of the car components, except for piston engines,
require either a tariff shift or regional value content. 399 The regional value content
percentages also vary. 400 For vehicles, the minimum percentage is forty-five
percent under the net cost method and fifty-five percent under the build-down
method; for auto parts, there is a general range of minimum percentages from
thirty-five percent to fifty-five percent and the regional value content calculation
method that can be applied.40
From review of the above table, one notices that the product-specific rule of
origin for wire harnesses is particularly lengthy.402 If tariff shift is used, certain

395. Id.
396. Id.
397. See also Appendix I (Provisions Related to the Product-Specific Rules of Origin for Certain
Vehicles and Parts of Vehicles).
398. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System heading 87.0287.05 (passenger vehicles).
399. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses); heading 8703; subheadings 8708.29 (vehicle body parts); 8708.30 (brakes
and parts); 8708.40 (transmissions); 8708.70 (road wheels and parts); 8708.94 (steering wheels);
airbags (8708.95); 8708.99 (miscellaneous motor vehicle parts).
400. Portions of the table above.
401. Id.
402. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses).
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tariff code headings and subheadings are excluded from the calculation; 403 those
same tariff code headings and subheadings are required to be taken into account
when using the regional value content focused value method. 4 04 The specificallyreferenced tariff code headings and sub-headings include insulated and noninsulated wire. 405 For the product-specific rules of origin for wire harnesses in the
above table, three regional value content methods are used, but the net cost method
is not one of them.4 06 In the above table, wire harnesses are the only parts that
include the focused value method in the product-specific rule of origin and the
sixty percent content requirement is higher than the content for any other good
included in the table.4 07 The high originating content requirement under the
focused value method probably is a result of some concern that wire harnesses may
be an auto component likely to be assembled in a non-TPP country. 408 The sixty
percent requirement would permit assembly in a non-TPP country but using a high
content of materials produced in TPP countries. 409
The wire harness is a critical car component that requires some portion of the
assembly to be done by hand. 41 0 An automotive car harness is a collection of wires
bundled together that provide electricity and signals to various areas of the car. 411
The bundling of the wires using some type of sleeve, tape, or other restraint into a
one-piece component has the advantages of being more compact, increasing the
ability to safeguard the electrical system from damage due to vibration, moisture,
or abrasion, decreasing the possibility of a short, decreasing the possibility of fire
through the use of a flame-retardant sleeve, and decreasing the time needed to wire
the car.412 After production, the wire harness must be tested to ascertain that it is
functioning correctly. 413 Although part of the wire harness manufacturing process
can be automated, such as cutting the wires, other portions of the process must be
done by hand.414 A wire harness supplier may have the component manufactured in

403. Id
404. Id.
405. Trans-Pacific Partnership Annex 3-D, at 81-82, 84, 152-55.
406. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses).
407. Id.
408. See CARLOS AYALA, AUTOMOTIVE WIRING HARNESS: MANUFACTURING PROCESS (1999),
http://www.personal.engin.umd.umich.edu/-jwvm/ece539/W99Presentations/WiringHam/AutoHames
s.PDF.
409. The portion of the table above containing information on Harmonized System subheading
8544.30 (wire harnesses).
410. AYALA, supra note 408, at 1, 8.
411. Id. atl.
412. Masakazu Kobayashi, Yoshiya Hirano & Masatake Higashi, OptimizationofAssembly
Processesofan Automobile Wire Harness, 11 COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN & APPLICATIONS 305, 305
(2013); Robert Kraus & David Ryan, Advances in Heat-Shrink Technology, 4 IEEE ELECTRICAL
INSULATION MAG. 31, 33 (1988); Austin Weber, A Little Covering Goes a Long Way, WIRE
PROCESSING 12 (Oct. 2016).

413. AYALA, supra note 408, at 11-12.
414. Id.at8, 11-12.

196

VOL. 45:2

DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

a location with low labor cost to cut down on its cost of manufacture.
I

415

Differences Between NAFTA and TPP Rules of Origin

Those familiar with NAFTA rules of origin would note the major differences
between NAFTA and TPP rules of origin when determining regional value content.
One difference is that TPP no longer requires tracing of certain non-originating
components.416 Pursuant to the tracing rule, the non-originating status of certain
417
goods was determined at the time a NAFTA party took title. From then on, those
goods had to be traced and they maintained their status as non-originating goods
418
The reason for the tracing rule
throughout the balance of the production process.

was to combat the "roll-up" problem. Roll-up occurs when an auto part contains
some non-originating content but the part is deemed to be originating under the
rules of origin. 41 9 This status of being 100% an originating good continues when
the auto part is incorporated into the finished car. 420 Thus the roll-up may give an
inaccurate picture of the percentage of the car that was produced with materials
originating in countries within the trade agreement.4 21 The auto industry had
lobbied for the tracing rule but no longer supports the rule because of the
administrative burden.422
Another difference between NAFTA and TPP is between applicable
percentages when using regional value content.42 3 For example, NAFTA requires
62.5% originating materials for cars and many parts under the net cost method to
qualify for preferential tariffs.424 Under TPP, the percentage drops to 45% under
the net cost method for cars. 425 For some auto parts, TPP lowers the threshold
percentage to 35% under the net cost method. TPP includes the use of a builddown method that is unavailable under NAFTA.426 The threshold minimum of
originating material is 55% for cars under the build-down method. 427 The builddown method can be used for auto parts, including motor vehicle bodies, road
wheels, radiators, mufflers, exhaust pipes, and clutches, and the threshold
minimum of originating material for those auto parts is 45% .428 The build-up
method can also be used for those same parts, with a threshold minimum of

415. Id.
416.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 236-37.

417. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 403.1.16, H.R. Doc. 103-159, 32
I.L.M. 289, 673 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
418. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Annex 403.1, 403.2, H.R. Doc. 103159, 32 1.L.M. 289, 673 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
419. SCHEWEL, supra note 263.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 237.

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.

WU, supranote 36, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2 n.3.
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originating material of 35%.429
The lower percentages lead most analysts to the conclusion that the threshold
percentages are lower under TPP than under NAFTA.430 Japan negotiated for low
threshold minimum percentages for originating materials to accommodate the
country's present practice of outsourcing parts from non-TPP countries, including
China.4 31 The percentage figures contained in TPP for auto goods were a
compromise between Japan and other TPP parties, 432 as some representing
Canadian and Mexican interests had advocated for a minimum fifty percent
originating materials percentage on all auto parts. 433
The beneficiaries of the lower minimum percentages of originating materials
included in TPP depend on several factors. As far as a United States auto company
is concerned, the lower percentages may give an automaker the ability to outsource
auto components from a non-TPP country to save on costs yet still take advantage
of the TPP preferential tariffs. 434 This may mean that a United States third-tier
producer of auto components may face more competition in cost, especially if the
product is a simple one like tires or steel. 435 Producers of complex auto
components or those for which the auto component producer needs to be
geographically close to a higher tier part supplier or automaker likely will be
unaffected. 436 A company with a global footprint may decide to shift some of its
operations to less costly geographical locations; however, a company with a more
local focus may not have that option.437

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF TPP

Geopolitics

Some political scientists employ game theory in analyzing the strategy of
what a country will do in relationship with what the country thinks other countries
will do. 43 8 One theory is that the signing of one free trade agreement may have a
contagion effect leading non-parties to the agreement to sign their own trade
agreement for fear of being left out of the gains the parties to the first trade
agreement, or losing existing markets,439 with "the degree of contagion . . . related
to the importance of the partners' markets."44 0 Another motivation may be for a

429.
430.
431.
432.

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.

433. TPP RULE OF ORIGIN is 45%, supranote 38.

434. WU, supra note 36, at 2.
435. SCHEWEL, supra note 263.
436. Wu, supra note 64, at 2-3.
437. TPP RULE OF ORIGIN is 45%, supra note 37.

438. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Brad L. LeVeck, David G. Victor, & James H. Fowler, Decision
Maker Preferencesfor InternationalLegal Cooperation,68 INT'L ORG. 845, 852 (2014).
439. Richard Baldwin & Dany Jaimovich, Are Free Trade Agreements contagious?, 88 J. INT'L

ECON. 1, 1 (2012).
440. Id. at 21.
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country to be in the position to better compete for future foreign direct investment
anticipated to be made in support of the global supply chain for the auto and auto
parts industries."' Although many think that the choice of partners is dependent on
trade, the choice is dependent more on power and politics.442 Economic
interdependence seems to have a positive effect in deterring conflict and promoting
3
peace and security."
TPP is the lead mega-regional 4 " in a region that has spawned a number of
5
concepts in the past for Asian regional integration." The primary Asian regional
association has been the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN"), with
its original five members, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand, and the addition of Brunei, plus the later addition of four more countries,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam, bringing the total countries in ASEAN to
ten." 6 In turn, China has been pressing forward with the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership, comprised of ASEAN+6 (the ASEAN countries plus
"47
Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand).
The TPP itself was an outgrowth of the P4 (Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and
Singapore)." 8 When the United States expressed its interest in joining, Australia,
9
Malaysia, Peru, and Vietnam followed shortly thereafter.44 Vietnam has high
tariffs; as a developing country it saw that it could benefit from joining the
45
others 450 and Malaysia did not want to be left out. 1 Canada and Mexico had to
join to be covered on the new measures under TPP that are not covered under
NAFTA.452 Japan had to join; it could not afford to have the United States get a
453
better deal with the other TPP parties than Japan.
Game theory should trigger an examination of the existing trade agreements
between TPP parties and what TPP parties stand to lose if TPP does not go into

441. Id. at l1.
442. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor & Yonatan Lupu, PoliticalScience Research on
InternationalLaw: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 47, 51-52 (2012).
443. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Alexander H. Montgomery, War, Trade, and Distrust: Why
Trade
Agreements Don'tAlways Keep the Peace, 29 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE ScL 257, 258 (2012).
444. For background on the TPP, see Chunding Li & John Whalley, China and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership:A Numerical Simulation Assessment of the Effects Involved, 37 WORLD ECON. 169, 17073 (2014).
445. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The TPP and the RCEP (ASEAN+6) as Potential Paths toward
Deeper Asian Economic Integration,8 ASIAN J. OF WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 359, 361 (2013).
446. Id at n.1, 3.
447. Id.at361-62.
448. Id. at 364; Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Expanding the P-4 Trade Agreement into a Broader
Trans-PacificPartnership:Implications, Risks and Opportunities,4 ASAN J. OF WTO & INT'L HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 401, 403 (2009).
449. Lewis, supra note 448, at 403.
450. Raj Bhala, Trans-Pacific Partnership or Trampling Poor Partners?A Tentative Critical
Review, I MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L. 2, 19 (2014).
451. CERDEIRO, supra note 17, at 13, 17, 23.
452. Id. at 7.
453. Id. at 8-9.
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effect. Three trade agreements overlap in the Pacific Ocean area of the globe. The
three are TPP, NAFTA, and the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement. 45 4 The three
NAFTA countries, the United States, Canada, and Mexico, are also parties to
TPP.4 55 Of the ten members of ASEAN, only four, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Vietnam, are parties to TPP.456 The six ASEAN members who are not parties
to TPP are Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand.457
As far as ASEAN countries with auto industries, only two, Malaysia and Vietnam,
are parties to TPP; three other ASEAN members with auto industries, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand, are not parties to TPP.458 The auto industries of
Malaysia and Vietnam may receive a boost above the auto industries of Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand because the latter three countries will not receive the
benefits that TPP has to offer. With TPP, the huge United States consumer base
would become more attractive to Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and
Vietnam.4 59 Chances are that those five countries will export more products to
satisfy the demands of consumers in the United States, as these are the only
countries with which the United States does not currently have a preferential trade
agreement in effect. 460
As far as Latin America is concerned, the United States already has trade
agreements with Chile, Mexico, and Peru.46 1 TPP will strengthen the ties between
the United States and those countries and will update NAFTA.4 62 One study
considered the effect of non-TPP Latin American countries joining TPP.4 3 The
conclusion of the study was that the countries that could see positive results by
becoming TPP members are Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Colombia because
of their current restrictiveness in trade in goods; Argentina and El Salvador are the
countries that would show little effect. 4 64
B.

Economics and TPP

The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) released its analysis
of TPP in May of 2016 and projected positive effects over baseline projections,
although representing a small percentage in comparison with the large size of the
United States economy."4 5 The analysis showed that by 2032, the United States

454.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supranote 3, at 695-740.

455. Id. at 703.
456. Id. at 410 n.28.
457. Id. at 19; Lewis, supra note 448, at 410 n.28.
458. HIDEO KOBAYASHI, CURRENT STATE AND ISSUES OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND AUTO PARTS
INDUSTRIES IN ASEAN 1 (2015), http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2015-22.pdf.
459. GOTO, supra note 16.

460. Id.
461. CHRISTOPHER WILSON, THE IMPACT OF TPP ON LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH
THE
REGION
(2015),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-impact-tpp-latin-america-and-usrelations-the-region.

462. Id.
463. See CERDEIRO, supra note 17.

464. Id. at 21.
465.

INTERN'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, at 21.
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will show a $57.3 billion USD increase in annual income (0.23 percent), a $42.7
billion USD increase in gross domestic product (0.15), and an increase in
employment (0.07 percent).' United States exports and imports would rise ($27.2
billion USD or 1.0 percent for exports and $48.9 billion USD or 1.1 percent for
imports).4 67 The analysis considered the effect on United States exports to and
imports from TPP countries that are new partners to free trade agreements with the
United States. 468 The estimates were that United States exports would show an
increase of $34.6 billion USD, or 18.7 percent, and United States imports would
469
show an increase of $23.4 billion USD, or 10.4 percent.
The ITC May 2016 report contained an economic assessment of the United
States auto industry. 470 The overview of the auto industry was positive with growth
47
in imports and exports of United States finished vehicles and vehicle parts. 1 For
2032, the report showed a growth of $1.6 billion USD, or 0.3 percent, in finished
47 2
The
cars but a decrease in auto parts of $1.4 billion USD, or 0.3 percent.
increase in exports is primarily based on exports to Japan and Vietnam. Japan
would contribute to the increase in car imports due to the reduction in United
States tariffs. 4 73 Imports of vehicles and parts from Canada and Mexico are also
projected to increase. 474 The TPP rules of origin for autos are expected to impact
475
The study concludes that the
the United States auto and auto parts industries.
lowering of the regional value content under TPP as compared to NAFTA will
contribute to a rise in the exports of United States autos but a decline in exports of
4 76
Auto industry experts see the
United States auto parts to Canada and Mexico.
regional value content percentages as sufficiently differentiating between
carmakers in TPP and non-TPP countries to lower the likelihood of carmakers in
477
However, there is a
non-TPP countries from taking advantage of the treaty.
perception that the rules of origin that impact auto parts may not be sufficiently
4 78
strong to protect auto parts suppliers in TPP countries.
Another recent economic analysis conducted in Spring of 2016 from the
Peterson Institute for International Economics (Peterson) projects that TPP will
result in benefits, although more significant than those projected by the
International Trade Commission. 4 79 This second analysis predicts that by 2030, the

466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31-32, 232-54.
Id. at 31, 232.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 31, 232-36.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31, 236-38.

477.

INDUST. TRADE ADVISORY COMM., supra note 233, at 6.

478. Id. at 6-7.
479. PETER A. PETRI & MICHAEL G. PLUMMER, ECONOMICS OF THE TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT (2016), https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/economics-trans-
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incomes of TPP countries will show a $465 billion USD annual increase (1.1
percent) and the exports of TPP countries will show a $1,025 billion USD annual
increase (11.5 percent). 480 The United States economy is projected to have a $131
billion USD boost, in part based on a 9.1 percent increase in exports.4 8 ' Although
the United States is ahead of all TPP countries in the dollar figure gain, Vietnam is
projected to have the largest percentage increase in real income, at 9.1 percent. 482
Other substantial beneficiaries are Japan, Malaysia, and Canada. Trade diversion is
projected to have a slightly negative effect on China.4 83
The projected economic benefits may be different for different economic
groups in the United States. For example, two economists analyzed the effects of
trade on the United States economy for the twenty-year period from 1988 to
2008.484 They found that there was a $720 billion USD benefit due to increased
trade but that competition from imports suppressed wages by $140 billion USD. 485
Although the overall effect was positive, the top twenty percent of United States
households received three-quarters of this gain.4 86 Two other economists analyzed
who are the winners and losers from the effects of trade. 487 They found a "pro-poor
bias of trade."4 88 What that means is that the poorest would lose sixty-three percent
of their purchasing power if the country was closed off from international trade
but, in contrast, the high-income individuals would lose twenty-eight percent. 48 9
The reason for this is that the poorest spend more on goods that are more traded
and the wealthy spend a larger portion of disposable income on services, which are
not so heavily traded. 490 The Peterson Spring 2016 report supports the pro-poor
bias of trade. 4 9 1 Although a common belief is that TPP will benefit the wealthy, the
recent analysis projected that TPP will slightly benefit the middle and lower
classes more than the upper class and will have a substantial beneficial effect on
the poorer developing countries. 492

pacific-partnership-distributional-impact.
480. Id.; see also Peter A. Petri & Michael G. Plummer, The Economic Effects of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership: New Estimates, in PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, ASSESSING
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP; VOLUME 1: MARKET ACCESS AND SECTORAL ISSUES (Cathleen
Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds., 2016), https://piie.com/system/files/documents/piiebl6-1.pdf.
481. PETRI & PLUMMER, supranote 479.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Tyler Moran, Does Foreign Trade and Investment Reduce Average
US Wages and Increase Inequality? (Part 2), TRADE & INV. POL'Y WATCH (Nov. 10, 2015),
https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/does-foreign-trade-and-investment-reduceaverage-us-wages-and.
485. Id.
486. Id.
487. Id
488. Pablo D. Fajgelbaum & Amit K. Khandelwal, MEASURING THE UNEQUAL GAINS FROM
TRADE 3 (2014), http://www.nber.org/papers/w20331.
489. Id
490. Id.
491. PETRJ &PLUMMER , supra note 479.
492. Id.

202

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 45:2

Vietnam's inclusion in TPP may have an interesting effect on the United
States and on China. Vietnam's labor costs are twenty percent lower than labor
costs in China and the Vietnamese population is becoming increasingly welleducated.493 Vietnam is reportedly encouraging domestic firms to develop by
protecting them from competition from China. 494 Vietnam may be able to improve
economic efficiency by permitting presently state-owned enterprises to pass into
private hands. The dynamism of the Vietnamese economy may be enhanced if it
receives foreign direct investment.495 In 2014, the United States collected $5.53
billion USD in tariff duties.496 Because Vietnam had no free trade agreement with
497
TPP will benefit
the United States, Vietnam paid 42.9 percent of that amount.
Vietnam by significantly reducing the tariffs that Vietnam pays to the United
States. One estimate is that the reduction in tariffs results in an 8.1 percent increase
in the gross domestic product of Vietnam by the year 2030.498 Vietnam's inclusion
in TPP may result in Vietnam taking over some trade with the United States that
would otherwise go to China. 499 For China, this may result in a zero to 0.1 percent
500
decline in China's gross domestic product.
Economists have been very interested in studying the potential effects of the
1
various regional trade agreements.5 0 China has become a big player in world trade
502
The volume of China's exports has made
with exports fueling its economy.
some countries leery of China because of China's imports competing strongly with
domestic production.50 3 Some have talked about China either joining TPP at some
5
point or becoming an associate member of TPP. 0 One econometric study
examined the effects of China being or not being a participant in TPP.os The study
estimates that China not being a participant in TPP would raise outside demand,
resulting in a growth of the exports and total production of the country, but that
China would decrease imports. 5 In econometric terms, this would be a "welfare
loss," 0 7 but a relatively small one, for China because of the combination of the

493. Andrew Collier, China Eyes Vietnam and the TPP Warily: Vietnam's economic growth,
coupled with TPP, could spell trouble for Chinese companies, DIPLOMAT (May 14, 2016),
http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/china-eyes-vietnam-and-the-tpp-warily/.
494. Id
495. Id.
496. Id
497. Id
498. Id
499. Id
500. Id. See also Rahel Aichele & Gabriel Felbermayr, The Trans-PacificPartnershipDeal (TPP):
What Are the Economic Consequences for In- and Outsiders?, 16 CESIFo F. 53, 59 (2016),

http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portaVDocB ...

pacific-december.pdf.

501. Chunding Li & John Whalley, China'spotentialfuture growth and gains from trade policy
bargaining:Some numerical simulationresults, 37 EcON. MODELLING 65, 65-66 (2014).

502.
503.
504.
505.
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507.

Id. at 65.
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Li & Whalley, supra note 444, at 169.
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growth in China's exports and the decline in China's imports. The situation would
change if China were to be a participant in TPP. The effect for China as a
participant would be significantly positive.508
V.

CONCLUSION

The TPP is a trade agreement with important geopolitical, strategic
dimensions. 509 The United States continues as the market hegemon in trade. 510 The
TPP is attractive to the United States because it promotes the United States
integration into the Asian region, which holds a large portion of the world's
population and has shown itself to be a region of dynamic economic growth.i1
The United States can better protect the investment interests of multi-national
enterprises headquartered in the United States by having a stronger presence in
Asia. If Congress were not to ratify the TPP, that action could very well signal a
protectionist trend and isolate the United States from being a full participant in
global trade.51 2
The United States needs to show its continuance as a world power in the
region and might provide needed stability in Asia during a time that Asia is
encountering substantial political, economic, and institutional changes. 513 With the
United States solidifying the Asian American block, the world could be dominated
by two blocks - Asian America on one side of the globe and Europe on the
other. 514 The United States needs to become a party to a regional club that includes
Asia during the time that other trade agreements are being negotiated.' 5 The
downside of TPP not being successful is that the United States may be foreclosing
itself from participation in other clubs that might come into being in Asia.516
When considering the auto industry, TPP may have an overall beneficial
effect on the consumer by lowering prices or keeping prices fairly constant even
with rising prices of raw materials and increased safety and gas conservation
requirements; TPP may have a negative effect in certain areas of the country that
lose business because an automaker moves a portion of the manufacturing chain to
another TPP country from the United States. Yet, a multinational enterprise, like a
major automaker, may benefit from lower costs of auto components and the
opening of new markets from the decrease in tariffs. A politician knows that a
small number of people a trade measure affects to a greater extent, such as those in
the auto component portion of the industry losing business, are more politically
effective than a large number of people, such as auto consumers, all affected by a
508. Id.
509. Lewis, supra note 46, at 37; Bhala, supra note 450, at 2.
510. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Alexander H. Montgomery, The Hegemon's Purse. No Economic
Peace Between Democracies, 45 J. PEACE RES. 111, 112 (2008).
511. Lewis, supra note 46, at 38-39.
512. GOTO, supra note 16.

513.
514.

Lewis, supranote 448, at 371; Bhala, supranote 450, at 20.
Lewis, supranote 448, at 412.

515.
516.

Lewis, supranote 46, at 51.
GOTO, supra note 16.
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smaller amount. The political effectiveness of the smaller group is based on the
fact that those who will lose from the TPP rules of origin for autos will be more
vocal in their objections and are likely to lobby their representatives in Congress.
Another factor is that the vast, but individually small, gains to consumers are
transparent in that consumers typically do not realize that they are benefiting from
a trade agreement in being able to take advantage of lower prices.
An econometric study published in 2014 analyzed the club goods effect of
TPP. The study found that the TPP mostly has a positive effect on the members of
the TPP club, although global free trade has a positive effect on nearly all
countries, with the global free trade benefits considerably exceeding the benefits of
the free trade effects of TPP."' TPP will increase the production, exports, and
imports of all club members, with the largest gains received by the smaller
countries.5 18 For most of the non-club members, exports are estimated to increase
9
and imports to decrease, with a decrease in welfare. 51 The 2014 study is consistent
with the ITC and Peterson econometric analyses from the spring of 2016 as far as
overall benefits are concerned and with the effect on non-club members. A word of
caution is advisable concerning the effect on the suppliers of less complex auto
parts. Those suppliers run the risk of stiff competition from other TPP members
with lower labor costs.
Therefore, the conclusion is that the TPP will have an overall positive effect
on the auto and suppliers of more sophisticated auto parts of the TPP parties.
However, TPP may not have such a positive effect on the suppliers of the less
complex auto parts. The effect of TPP will likely be slightly negative as far as
China's auto and auto parts industries are concerned.

517. Li & Whalley, supra note 444, at 170.
518. Id. at 182.
519. Id. at 182.

THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT AND STATES'
RIGHT TO REGULATE UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW
*NoAM ZAMIR & PAUL BARKER

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP),' which was signed in

November 2015 by Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico,
New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, is said to establish
new terms for trade and investment deals. 2 The TPP was intended to establish a
free trade area in the Asia-Pacific covering nearly 40 percent of global GDP and a
third of global trade.3 The agreement also forms an integral part of broader
4
geopolitical calculations in the region. However, the TPP as currently drafted can
only come into force if ratified by six or more of the States Parties representing at
least 85% of the GDP of the twelve original signatories. This prospect is now

* Dr. Noam Zamir, LLB (Colman), BCL (Oxon), PhD (Cantab), Assistant Professor, City University of
Hong Kong, School of Law.
Paul Barker, MA (Cantab), LLM (Columbia), Barrister, Doughty Street Chambers, London.
1. Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/3,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc2016d3_en.pdf.
2. See Kevin Granville, The Trans-PacificPartnership, Explained, THE NEW YORK TtMEs (Aug.
20,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacificpartnership.html ('The Trans-Pacific Partnership, the largest regional trade accord in history, would set
new terms for trade and business investment among the United States and 11 other Pacific Rim
nations'); Mehreen Khan, Why TPP is the most important acronym you've never heard of, THE

TELEGRAPH (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/ll913939/What-is-TransPacific-Partnership-TPP-Obama-Japan.html; see also Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The
Trans-PacificPartnership,https://ustr.gov/tpp/.

3. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Overview of the Trans Pacific Partnership,
https://ustr.gov/tpp/overview-of-the-TPP ("Through this agreement, the Obama Administration seeks to
boost U.S. economic growth and support the creation and retention of high-quality American jobs by
increasing exports in a region that includes some of the world's most robust economies and that

represents nearly 40 percent of global GDP."); see also Granville, supra note 2 (stating "the United
States and 11 other Pacific Rim nations - a far-flung group with an annual gross domestic product of
nearly $28 trillion that represents roughly 40 percent of global G.D.P. and one-third of world trade.").
4. President Obama, The TPP Would Let America, not China, leadthe way on global trade, THE
WASHINGTON POST (May 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-

tpp-would-let-america-not-china-lead-the-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-OfdO-1 I e6-93ae50921721165d story.html ("The world has changed. The rules are changing with it. The United States,
not countries like China, should write them. Let's seize this opportunity, pass the Trans-Pacific

Partnership and make sure America isn't holding the bag, but holding the pen.").
5. Trans-Pacific
Partnership
Agreement,
art.
30.5,
UNCTAD/WEB/DITC/2016/3,
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webditc2016d3_en.pdf.
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unlikely following the new U.S. administration's announcement in January 2017
that it will not ratify the treaty,6 amidst a rising tide of anti-free trade sentiment
around the world.7 Nevertheless, other States Parties to the TPP continue to strive
8
for ratification in one form or another, and the TPP will arguably remain a
benchmark for future trade deal negotiations.
The political response to, and widespread scepticism towards the TPP and
other international investment agreements (HAs) is complex and widely debated.
This article will focus on one issue that has played an important role in framing the
debate on the TPP: the potential impact of the TPP (and similar deals) on States'
right to regulate public welfare under international investment law.
In response to a growing number of investment treaty arbitrations arising out
9
of regulatory measures taken by host States, the recent trend in IIA practice has
been to include express language in the treaty preamble reaffirming the right to
regulate, to provide greater guidance on the standards of investment protection as
they apply to regulatory measures, and to carve out general exceptions, for
example, measures taken for the protection of the environment, public health or
0
financial stability.'
As the tribunal in Lemire v. Ukraine" stated, the host States enjoys an
"inherent right to regulate (.. .) in order to protect the common good of its
people." 1 2 Indeed, it is said that HAs "may not be read as preventing States from
3
bona fide regulation in the public interest"' and that it is necessary "to balance
objectives of the host State, and in
policy
investment protection with competing
interest."' 4 In a recent high profile
public
particular, with its right to regulate in the
award rejecting Philip Morris' claims against Uruguay relating to tobacco control
measures, an eminent tribunal held that there is a "consistent trend" in awards and
treaty practice differentiating an indirect expropriation from a non-compensable
6. Peter Baker, Trump Abandons Trans-PacificPartnership, Obama's Signature Trade Deal,

NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/us/politics/tpp-trump-tradenafta.htmlr=0.

7. Martin Wolf, The Tide of Gloablisation is Turning, FINANCIAL TimES (Sept. 6, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/87bb0eda-7364-1 1e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.
8. Jason Scott, Australia Strives for 'TPP Minus 1' After Trump Withdraws, REUTERS (Feb. 7,
2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-07/australia-striving-for-tpp-minus-1 -after-trump-swithdrawal.

9. Recent Trends in HAs and ISDS - IIA Issues Note No.1, UNCTAD (Feb. 2015),
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepeb20l5dlen.pdf.
10. Id. at 3.
11. Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSIID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and
Liability (Jan. 14, 2010).
12. Id.1505.
13.

Expropriation-A

(2012),
II, UNCTAD
Expropriation - A Sequel].
14.

Sequel - UNCTAD Series on Issues in InternationalInvestment Agreements

85,

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf

[hereinafter

Fair and Equitable Treatment - UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment

Agreements II, UNCTAD (2012), xiii, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia20l1Id5_en.pdf.

TPP AND STATES' RIGHTS TO REGULATE

2017

207

regulatory measure.' 5 However, the circumstances in which a host State may still
be obliged to compensate a foreign investor for a regulatory measure having an
econonc impact on a protected investment remain contested. In Daimler v.
Argentinal, for example, the Tribunal agreed that host States have the right to
regulate the economy as they see fit, but held that:
[W]here Argentina elects to exercise its powers in a manner that
contravenes one of Argentina's voluntarily assumed international
obligations to German investors under the German-Argentine BIT, and
where such contravention specifically harms the Claimant's investment,
Argentina must compensate the Claimant for the violation.' 7
Against this background, critics of investment treaty arbitration assert that
tribunals illegitimately interfere with States' core public policy prerogatives and
that an award of damages against host States can have a "chilling effect on future
governmental conduct by preventing governments from adopting certain courses of
action for fear of future liability."' 8 These concerns have translated into heightened
public scrutiny of investment treaty arbitration awards and of IIA negotiations,
including the TPP.19
Accordingly, this paper seeks to establish the extent to which the States
Parties to the TPP have negotiated the treaty's language to address concerns
regarding their right to regulate, and how consistent this has been with the efforts
of non-TPP parties, such as the European Union, in their treaty negotiations. As the
current uncertainty surrounding the TPP's ratification partly demonstrates, it
remains an open question whether the contents of the TPP's investment protection
chapter will be sufficient to secure the confidence of all stakeholders.
It has been suggested elsewhere that the TPP's Investment Chapter sets a new
worldwide standard.2 o We suggest that the Investment Chapter is nevertheless

15. Philip Morris Brands SArl, Philip Morris Products SA, Abal Hermanos SA v. Uruguay, ICSID
Case No. ARB/10/7, Award 1295 (July 8, 2016).
16. Daimler Financial Services AG v. Argentina, ICSID Case No ARB/05/1, Award (Aug. 22,
2012).
17. Id. ¶ 100.
18. Anthea Roberts, The Present - Investment Arbitration as a Governance Tool for Economic
InternationalRelations? The Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty Arbitration,
in ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG (ED.), ARBITRATION: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS, ICCA CONGRESS SERIES
16, 170 (2011).
19. See, e.g., Cecilia Olivet and Alberto Villareal, Who really won the legal battle between Philip
Morris and Uruguay?, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2016/jul/28/who-really-won-legal-battle-philip-morris-uruguay-cigarette-adverts;
Mark
Weisbrot, Trans-Pacific PartnershipAgreements Run Into Serious Resistance Due to Public Scrutiny,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-weisbrot/trans-pacificpartnershipb_4303066.html.
20. Melida Hodgson, The Trans-PacificPartnershipinestment chapter sets out a new worldwide
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broadly consistent (and in parts entirely derivative of) the approach taken by the
U.S. for over ten years. Although States Parties to the TPP appear to have reacted
to particular investment treaty arbitration claims or awards - as well as perhaps to
general legitimacy concerns regarding how investment agreements constrain host
State regulatory space - the TPP represents an evolution rather than revolution in
the drafting of IIAs.21 Indeed, as set out below, the TPP is largely consistent with
the 2012 U.S. Model BIT 22 and recent U.S. HAs, and notably seeks to preserve the
status quo by retaining ad hoc arbitration as the mechanism for resolving investorState disputes. 23 By contrast, new EU investment treaties, including the EU-

Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), have replaced
24
investment treaty arbitration with a standing international investment court.

This paper is structured as follows: Section II briefly explains the main
features of international investment law and the debates regarding the legitimacy
of this legal regime in light of its effect on States' regulatory power; Section III
examines the main provisions of Chapter 9, the Investment Chapter of the TPP,
which address States Parties' regulatory power, and highlights how some of these
provisions were drafted in direct response to certain controversial treaty claims and
awards. This reaction is manifest in three main respects: (1) express language
asserting the inherent rights of States to regulate in the public interest; (2) denial of
benefits clauses excluding specific types of claim, such as tobacco regulations; and
(3) more detailed guidance in order to limit tribunal discretion in the interpretation
of the standards of protection in the treaty. Section IV concludes this paper.
II.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE
LEGITIMACY DEBATES REGARDING THIS REGIME

International investment law is a branch of public international law that
25
governs the protection of foreign investments in host States. IIAs are the primary
source of international investment law and establish certain substantive standards
of investment protection, including fair and equitable treatment ("FET") and
compensation for acts of expropriation. 2 6 The majority of the more-than-3,200 HAs
21. Id.
22. 2012
U.S.
Model
BIT,
Annex
B
(Expropriation),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT/2Otext/`20for/o20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf
23. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, sec. B (Investor-State Dispute Settlement).
24. European Comm'n Press Release IP/16/399, CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach
on
investment
in
trade
agreement
(Feb.
29,
2016),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1468.
25. International
Investment
Law
and
Arbitration,
ROSTRUMLEGAL,
"International
(stating
http://rostrumlegal.com/course/international-investment-law-arbitration/
investment law is a branch of public international law which governs foreign direct investment and the
resolution of disputes between foreign investors and sovereign states").
26. Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS
OF
TREATMENT
1,
70-71,
(2009),

http://www.italaw.com/documents/NewcombeandParadellLawandPracticeoflnvestmentTreatiesChapterl.pdf.
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worldwide are bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which as the name suggests are
concluded between two States.27 There are also a growing number of free trade
agreements ("FTAs") that contain foreign investment protection provisions in
addition to establishing free trade areas. These may be bilateral or multilateral,
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),2 8 the Energy
Charter Treaty 29 and the TPP itself.
Investor-State disputes are typically heard by an international arbitration
tribunal. 30 The creation of a neutral forum for the settlement of disputes between
investors and States is a key feature of the modem system of international
investment protection. Whereas the jurisdiction of international commercial
arbitration tribunals is based on an arbitration clause in a contract between the
parties, 31 the claimant investor in an investment treaty arbitration is not a party to
the IIA. Rather, the arbitration clause in the IIA contains an offer by the host State
to arbitrate investment disputes; the investor accepts this offer by filing a request
for arbitration. 32 This procedure for investor-State dispute settlement has famously
been described as "arbitration without privity."33 As discussed below, the use of
arbitration for investor-State dispute settlement is not without its critics. 34 Indeed,
the recently signed but not yet effective EU-Vietnam FTA,3 5 and the EU-Canada
CETA, both replace investor-State arbitration with a standing international
investment court. 36

27. See
International
Agreements
Investment
Navigator,
INVESTMENT
POLICY,
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (stating there are 2958 BITS in total, 2324 of them are in
force).
28. North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1992), ch. 11 (Dec. 17).
29. Energy Charter Treaty, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, part 111.
30. Investor-State" Disputes in Trade Pacts Threaten Fundamental Principles of National
Judicial Systems,
CITIZEN.ORG,
https://www.citizen.org/documents/isds-domestic-legal-processbackground-brief.pdf.
31. Standard
ICC
Arbitration
Clauses,
INT'L
CHAMBER
OF
COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/standard-icc-arbitrationclauses/.
32. How to file a Request for Arbitration - ICSID Convention Arbitration, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/How-to-File-a-Request-for-ArbitrationConvention.aspx.
33. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232 (1995).
34. See, e.g., Matthew Rimmer, A Supplementary Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties
the
Korea-Australia
Free
Trade
Agreement
5,
https://works.bepress.com/matthew-rimmer/202/ (stating that "investor-state arbitration raises some
profoundly troublesome political issues regardless of arbitrator discretion"); Danny Vinik, Why Obama
Is Spurning Liberals With a Massive Trade Deal, NEW REPUBLIC (April 7, 2015),
https://newrepublic.com/article/1 21476/trans-pacific-partnership-foundation-all-future-trade-deals
(stating that international investment arbitration "gives extraordinary new privileges and powers and
rights to just one interest. Foreign investors are privileged vis-a-vis domestic companies, vis-a-vis the
government of a country, [and] vis-a-vis other private sector interests").
35. EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed text as of January 2016, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfmid=1437.
36. Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement, E.U.-Can. (unratified as of Feb. 2017), ch.
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This combination of substantive and procedural protections for foreign
investors has resulted in a robust and far-reaching legal regime.3 7 Indeed,
investment treaty arbitration has been analogized to judicial review or to an
international human rights court. 38 Arbitral tribunals scrutinise the sovereign
conduct of the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of host States to assess
39
compliance with the standards of protection set out in the relevant IIA. It is a
potent mechanism: to date, several tribunals have ordered the respondent State to
40
pay investors over a billion U.S. dollars in compensation for treaty violations.
Additionally, notorious inconsistencies notwithstanding, the sheer volume of
claims and resulting arbitral awards has revolutionised the practice of public
international law in little over fifteen years.41
There is an inherent tension between State regulatory power and investment
treaty arbitration. By entering into IIAs, States consent to delegate some of their
sovereignty to an international tribunal to determine when an investor is entitled to
compensation for an attributable sovereign act.4 2 The rub is that most investment
treaty claims today do not concern bright-line cases of direct expropriation - a
government's takeover of a factory plant, for example - but may seek to impugn
general regulatory measures directed at environmental protection, public health,
prudential economic regulation or other key public welfare interests.4 3 This entails
obvious economic and political implications for respondent States. As practitioner
Toby Landau explains:
8: Investment, art. 8.27, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-bychapter/ [hereinafter CETA].
37. Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2015 - IIA Issues Note No.2,
UNCTAD
(July
2016),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/ISDS%20Issues%2ONote%202016.pdf ("A record high
of 70 investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) cases were filed in 2015. The overall number of publicly
known ISDS claims reached 696. Following the recent trend, a high share of new cases in 2015 (about
40 per cent) was brought against developed countries, including many cases by European investors
against European Union member States.").
38. Paul Barker, Investor-State Arbitration as International Public Law: Deference,
Proportionality and the Standard of Review, in INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (1. Laird & T. Weiler eds., 2015).
39. Id. at 244-245.
40. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corporation and Occidental Exploration and Production
Company v. the Republic of Ecuador, Case No. ARB/06/1 1, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 308 (Oct.
5, 2012); Hulley Enterprises Ltd. (Cyprus) v. The Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226, Final
Award, UNCITRAL, 577 (July 18, 2014); Venezuela Holdings, B.V., et al. (case formerly known as
Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., Mobil Cerro Negro Holding, Ltd., Mobil Venezolana de
Petr6leos Holdings, Inc., Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd., & Mobil Venezolana de Petr6leos, Inc.) v.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Case No. ARB/07/27, Award, ICSID Arbitrual Tribunal, 133 (Oct.
9,2014).
41. Barker, supra note 38, at 235-36.
42. Id.
43. Paul Barker, LegitimateRegulatory Interests: Case Law and Developments in IIA Practice, in
REASSERTION OF CONTROL OVER THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME 232-33 (Andreas Kulick ed.,

2016).
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Your mandate [as an arbitrator in investment arbitration case] unlike
commercial arbitration is to review the exercise of discretion by a
sovereign by way of its executive, its legislative even its judiciary. [. . .]
You are supposedly to rule upon the interest of an individual investor
and yet in doing so, you may well impact upon a whole community
[.. .] And, you do so with the ability to impose damages unlike many
public law municipal systems and those damages may be significant.
You have the power to affect the most extraordinary allocation of public
funds."

Indeed, investor-State tribunals have recently considered inter alia:
emergency powers exercised during national economic crises; 45 the regulation of
public utilities; 46 the regulation of harmful substances; 47 the protection of cultural
property or heritage; 48 and non-discrimination and affirmative action policies. 49
Two claimants in particular have caught the public's attention: 50 Phillip Morris,

44. Toby Landau, Response to the Report, Rethinking the Substantive Standards of Protection
Under
Investment
Treaties
(Dec.
14,
2010),
367-68,
https://pca-cpa.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Mauritius-Intemational-Arbitration-Conference-2010.pdf.
45. CMS Gas Transmission Co v. Argentina, Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ICSID Arbitral
Tribunal, 108 (May 12 2005); LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc v.
Argentina, Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 29 (Oct. 3, 2006);
Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, Case No ARB/02/16, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 7273 (Sept 28, 2007); Enron Corp and Ponderosa Assets, LP v. Argentina, Case No ARB/01/3, Award,
ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 59 (May 22, 2007); BG Group plc v. Argentina, Case No ARB/03/9, Final
Award, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 115 (Dec. 24, 2007); Continental Casualty Co v. Argentina,
Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 122 (Sept. 5, 2008); National Grid plc v.
Argentina, Award, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 96-97 (Nov. 3, 2008); Suez, Sociedad General de
Aguas de Barcelona SA, InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Aguas SA v. Argentina, Case No.
ARB/03/17, Award, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, 90-91 (July 30, 2010); Daimler Financial Services AG,
supra note 14; PoItovA & ISTROKAPITAL SE v. Hellenic Republic, Case No. ARB/13/8, Award,
ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, (Apr. 9, 2015); Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd v. Hellenic Republic,
Case No. ARB/14/16, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal.
46. See Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanz., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22,
Award
(July
24,
2008),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC1589_En&caseld=C67; Aguas del Tunari S.A. v. Republic of Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3,
Decision on Respondent's Objections to Jurisdiction (Oct. 21, 2005), 16 ICSID Rep. 303 (2005).
47. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits,
NAFTA Arbitral Trib., 16 ICSID Rep. 40 (2005).
48. See S. Pac. Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992), 3 ICSID Rep. 189 (1992); Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States,
Award, NAFTA Arbitral Trib., http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf.
49. See Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug.
4,
2010),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICStD/FrontServletrequestType-CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC1651_En&caseld=C90.
50. European Comm'n, Fact sheet. Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute
Settlement
in
EU
agreements
5
(Nov.
2013),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc 151916.pdf.
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which introduced two claims (both recently dismissed) against Australia and
Uruguay relating to public health measures (tobacco plain-packaging legislation); 5 1
and Vattenfall, which commenced an arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty
against Germany for the termination of that country's nuclear energy programme
following the Fukushima disaster. 52
States have been recalibrating their IIAs in response to the rapidly developing
body of international investment law.5 3 In recent years, States have sought to
reassert control over the international investment law regime when drafting new
investment treaties, for example by limiting tribunals' discretion in the
interpretation of the FET treatment and indirect expropriation standards of
protection. 54 Respondent States have consistently argued in arbitral proceedings
that IIAs do not impose liability for bona fide and non-discriminatory measures
affecting foreign investors. However, the series of awards finding Argentina
56
liable for FET violations arising out of measures taken during its financial crisiS,

and the recent NAFTA award in Bilcon v. Canada, demonstrate how potentially
far-reaching a tribunal's review of host State regulatory measures can be.
The right to regulate is centre-stage in the current negotiation of major IIAs. 8
For example, responding to widely publicised concerns, the European
Commission's policy is that all future EU IIAs will provide a detailed set of
provisions giving guidance to tribunals, "[i]n particular, [that] when the state is
protecting the public interest in a non-discriminatory way, the right of the state to
regulate should prevail over the economic impact of those measures on the
51. Philip Morris Brands Sirl, supra note 15 (dismissing Philip Morris' claims on the merits,
finding that the measures were a reasonable bona fide exercise of police powers for the protection of
public health, were not arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust, discriminatory or disproportionate, and were
therefore non-compensable); Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Commonwealth of Australia,
PCA Case Repository Case No. 2012-12, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Dec. 17, 2015),
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1711 (dismissing Philip Morris' claims on jurisdictional
grounds).
52. Vattenfall AB v. Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Notice of Arbitration (May 31,
2012).
53. See Policy Options for IIA Reform: Treaty Examples and Data, UNCTAD (June 25, 2015),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/Policy-options-for-IIA-reform-WIR2015.pdf.
54. Id. at 11-13.
55. See the submissions of States in, e.g., Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim
2000),
26,
(June
Trib.
Arbitral
NAFTA
Award,
Saluka Investments B.V. v.
http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes/canada/pope/pope-phase-10.pdf;
Czech Republic, Case No. 2001-04, Partial Award, Perm. Ct. Arb. (Mar. 17, 2006),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/880; Philip Morris Brands Strl, supra note 15.
56. See e.g. CMS Gas Transmission Co., supra note 46; LG&E Energy Corp., supra note 46;
Sempra Energy Int'l, supra note 46; Enron Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, LP, supra note 46; BG Group
Plc., supra note 46; Continental Casualty Co., supra note 46; National Grid P.L.C., supra note 46.
57. William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton & Bilcon
of Delaware Inc. v. Canada, Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, Perm. Ct. Arb.
(Mar. 17, 2015), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1 287.
58. European Comm'n, supra note 50, at 2.
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investor." 59 In February 2016, an express right to regulate provision was added to a
revised text of the CETA. 60 As discussed further below, in contradistinction to the
dispute settlement mechanism agreed by the States Parties to the TPP, the EU is
also demanding that its IIA counterparties replace arbitration with a new standing
investment court and appellate mechanism on the grounds that it will safeguard EU
Member States' right to regulate. 6 Both the revised CETA text and EU-Vietnam
FTA concluded in December 2015 incorporate the EU's proposed investment court
system. 62
These developments raise the prospect of regional divergence or
fragmentation of international investment law as States respond differently to
arbitral awards and criticisms of the regime. Indeed, the ICJ judge and eminent
arbitrator, James Crawford, has stated that:
Some would say investment arbitration has reached its half-life.
Emerging from, or in reaction against, earlier inter-state forms
[diplomatic protection, FCN treaties] it has a kind of 'boom-and-bust'
feel to it. Ad hoc tribunals have produced an erratic pattern of decisions,
with reasoning often impressionistic and displaying a certain disregard
for state regulatory prerogatives. This is leading in turn to a reaction by
some host states. Meantime there is much that is uncertain and
unpredictable.6 3
States' assertion of their right to regulate under international investment law
has coincided with increasing public opposition to IAS on the grounds that they
undermine the host State's right to regulate in the public interest.6
As demonstrated in the section below, the States Parties to the TPP have
likewise reacted to the prevailing concerns regarding their right to regulate.
However, the TPP member States appear to have favoured evolution rather than
wholesale change to the basic features of the regime of international investment

law. 65

59. European Comm'n, supranote 50, at 2, 7-8.
60. CETA, supra note 36, art. 8.9..
61. European Comm'n Press Release MEMO/15/6060, Why the new EU proposal for an
Investment Court System in TTIP is beneficial to both States and investors (Nov. 12, 2015).
62. European Comm'n, EU- Vietnam Free Trade Agreement Now Available Online, TRADE (Jan.
29, 2016), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1449; European Comm'n Press Release
IP/16/399, CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach on investment in trade agreement (Feb. 29,

2016).
63. James Crawford, Foreword to ZACHARY DOUGLAS,
INVESTMENT CLAIMS xxi (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009).

THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW OF

64. Andrew Walker, 7TTP: Why the EU-US trade deal matters, BBC.cOM (May 13, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32691589.
65. See Alexander W. Resar, The Evolution of Investor-State Arbitration in the Trans-Pacific
PartnershipAgreement, 34 BERKELY J. INT'L L. 159 (2016).
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III.

STATES' RIGHT TO REGULATE AND THE TPP's INVESTMENT CHAPTER

The TPP would empower a protected investor (either an individual or
corporation) from one of the States Parties to commence international arbitration
against the government of another TPP party for measures violating the broad
66
standards of investment protection set out in the Investment Chapter. The Obama
Administration argued that:
TPP will result in higher levels of labor and environmental protections
in most TPP countries than they have today. [. . .] We can't change the
standards in the more than 3,000 agreements among other countries.
Most of those agreements will continue to exist, with or without TPP.
But through TPP, we can set a new, higher set of standards, stronger
safeguards and better transparency provisions.

.

The States Parties to the TPP have sought to safeguard their right to regulate
in their drafting of the Investment Chapter, which provides: (i) express language
68
asserting the inherent rights of states to regulate in the public interest; (ii) denial
69
of benefits clauses excluding specific types of claim, such as tobacco regulations;
and (iii) more detailed guidance in order to limit tribunal discretion in the
70
To that extent, the Investment
interpretation of the standards of protection.
Chapter is consistent with the approach taken in other IIAs, in particular recent
U.S. treaties.7
It remains to be seen whether the TPP's articles addressing host States' right
to regulate will have a substantive impact on tribunal rulings. It is significant,
however, that the States Parties to the TPP have not done away with the essential
features of the investment treaty regime, for example by retaining investor-State
arbitration.72 Indeed, the final agreed language of the Investment Chapter could be
interpreted as an affirmation by the States Parties of the basic legitimacy of
international investment law and broad acceptance of its development by arbitral
tribunals rather than an attempt to overhaul the entire system from the top down.

66. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.12.
67. Jeffrey Zients, Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Questions and Answers, THE WHITE
HouSE: BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/26/investor-state-disputesettlement-isds-questions-and-answers.
68. TPP Made in America: 9 Investment, USTR, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-ChapterSummary- Investment.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2016).
69. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.15.
70. See TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9.
71. See Todd Allee & Andrew Lugg, Who wrote the rules for the Trans-Pacific Partnership?,
RESEARCH

&

POLITICS

(July-

Sep.

2016),

http://rap.sagepub.com/content/3/3/2053168016658919.full.pdf+html.
72. Shawn Donnan, U.S. looks to TPP to reform arbitration system, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 8,
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/d7379996-862b-l le5-90de-f44762bf9896.
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The use of express languageasserting the inherentright ofStates to
regulate in the public interest

The TPP contains express provisions on the right to regulate for the public
welfare and public health, the environment, and for financial stability. The TPP's
Preamble provides:
[The Parties recognize] their inherent right to regulate and resolve to
preserve the flexibility of the Parties to set legislative and regulatory
priorities, safeguard public welfare, and protect legitimate public
welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, the
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources, the
integrity and stability of the financial system and public morals.73
Although the Preamble is non-binding, this language may be consequential.
Pursuant to the rules of treaty interpretation codified in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 74 , a tribunal should consider the
context of the terms used and the treaty's object and purpose. Article 31(2) of the
VCLT expressly provides that the preamble is part of the context for the purpose of
the interpretation of a treaty.7 6 On this basis, certain tribunals have justified broad
interpretations of investor protections on the basis of language in the IIA preamble
stating the object and purpose of the treaty to be investment promotion and
protection.7 7
The substantive standards of protection in the TPP also include express
language on the right to regulate. Article 9.16 provides:
Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent
with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment
activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.
This provision is
successfully made in
regulation aimed at the
Although Article 9.16

consistent with the argument that the United States has
defending NAFTA claims that a non-discriminatory
general welfare will not ordinarily violate IIA standards. 79
is arguably a signal that States intend for international

73. TPP, supra note 1, at Preamble.
74. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
75. Id.
76. Id. art. 31(2).
77. See, e.g., Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award,
T 70, 76 (Aug. 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2000); Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award,
UNCITRAL Arbitral Trib., (Sept. 3, 2001), http://www.italaw.com/documents/LauderAward.pdf.
78. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.16.
79. See Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Counter Memorial of Respondent United States of
America
197,
UNCITRAL
Arbitral
Trib.
(Sept.
19
2006),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/73686.pdf.
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tribunals to show deference in their review of non-discriminatory bona fide
regulatory measures, it has been criticized for the perhaps circular language stating
that regulatory measures must still be consistent with the provisions of the
Investment Chapter.80 Indeed, in finding Argentina liable to pay compensation, the
tribunal in Daimlert8 did not deny that States have a right to regulate in accordance
with their international obligations. 82
B.

General exceptions and denial of benefits clauses excluding specific types
of claim, such as tobacco regulations

83
Chapter 29 sets out the Exceptions and General Provisions to the TPP.
Article 29.3 of Chapter 29 provides that "temporary safeguard measures" are
permitted in response to a financial crisis, for example "serious balance of
payments and external financial difficulties or threats thereof[,]" or where capital
movements cause or threaten to cause "serious difficulties for macroeconomic
management."8 Hodgson suggests that "the shadow of the Argentina investment
jurisprudence looms large - various Asian-Pacific countries themselves had to deal
with a scarring financial crisis around the same time." 8s Any measure taken
pursuant to Article 29.3 must, however, not be inconsistent with the National
Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and Expropriation provisions of the
Investment Chapter, and must not inter alia exceed 18 months in duration (subject
to the right to seek an extension from the other TPP States Parties).8
As expected, the TPP contains an express carve out for tobacco control
measures at Article 29.5. This innovative denial of benefits clause is a direct
response to the controversial (and recently dismissed) treaty claims brought by
Philip Morris, a global cigarette and tobacco company, against Australia and
Uruguay relating to tobacco plain-packaging legislation enacted on public health
grounds. 88 In order to protect the TPP member states against such claims, Article
29.5 provides that:
A Party may elect to deny the benefits of Section B of Chapter 9
(Investment) with respect to claims challenging a tobacco control
measure of the Party. Such a claim shall not be submitted to arbitration

80. Amokura Kawharu, Expert Paper #2 TPPA: Chapter 9 on Investment, WORDPRESS.COM:
TPP LEGAL (Dec. 2015), at 9, https://tpplegal.files.wordpress.com/2015/12/ep2-amokura-kawharu.pdf.
81. See Daimler Financial Services AG, supra note 16.
82. See Daimler Financial Services AG, supra note 16, 1 100.
83. TPP, supranote 1, ch. 29.
84. TPP, supranote 1, art. 29.3.
85. Hodgson, supra note 20, at 1.
86. See TPP, supra note 1, ch. 9, art. 9.4-9.5, ch. 10, art. 10.3-10.4, ch. 11, art. 11.3-11.4.
87. TPP, supranote 1, at ch. 29, art. 29.5.
88. Philip Morris Brands Sarl, supra note 15 (rejecting claimants arguments, with a partial
dissenting opinion of Gary Bom); Philip Morris Asia Ltd., supra note 52; see IA Reporter story,
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/breaking-australia-prevails-in-arbitration-with-philip-morris-over-

tobacco-plain-packaging-dispute/
jurisdictional grounds).

(in which

the tribunal

dismissed Philip Morris'

claims on
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under Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment) if a Party has made such an
election. If a Party has not elected to deny benefits with respect to such
claims by the time of the submission of such a claim to arbitration under
Section B of Chapter 9 (Investment), a Party may elect to deny benefits
during the proceedings. For greater certainty, if a Party elects to deny
benefits with respect to such claims, any such claim shall be
dismissed.89
Prior awards have taken contrasting views on whether denial of benefits
clauses operate retrospectively" or with prospective effect only.9 ' By contrast,
Article 29.5 makes clear that a host State may elect to deny benefits after an
investor has brought a dispute. 92 It is notable that in contrast to Article 29.5, the
denial of benefits provision in Article 9.15 does not contain such language.93 It is
therefore arguable whether a respondent State can invoke Article 9.15 after the

89. TPP, supra note 1, ch. 29, art. 29.5 Tobacco control measures are defined in footnote 12 to
Chapter 29 as follows:
. . a measure of a Party related to the production or consumption of manufactured tobacco
products (including products made or derived from tobacco), their distribution, labeling,
packaging, advertising, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase, or use, as well as enforcement
measures, such as inspection, recordkeeping, and reporting requirements. For greater
certainty, a measure with respect to tobacco leaf that is not in the possession of a
manufacturer of tobacco products or that is not part of a manufactured tobacco product is not
a tobacco control measure.
90. Ulysseas, Inc. v. Ecuador, Interim Award, 1 173, UNCITRAL Arbitral Trib. (Sept. 28, 2010),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita1045.pdf (stating that the tribunal sees "no
valid reasons to exclude retrospective effects" of the denial of benefits provision, reasoning that the
very existence of a denial of benefits provision in an investment agreement alerts potential investors
that "the protection afforded by the [investment treaty] is subject during the life of the investment to the
possibility of a denial of the [investment treaty's] advantages").
91. Plama Consorium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, IN 159-65 (Feb. 8, 2005), 13 ICSID Rep. 272; Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian
Federation, Case No. 2005/05/AA228, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, $$ 514-15,
Penn. Ct. Arb., (Nov. 30, 2009), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/423; see also Philip Morris Asia
Ltd., supra note 52, In 38, 58; Liman Caspian Oil BV & NCL Dutch Investment BV v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICISD Case No. ARB/07/14, Excerpts of the Award, 1 225, (June 22, 2010),
https://icsid.worldbank.org/1CSID/FrontServlet?requestType-CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=
DC3392_En&caseld-C106.
92. TPP, supranote 1, ch. 29, art. 29.5.
93. TPP, supranote 1, ch. 9, art. 9.15 states:
1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an
enterprise of that other Party and to investments of that investor if the enterprise: (a) is
owned or controlled by a person of a non-Party or of the denying Party; and (b) has no
substantial business activities in the territory of any Party other than the denying Party.
2. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an
enterprise of that other Party and to investments of that investor if persons of a non-Party
own or control the enterprise and the denying Party adopts or maintains measures with
respect to the non-Party or a person of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the
enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were
accorded to the enterprise or to its investments.
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commencement of the proceedings. 94 It also remains unclear whether arbitral
tribunals interpreting other HAs may consider that the denial of benefits clause in
that IIA cannot be invoked after the start of the proceedings where the clause does
not contain the type of express language found in Article 29.5.
C. Detailedprovisions regardinginvestment protectionstandards
Earlier generations of IAs are typically skeletal documents of little more than
ten pages, setting out "provisions for investor rights without addressing in a
comprehensive fashion the relationship of these to continuing powers of State
regulation." 95 However, since around the turn of the century, newer IIAs have
sought to clarify that they "do not purport to promote and protect investment at the
expense of other key values such as health, safety, labour protection and the
environment." 96 The result is that newer IIAs contain more detailed drafting. By
contrast to the skeletal treaties of old, 97 the TPP's Investment Chapter is 54 pages
long. 98

The TPP's Investment Chapter generally tracks the approach of recent U.S.
BITs and FTAs. 99 Notably, the language of Annex 9-B to the Investment Chapter,
which provides guidance on the distinction between indirect expropriations and
non-compensable regulatory measures, is almost exactly the same as the 2004 and
2012 U.S. Model BITs.100
In determining whether an action or a series of actions constitutes an indirect

expropriation, TPP Annex 9-B directs the tribunal to conduct:
[A] case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that
an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that
an indirect expropriation has occurred; (ii) the extent to which the
government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-

94. Notwithstanding the footnote attached to the Article 29.5 that states that the Article does not
prejudice the operation of Article 9.15 (Denial of Benefits).
95. Benedict Kingsbury & Stephan Schill, INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION As GOVERNANCE:
FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE EMERGING GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW 23 (New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers, 2009).
96. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006:
Trends in Investment Rulemaking, 14, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2606/5, (Feb. 2007).
97. See, e.g., Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Apr. 6, 1989, Treaty Series No. 3 (1992);
Agreement between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Italy on the Promotion and Protection
of Investment, May 22, 1990; Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the
Government of the Republic of Albania for the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Aug. 1, 1991.
98. TPP, supra note 1, 19.
99. See TPP,supra note 1; 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 22.
100. Compare2012 U.S. Model BIT, supranote 22; TPP, supra note 1, at Annex 9-B.
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backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the government action.' 0

Annex 9-B also reflects language intended to safeguard the right to regulate
first introduced in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT that has been widely copied in
subsequent IIAs worldwide.1 02 The annex directs the tribunal that "nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and the
environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations, except in rare
circumstances."l103
Interestingly, the States Parties to TPP rowed back from earlier draft language
that reportedly would have limited the circumstances in which a measure amounts
to a compensable treaty violation.'0 For example, in previous drafts, "rare
circumstances" were limited to situation in which the host state breached a prior
binding written commitment to investors or discriminated against it.' 05 The States
Parties also rejected language in an earlier draft providing that non-discriminatory
law making for legitimate public welfare objectives shall not be regarded as
expropriation.1 06
While the clause does not provide express guidance, it is likely that "rare
circumstances" will be interpreted narrowly. 0 7 The tribunal in the recent Philip
Morris v. Uruguay0 award held similar language found in the 2012 U.S. Model
BIT and other IIAs reflects the position under general international law that
compensation is not required where a bona fide regulatory measure is within the
State's police powers.' 9 Nevertheless, neither the police powers doctrine nor the
TPP provide blanket exceptions from compensation for States' regulatory
measures."i 0 As explained by the Pope & Talbot tribunal "much creeping
expropriation could be conducted by regulation and a blanket exception for
regulatory measures would create a gaping loophole in international protections
101. TPP, supra note 1, at Annex 9-B(3)(a). In a footnote, Annex 9-B clarifies "for greater
certainty" that whether "investor's investment-backed expectations are reasonable depends, to the
extent relevant, on factors such as whether the government provided the investor with binding written
assurances and the nature and extent of governmental regulation or the potential for government
regulation in the relevant sector." TPP, supra note 1.

102. Expropriation - A Sequel, supra note 13,
103. TPP, supranote 1, at Annex 9-B(3)(b).
104.
105.
106.
107.

Kawharu,
Kawharu,
Kawharu,
Kawharu,

supranote
supranote
supranote
supra note

80,
80,
80,
80,

at
at
at
at

¶ 60.

12.
12.
12.
12.

108. Philip Morris Brands Sdrl, supranote 15.
109. Philip Morris Brands SArl, supra note 15, at 294, 300. By contrast to the 2012 U.S. Model
BIT and recent U.S. hlAs, the TPP Annex 9-B guidance on the distinction between expropriation and
non-compensable regulatory measures does not state that the Investment Chapter's provisions on
expropriation and compensation are intended to reflect customary international law.

110. Chemtura Corporation v. The Government of Canada, Ad Hoc NAFTA UNCITRAL Arbitral
Tribunal, Award, 1 266, (Aug. 2, 2010) (the police powers doctrine operates within certain limits "so
that it is not abused by governments who might enact police measures as a pretext to an

expropriation.").
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against expropriation."'" It follows that the form of measure is not determinative
to the existence of expropriation and the formal characterisation or status of a
government measure will not prevent a tribunal from assessing whether it is
expropriatory or not.112
By contrast to the 2012 U.S. Model BIT and recent U.S. HAs, the TPP Annex
9-B guidance on the distinction between expropriation and non-compensable
regulatory measures does not state that the Investment Chapter's provisions on
expropriation and compensation are intended to reflect customary international
law.

113

TPP Article 9.6, as supplemented by Annex 9-A, prescribes the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to protected investments. 114 The Article
provides that the concepts of "fair and equitable treatment [and] full protection and
security . .. do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required
by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights."" 5 This is a
continuation of existing U.S. practice and is consistent with the 2001 NAFTA Free
Trade Commission's Interpretative Note clarifying that the Minimum Standard of
Treatment ("MST") provision in NAFTA was not additive to the customary
international law standard."16
To what extent does linking FET with the customary international law
minimum standard help safeguard host States' right to regulate? The answer is not
clear. On the one hand, FET clauses that are linked to the MST have been
interpreted as having a higher threshold of liability than other unlinked/
autonomous FET clauses." 7 On the other hand, some tribunals have interpreted the
MST so broadly as to reduce the differences between the autonomous FET
standard and the MST. 1s For example, the Merrill & Ring tribunal stated that the
111. Pope & Talbot, Inc v. The Government of Canada, NAFTA Arbitral Tribunal 34 (June 26,
2000).
112. See, e.g., RoslnvestCo UK Ltd. v. The Russian Federation, Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Comerce Case No. V079/2005, Final Award, 1 628 (Sept. 12, 2010).
113. Compare 2012 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 20, at Annex B, 11 (stating "The Parties confirm
their shared understanding that.... Article 6 [Expropriation and Compensation](1) is intended to reflect
customary international law concerning the obligation of States with respect to expropriation."); TPP,
supra note 1, ch. 9, Annex B (does not contain this language).

114. TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(2).
115. TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(2).
116. NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter II Provisions,
ORGANIZATION
OF
AMERICAN
STATES,
2
(July
31
2001),
http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/Commission/CH1 1understandinge.asp.
117. PATRICK DUMBERRY, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD: A GUIDE TO

NAFTA CASE LAW ON ARTICLE 1105, 321 (Kluwer Law International, 2013) (stating ". . . the existence
of this high threshold of severity is a predominant characteristic of NAFTA case law. It is, indeed, one
aspect that clearly differentiates it from awards rendered by non-NAFTA tribunals which have often
used a lower threshold of liability. This is certainly the case of non-NAFTA tribunals when interpreting
an unqualified FET clause").
118. Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. The Government of Canada, UNCITRAL and NAFTA Arbitral
Tribunal, ICSID Administered, Award, (Mar. 31, 2010).

2017

TPP AND STATES' RIGHTS TO REGULATE

221

customary MST "protects against all such acts or behavior that might infringe a
sense of fairness, equity and reasonableness."" 9 Furthermore, the Tribunal stated
that the customary MST "provides for the fair and equitable treatment of alien
investors within the confines of reasonableness." 1 20
Moreover, even when formally adopting the MST's high threshold, the extent
of the tribunal's review can be potentially far-reaching. Take Bilcon v. Canada,121
which concerned the rejection by a joint federal-provincial environmental review
panel of the claimants' application to develop a mining and marine terminal project
in Canada. In that case, a majority of the tribunal held that Canada had violated
the MST and national provision provisions of NAFTA.1 22 The majority considered
that the conduct of the joint review was arbitrary for the purposes of the NAFTA
MST standard because it departed from the methodology required by Canadian
law.1 23 This, the majority held, had the effect of depriving the claimants of a fair
opportunity to have their proposal considered in accordance with applicable laws.
The majority concluded that Canada thereby frustrated claimants' legitimate
expectations that their project would obtain environmental permission if it
complied with the environmental review process prescribed by domestic law.' 2 4 A
forceful dissent challenged the foundation of such a legitimate expectation,12 5 and
considered whether Canadian law had been complied with was arguable, since "the
Tribunal did not have the benefit of a determination by a Canadian federal court on
the matter." 2 6 Rather, the dissenting arbitrator concluded, the award constitutes a
"significant intrusion into domestic jurisdiction and will create a chill on the
7
operation of environment review panels." 2
TPP Article 9.6 also includes two sub clauses, which elaborate that measure
that are inconsistent with an investor's expectations, and the withdrawal or
amendment of a subsidy or grant, are deemed insufficient by themselves to
constitute a breach of the MST (arts 9.6.4 and 9.6.5 respectively).1 2 8
Notably, Article 9.6(4) provides that "the mere fact that a Party takes or fails
to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor's expectations" does not
constitute a breach of the MST, "even if there is loss or damage to the covered

119. Idat 210.
120. Id. at }213.
121. William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and
Bilcon of Delaware Inc v. Canada, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Case No 2009-04, Notice of
Intent, (Feb. 5, 2008).
122. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57.
123. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57, ¶ 591, 604.
124. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57, J¶ 447, 603.
125. William Ralph Clayton, supranote 57, ¶733.
126. William Ralph Clayton, William Richard Clayton, Douglas Clayton, Daniel Clayton and
Bilcon of Delaware Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, Permanent Court of
Arbitration, Case No. 2009-04, Dissenting Opinion of Professor Donald McCrae, 1 34 (Mar.10, 2015).
127. Id.148.
128. TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(4-5).
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investment as a result."1 2 9 It has been suggested that the provision on legitimate
expectations "seems to rule out the possibility that a state's mere thwarting of a
130
Other scholars
subjective expectation of an investor can trigger an MST breach."
suggested that this provision may indicate that "expectations-based claim may still
13 1
be possible, where a state arbitrarily departs from reasonable expectations."
Both interpretations could arguably reduce the intended effect of the clause. The
wording of the clause does not qualify its impact to subjective expectations.12 The
clause clarifies that legitimate expectations may be a factor in establishing a
violation of the FET standard but they cannot give rise to a stand-alone obligation
of the host state.1 33 The clause could also be interpreted as insuring that even if the
customary MST will develop one day to include legitimate expectations as a standalone obligation, the FET obligation under the TPP will not include legitimate
expectations as a stand-alone obligation.
Finally, the TPP contains important language on non-discrimination against
foreign investors. Article 9.4(2) sets out the national treatment obligation:
Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment no less
favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments in
its territory of its own investors with respect to the establishment,
acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or
1 34
other disposition of investments.
A footnote to Article 9.4 expressly provides that the tribunal should consider
the State's right to regulate in determining a discrimination claim:
For greater certainty, whether treatment is accorded in 'like
circumstances' under Article 9.4 (National Treatment) or Article 9.5
(Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) depends on the totality of the
129. TPP, supranote 1, art. 9.6(4).
130. Luke Eric Peterson, A First Glance at the Investment Chapter of the TPP Agreement. A
FamiliarUS-Style Structure with a Few Novel Twists 2, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION REPORTER (Nov. 6,
https://www.iareporter.com/articles/a-first-glance-at-the-investment-chapter-of-the-tpp2015),
agreement-a-familar-us-style-structure-with-a-few-novel-twists/.
131. Kawharu, supra note 0, at 11.
132. See TPP, supra note 1, art. 9.6(4) (stating "For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party
takes or fails to take an action that may be inconsistent with an investor's expectations does not
constitute a breach of this Article, even if there is loss or damage to the covered investment as a
result.").
133. This interpretation is also in light with the understanding of other TPP members. See, e.g.,
Spence Int'l Investments, LLC, Berkowitz Et Al., v. The Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No.
UNCT/13/2, Submission of the United States of America, 1 17, (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw4249.pdf. ("Neither the concepts of
'good faith' nor 'legitimate expectations' are component elements of 'fair and equitable treatment'
under customary international law that give rise to an independent host State obligation"). Nevertheless,
it should be emphasized that a breach of legitimate expectation can be a factor in analyzing stand-alone
obligations (see e.g., Mobil Investments Canada Inc. & Murphy Oil Corp. v Canada, Decision on
Liability and on Principles of Quantum, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal, Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, 1 153,
(May 22, 2012), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italawl 145.pdf.
134. TPP, supranote 1, art. 9.4(2).

TPP AND STATES' RIGHTS TO REGULATE

2017

223

circumstances, including whether the relevant treatment distinguishes
between investors or investments on the basis of legitimate public
35
welfare objectives.1
Whether such language would have affected the tribunal's analysis in Bilcon
is again debatable. Johnson and Sachs argue that the non-discrimination standard
should expressly require that the investor was discriminated against on grounds of
nationality.' 3 6 Johnson and Sachs appear to object to the extent of the tribunal's
discretion in determining whether "legitimate public welfare objectives" exist.13 7
However, the inclusion of right to regulate language necessarily requires tribunals
to probe such questions, and much will depend on the standard of review that the
tribunal applies.1 38
IV.

CONCLUSION

The TPP's Investment Chapter continues the recent trend in IIA practice to
include language intended to safeguard host States' legitimate public welfare
objectives. As summarised above, the TPP preamble contains express language
reaffirming the right to regulate, and the Investment Chapter itself provides
guidance on the standards of investment protection as they apply to regulatory
measures, as well as general exceptions, including the high profile tobacco control
measure denial of benefits clause and a carve out for temporary safeguard
measures in financial crises. However, the extent to which the Investment Chapter
pushes the envelope is debatable. Indeed, its provisions are remarkably consistent
with U.S. IIA practice since the 2004 Model BIT.1 39 Moreover, the final agreement
rejected earlier proposals for an express carve out for non-discriminatory
regulatory measures. In their critique, Johnson and Sachs question why taxation
measures continue to be expressly carved out from the MST provision when
environmental or health measures are not; if States Parties are "unwilling to trust"
tribunals with the former then why, Johnson and Sachs ask, not exclude the
latter?

40

The irony of the new U.S. administration's trade policy is that the TPP
arguably represented an expansion of influence of U.S. treaty practice into the
Asia-Pacific region. But it is not the only show in town. By contrast to the TPP, the

135. TPP, supranote 1, art. 9.4 n.14.
136. Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, The TPP's Investment Chapter: Entrenching, rather than
reforming, a flawed system, COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT, 10, (Nov. 2015),

http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2015/1 1/TPP-entrenching-flaws-21 -Nov-FINAL.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Caroline Henckels, BalancingInvestment Protectionand the Public Interest: The Role of the
standard of Review and the Importance of deference in Investor-State Arbitration, 4 J. OF INT'L
DISPUTE SETrLEMENT 197 (Jan. 12, 2013) (stating that 'the standard of review applied by tribunals is
"a central means by which to calibrate the balance of power between host states and foreign investors in
international investment law.").
139. See Allee, supra note 71.
140. Johnson & Sachs, supranote 136, at 2.
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China-Australia FTA1 41 ('ChAFTA'), which was signed in 2015, has taken an
14 2
Unlike the TPP, ChAFTA
innovative approach to the right to regulate issue.
expressly excludes legitimate and non-discriminatory regulatory measures from
treaty protection.1 43 ChAFTA goes further still. Whereas the European Union has
placed its faith in an investment court system to better protect member states' right
to regulate, ChAFTA provides that a respondent State facing a claim arising out of
a regulatory measure may issue a "public welfare notice" which suspends the
investor-State proceedings for 90 days, during which the States Parties have the
opportunity to agree whether the complaint falls within the exception for legitimate
and non-discriminatory regulatory measures or not." If the States Parties are
1 45
unable to agree, the tribunal decides if the measure violates the treaty.
The TPP's Investment Chapter may not be radical, but its provisions arguably
reinforce the legal foundation for States' right to regulate for the public welfare
without incurring liability under international investment law. This may not,
however, be enough to satisfy increasingly sceptical politicians and citizens of the
46
merits of HAs.1

141. Free Trade Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the
People's Republic of China, Austl.-China, June 17, 2015 [hereinafter CHAFTA].
142. Anthea Roberts and Richard Braddock, Protecting public welfare regulation through joint
treaty party control: a CHAFTA Innovation , COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES ON TOPICAL FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT ISSUES 1, 2, p. 176 (June 20, 2016).

143. CHAFTA, supra note 143, art. 9.11(4) (stating "Measures of a Party that are nondiscriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare objectives of public health, safety, the environment,
public morals or public order shall not be the subject of a claim under this Section.").
144. CHAFTA, supra note 141, art. 9.11(6).
145. CHAFTA, supra note 141, art. 9.12.
146. See, e.g., Lawrence Summers, Voters deserve responsible nationalism not reflex globalism,

FINANCIAL TIMES, (July 10, 2016),
0712b3873ael.html#axzz4FOzkdD22.

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/15598db8-4456-1le6-9b66-

INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION AND THE RISE OF TRANSPARENCY
IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: OPPORTUNITY OR
THREAT?

SHAHLA F. ALt & ODYSSEAS G. REPousis
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, more than ever, the role of investor-state mediation cannot be
appraised without regard to the mounting concerns against investor-state
arbitration. Investment treaties typically protect nationals of one Contracting Party
(natural persons or corporations) when realizing investments in the other
Contracting Party State.' The most common form of such treaties is the bilateral
investment treaty (BIT). As of today, more than 2,800 BITs have been concluded,
2,100 of which are in force.2 To these treaties one may add regional free trade
agreements that include investment chapters or regional investment treaties. One of
the many examples is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) that covers investments. All of these treaties provide for substantive
rights and protections such as the prohibition against uncompensated expropriation
and various non-discriminatory standards.4 However, investment treaties have
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Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong and Member of the IBA
Investor State Mediation Rules Drafting Committee. Special thanks the Government of Hong Kong's
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attained their present recognition due to their dispute settlement provisions and
particularly the investor-state arbitration clause almost mechanically inserted in the
majority of such treaties. This arbitration clause enables investors to directly sue
the host state for breaches of the investment treaty in an international arbitral
tribunal typically comprised of three members.s Investor-state arbitrations are
either ad hoc or institutional, 6 with the most well regarded institutional body being
the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
established by the Washington 1965 Convention. 7
Over the past three decades, investor-state arbitration proliferated with ICSID
registering fifty cases per year and administering more than two hundred at any
given time.8 The most frequent respondent states are Argentina (more than fifty
cases), Venezuela, Czech Republic, Egypt, Canada, Mexico, Ecuador, India,
Ukraine, Poland, and the United States. 9 The increasing use of investor-state
arbitration has also been met with opposition and a widespread consensus for the
need of reform.' 0 Over the past few years, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela
withdrew from the ICSID Convention and terminated a considerable number of
BITs.' More recently, South Africa and Indonesia have also filed notices to
Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008);

CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC,
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2007); NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (2005);
VANDEVELDE, supra note 1.
5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other

States, § 2, art. 37, 1 37(2)(b), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 UNTS 159 (entered into force on Oct. 14, 1966)
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
6. Compare Corona Materials, LLC. v. Dom. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/14/3, Award on
the Respondent's Expedited Preliminary Objection, (May 31, 2016), with Occidental Petroleum Corp.
and Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1 1, Decision
on Annulment, (Nov. 2, 2015).
7. ICSID Convention, supranote 5, § 1, art. 1; see ANTONIO R. PARRA, THE HISTORY OF ICSID
(2012); CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, JURISDICTION OF SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS

433-35 (2009).
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Report 21 (Sept. 4, 2015).
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terminate BITs.12

'

The opposition towards investor-state arbitration stems, in many regards,
from the characteristics of such contemporary dispute settlement procedures. In a
nutshell, a significant number of investment arbitration cases involve investment in
public service sectors and public utilities;1 3 investment claims arising out of
emergency economic measures or civil unrest; 14 and cases that revolve around
issues of public health, environmental regulation,' 5 and human rights, in general.' 6
Moreover, investor-state cases often involve allegations of state misconduct and
corruption,' 7 are costly dispute settlement procedures, and the payment of
compensation in connection with any arising arbitration awards is borne by the
taxpayers of the host state.' 8 All these factors are to the interest of the local
population as the objectives of foreign investors, governments, and local
populations are oftentimes conflicting.' 9 Investor-state arbitration has also been
criticized for enabling the so-called "regulatory chill",2 0 which is a hesitancy to
implement a higher degree of regulation in fear of investment arbitration claims. 2
12. Jonathan Lang, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A shield or a sword?, BOWAN GILFILLAN:
CORPORATE NEWSFLASH, http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/South-AfricanGovemment-Canceling-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties.pdf.
13. See Biwater Gauff (Tanz.) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22,
Procedural Order No 3, 1 60 (Sept. 29, 2006); Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID
Case No. ARB/12/12 (Oct. 2016); Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/94/2, Award, § G, Art. 4 (Apr. 29, 1999), 5 ISCID Rep. 70 (2002).
14. See, e.g., PottovA banka, a.s. v. Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8, Award, ¶ 46
(Apr. 9, 2015); Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly named Giovanna a
Beccara v. the Argentine Republic).
15. See, e.g., Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award of the Tribunal on
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56

(NAFTA

Trib.
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3,
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Case No. ARB/12/12; Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, PCA Case No. 2012-12,
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¶
102,
111,
390-92,
https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1711.
16. See, e.g., Piero Foresti v. Republic of South Africa, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/1, Award,
§ 2(B).
17. See, e.g., Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, Chap. IV, 1
154.; World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award, § II, 1 74
(Oct. 4, 2006).; see generally ALOYSIuS P. LLAMZON, CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (2014).

18. See Yukos UniversalLtd. (Isle ofMan) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final
Award, 1635, 1887 (July 18, 2014) (award of USD 60,000,000).
19. See Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What's in a Meme? The Truth about InvestorState Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 719-20 (2014); Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes, Making the ProceedingsPublic
and Allowing Third Party Interventions: Are the New Generation Bilateral Investment Treaties (U.S.,
Canada) Bifurcating Investment Arbitration from International Commercial Arbitration?, 6 J. WORLD

INV. & TRADE 105, 105-08 (2005); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for
Legitimacy in Investment Arbitration?, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:

PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 253, 253-55 (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
20. Scott Miller, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES
(Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.csis.org/analysis/investor-state-dispute-settlement.
21. Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political
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As later discussed in this article, another source of concern for investor-state
arbitration is the lack of transparency in such transnational proceedings.2 2 Finally,
another concern that is frequently raised is the use of investor-state arbitration to
circumvent national courts and the perceived bias of arbitrators, that act both as
counsel and as arbitrator in related proceedings.2 3
The above concerns have influenced the drafting of contemporary investment
treaties and have also led to initiatives seeking to reform some of the perceived
deficiencies of international investment law. The most notable of such initiatives is
the rise of transparency discussed in Part IV of this article. 24 Suffice however to
say, that it should not be hard to see that greater transparency in investor-state
arbitration is aimed at alleviating some of the concerns referred to above. Investorstate mediation is nevertheless a pre-arbitration dispute resolution method that, if
successful, eliminates the need to pursue investor-state arbitration. However, as we
will see, mediation in general and investor-state mediation in particular, is highly
confidential. Would this then mean that investor-state mediation may be used as a
medium to circumvent the increasing standards of transparency and other public
concerns that are sought to be addressed when it comes to investor-state
arbitration? In other words, if the concerns raised with regard to investor-state
arbitration have merit, why shouldn't they be applicable with respect to any
investor-state dispute settlement proceeding? In addition to these questions, one
should also take into account that the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) is considering a multilateral convention on the
enforcement of mediated settlements.2 5 If this treaty were to be concluded, would it
mean that investor-state mediation would not only be a convenient method to avoid

&

Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 606, 607 (Chester Brown
Kate Miles eds., 2011).
22. See N. Jansen Calamita, Dispute Settlement Transparency in Europe's Evolving Investment
Treaty Policy: Adopting the UNCITRAL TransparencyRules Approach, 15 J. WORLD INVEST. & TRADE

645, 650-53 (2014).
23. See Michael Waibel et al., The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and
Reality, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY xxxvii,

xxxvii-li (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See generally Laila El Shentenawi, A New York Convention for Mediation May be Coming
Soon, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-416b9435-39bb4fa7-a3b0-1039f0007e7f, UNCITRAL Rep., Forty-Seventh Session, UN Doc A/69/17, 1 124 (July 718, 2014) stating that:
Support was expressed for possible work in that area on many of the bases expressed above.
Doubts were also expressed as to the feasibility of the project and questions were raised in
relation to that possible topic of work, including: (a) whether the new regime of enforcement
envisaged would be optional in nature; (b) whether the New York Convention was the
appropriate model for work in relation to mediated settlement agreements; (c) whether
formalizing enforcement of settlement agreements would in fact diminish the value of
mediation as resulting in contractual agreements; (d) whether complex contracts arising out
of mediation were suitable for enforcement under such a proposed treaty; (e) whether other
means of converting mediated settlement agreements into binding awards obviated the need
for such a treaty; and (f) what the legal implications for a regime akin to the New York
Convention in the field of mediation might be.
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the high levels of transparency now paradigmatic to investor-state arbitration, but
would also enjoy high levels of international enforceability?
For now, these arguably legitimate concerns may be kept as a working
hypothesis, or an issue to be determined after the apposition of three tenets. The
first is the role of negotiation and pre-arbitration consultations in international
investment law discussed in Part II of this article. With respect to this tenet, this
article shows that investment treaties usually provide for negotiation and prearbitration consultation periods as a means to promote the amicable resolution of
disputes between investors and host states. Given however that investor-state
mediation is a distinct dispute resolution method, an examination of negotiation
and pre-arbitration consultation periods is required in order to more fully detail the
role and potential use of investor-state mediation. The second tenet is dealt with in
Part II that focuses on the development and evolution of investor-state mediation
as a distinct pre-arbitration dispute resolution procedure. 26 Specific weight is given
to two recent developments, the adoption by the International Bar Association
(IBA) of a distinct set of rules for investor-state mediation that took place in
2012,27 and the appearance of distinct investor-state mediation provisions in recent
investment treaties.28 Finally, the third tenet is the rise of transparency in investorstate arbitration that is discussed in Part 111.29 In particular, this part lays out the
main characteristics of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency and of the
Mauritius Convention on Transparency in investor-state arbitration. 30 With these
three tenets in place, Part V analyzes the implications of transparency in
international investment law to the future role and importance of investor-state
mediation.
II. INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION AND OTHER PRE-ARBITRATION OPTIONS
A.

Amicable Consultationsand Negotiation

Investment treaties typically include a series of pre-arbitration requirements
that can be broken down into amicable consultation periods, waiver and consent
provisions,3 1 and prior-litigation requirements.3 2 This section only focuses on the
26. See infra Section II.
27.

See International Bar Association, Rules for Investor-State Mediation, art. 1,

¶

1 (Oct. 4,

2012),
http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Dispute ResolutionSection/Mediation/StateMediation/Default.aspx.
28. Comprehensive Economic & Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 8.2, Sept. 14, 2016, 10973
Council of European Union 16; Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion & Protection of Investments,

Belg.-U.A.E., art. 12, 111, Mar. 8, 2004, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub.
29.

See infra Section III.

30. Rep. of the Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, at Annex 1, U.N. Doc. A/68/17 (Jan. 2014); G.A.
Res. 69/116, at 2/7 (Feb. 2015).
31.

See J.C. Thomas, Investor-State Arbitration under NAFTA Chapter 11, 37 CAN. YB. INT'L L.

99, 115-19 (1999); Jacob S. Lee, No "Double-Dipping"Allowed: An Analysis of Waste Management,
Inc. v. United Mexican States and the Article 1121 Waiver Requirementfor Arbitration under Chapter

11 ofNAFTA, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2655, 2669 (2001).
32.

See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion & Protection of Investments, Arg.-Spain,

art. X, I 3(a), Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 29403 (a claim may be submitted to investment arbitration if
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first pre-arbitration requirement, which is often referred to as "consultation and
negotiation." 33 A typical investment treaty provision of this kind usually reads as
follows:
The disputing parties should first attempt to settle a claim through
consultation or negotiation. 3
The verb "shall" is sometimes replaced by the verb "should." 3 5 However,
investment treaties are generally not particularly specific as to the form and
procedure that this effort to amicably settle investment disputes needs to take.
Some investment treaties nevertheless require the filing of a "written request" for
consultations or negotiations36 as well as set specific timeframes for the holding of
such amicable procedures. 37 Furthermore, the amicable settlement requirement
"after a period of eighteen (18) months has elapsed from the moment when the dispute was submitted to
the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made, the said
tribunal has not given its final decision, or where the final decision has been made but the parties are
still in dispute."); see also Agreement for the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K.-N. Ir.
B.I.T., art. 8, 1 2(a), Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 30682; Treaty on the Encouragement & Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Arg.-Ger., art. 10, 1 3(a), Apr. 9, 1991, 1091 U.N.T.S. 32583.
33. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2012 U.S. MODEL BILATERAL INV. TREATY, art. 23 (2012),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit.;
Italian 2003
Model B.I.T., art. X, 1 1
(2003),
http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties [hereinafter Italian Model BIT]. Such consultation and
negotiation may also include the use of non-binding third-party procedures. See e.g., Ass'n of Southeast
(2007),
1
1
31,
art.
Agreement,
Inv.
Comprehensive
Nations
Asia
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3095 [hereinafter ASEAN CIA].
34. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1118. See also Draft Agreement Between the Government of the
Republic of France and the Government of the Republic of [Country] on the Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments, art. 7 (2006), http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties ("Any dispute
concerning the investments occurring between one Contracting Party and a national or company of the
other Contracting Party shall be settled amicably between the two parties concerned.") [hereinafter
France Model BIT]; see also Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of India and the
Government of the Republic of [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 9, ¶ 1
(2003), http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties [hereinafter India Model BIT]; Free Trade
Agreement, China-Peru, art. 139, 1 1 (Apr. 28, 2009) Agreement for the Strengthening of Economic
Partnership, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu xdwben.pdf [hereinafter China-Peru FTA];
Agreement for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, Japan-Mex., art. 77 (Sept. 17, 2004)
Ministry
of
Foreign
Affairs
of
Japan,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/latin/mexico/agreement/agreement.pdf.
35. Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and [Country] Concerning the
Encouragement
and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments,
art. 10, 1 1
(2008),
http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties [hereinafter German Model BIT]; Agreement Between the
Kingdom of Norway and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 15, 1 2 (2007),
http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties. See Energy Charter Treaty, art. 26, 1 1, Dec. 17, 1994, 280
U.N.T.S. 36116 (entered into force Apr. 16, 1998) (The ECT employs the verb "shall" along with the
"if possible" proviso. "Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting
Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach
of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably.") [hereinafter ECT].
36. See, e.g., ASEAN CIA, supranote 33, at art. 31, 11 (". . . consultations shall be initiated by a
written request for consultations delivered by the disputing investor to the disputing Member State.").
37. Compare Agreement Between Canada and [Country] for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, art. 25, 1 2 (2004), http://www.italaw.com/investment-treaties ("Consultations shall be
held within 30 days of the submission of the notice of intent to submit a claim to arbitration, unless the
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found in investment treaties is in principle supplemented by a specific cooling-off
period3 8 that usually ranges between three,3 9 six,40 and twelve months. 41
Failing to amicably settle a dispute within the given cooling-off period allows
for an investor to bring an investor-state arbitration claim. 4 2 However, investorstate tribunals have not been uniform in approaching pre-arbitration consultation
periods. For example, an issue of great divide has been the ability of an investor to
resort to arbitration if amicable consultations/negotiations failed or are futile but
the cooling-off period has not yet lapsed.43 In this respect, a possible way to
determine the nature of pre-arbitration consultation periods would be to examine
the language used by the contracting parties to an investment treaty. However, this
is not an easy task since treaty stipulations differ as well as rarely provide for any

.

disputing parties otherwise agree."), with ASEAN CIA, supra note 33, at art. 31, 1 2 (which however
refers to "30 days of receipt by the disputing Member State of the request for consultations . .
38.
39.

DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 1, at 249-50.
See, e.g., ECT, supra note 35, art. 26, 1 2; Agreement on Mutual Encouragement and

Protection of Investments, Bulg.-Cyprus, art. 4.1, June, 18, 1988, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement
for the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Kyrg.-N. Ir. - U.K., art. 8, 1 1, Dec. 8, 1994, UNCTAD
Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement for the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Russ.-N. Ir.-

U.K., art. 8,

1

2, Apr. 6, 1989, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; U.K.-Hung., art. 8,

1

1, Mar. 9, 1987;

Agreement on the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Aust.-FYROM, art. 12, ¶ 1, Mar. 28, 2001,
2195 U.N.T.S 191; Agreement on Encouragement & Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Rom.,

art. 8, T 2, Oct. 27, 1983, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub.
40. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1120, 1 1; Agreement on the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection
of Investments, Lat.-Swed., art. 8, 1 2, Mar. 10, 1992, 1823 U.N.T.S. 31209; Agreement Regarding the
Promotion & Mutual Protection of Investments, Cyprus-Russ., art. 7, ¶ 2, Apr. I1, 1997, UNCTAD Inv.
Pol'y Hub; Agreement on the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Geor.-Grecce, art. 8,

1 2,

Nov. 9, 1994, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement on the Promotion & Reciprocal Protection of
Investments, Croat.-Slovn., art. 8, ¶ 2, Dec. 12, 1997, 2366 U.N.T.S. 42665; Agreement Concerning the
Reciprocal Protection & Promotion of Investments, Belg.-Hung., art. 9, 1 2, May, 14, 1986, UNCTAD
Inv. Pol'y Hub; Convention for the Protection & Promotion of Investments, Spain-Russ., art. 10,

1

1,

Oct. 26, 1990, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Treaty on the Promotion & Mutual Protection of Investments,
Germ.-Ukr., art. 11, $ 1, Feb. 15, 1993; Free Trade Agreement, China-Pak., art. 54, ¶ 2, Nov. 24, 2006,
China FTA Network, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/topic/enpakistan.shtml; China-Peru FTA, supra note 34,
art. 139, $ 2.
41. See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion & Protection of Investments, Pol.-Turk.,

&

art. 8, ¶ 1, Aug. 21, 1991, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub; Agreement on the Reciprocal Encouragement
Protection of Investments, China-Pak., art. 10, Feb. 12, 1989, UNCTAD Inv. Pol'y Hub.
42. See, e.g., German Model BIT, supra note 35, at art. 10,

1

2 ("If the dispute cannot be settled

within six months of the date on which it was raised by one of the parties to the dispute, it shall, at the
request of the investor of the other Contracting State, be submitted to arbitration."); France Model BIT,
supra note 34, art. 7 ("If this dispute has not been settled within a period of six months from the date on

which it occurred by one or other of the parties to the dispute, it shall be submitted at the request of
either party to [arbitration] . . . ."); India Model BIT, supra note 34, art. 9, 12 ("Any such dispute which
has not been amicably settled within a period of six months may, if both Parties agree, be submitted [to
arbitration]"); Italian Model BIT, art. X,

1

3 ("In the event that such dispute cannot be settled as

provided for in paragraph I [amicable settlement] of this Article within six months from the date of the
written application for settlement, the investor in question may submit at his choice the dispute for

settlement to..."); NAFTA, Article 1120(1): ".

.

provided that six months have elapsed since the
.

events giving rise to a claim, a disputing investor may submit the claim to arbitration .

43. See infra p. 8-9.
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clarifications whatsoever. For example, the NAFTA provides that the "disputing
parties should first attempt to settle a claim through consultation or negotiation."44
Contrarily, the ECT employs the verb "shall" but also adds the proviso "if
possible." 45 The indeterminacy associated with the obligatory nature of prearbitration consultation periods is best reflected in the rulings of the tribunals in
47
Abaclat v. Argentina46 and Ambiente v. Argentina, both of which were
48
established under the Argentina-Italy BIT. In these cases, the tribunals were
49
divided in interpreting the amicable consultations clause. The first tribunal found
that "the consultation requirement" of the above BIT "is not to be considered of a
mandatory nature but as the expression of the good will of the Parties to try firstly
50
to settle any dispute in an amicable way" and it "only refers to the possibility of
such amicable settlement talks, whereby such term is to be reasonably understood
as referring not only to the technical possibility of settlement talks, but also to the
5
possibility, i.e. the [likelihood], of a positive result." ' Contrarily, the second
tribunal found that the Argentina-Italy BIT created a "multi-layered, sequential
52
dispute resolution system constituting mandatory jurisdictional requirements"
and the amicable consultations clause "clearly suggests that it creates a duty for the
53
Parties to enter into consultations."
The above findings clearly indicate the indeterminacy of pre-arbitration
54
consultation periods and question the obligatory nature of such consultations. At
the same time, the disputing parties to an investor-state arbitration can always
engage in negotiations for the settlement of their dispute. In fact, the latest ICSID
caseload statistics indicate that with regard to concluded cases, thirty six percent
Indeed, a prominent commentator has
were settled or otherwise discontinued.
56
noted that "[ilt is unclear whether settlement negotiations are mandatory" since
"nothing prevents [the parties] from engaging in settlement negotiations after the

44. NAFTA, supranote 3, art. 1118 (emphasis added).
45. See ECT, supranote 35, art. 26 11 ("Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of
another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which

concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled
amicably.").
46. Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5 (formerly named Giovanna a
Beccarav. the Argentine Republic), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011).
47. Ambiente Ufficio S.P.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (formerly named
GiordanoAlpi v. Argentine Republic), Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Feb. 8, 2013).
48. Agreement for the Promotion & Protection of Investments, Arg.-It., 1990, Investor-State
LawGuide, http://www.investorstatelawguide.com.

49. Id. at art. 8, 11.
50. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1564.
51. Id.
52. Ambiente, ICS1D Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 570.
53. Id. 1 577.
54. See Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility;
Ambiente, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility.
55. INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT
CASELOAD - STATISTICS (IssUE 2016-1) 13 (2016).
56. Bjorklund, supranote 3, at 504.

DISPUTES,

THE ICSID
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arbitration has commenced." 5 7 All these statements lead to the conclusion that
while investment treaties usually provide for amicable consultations or negotiation,
the mandatory, nature of such pre-arbitration procedures is not always clear. 8 At
the same time, settlement negotiations are always available to the disputing parties
even after the initiation of the arbitration claim. With these remarks in place, one
may wonder how investor-state mediation can provide an alternative avenue for
the pre-arbitration settlement of investment disputes.
B. Why then mediate? An Introduction
In order to understand the current need for investor-state mediation, two main
issues should be taken into consideration. First, due regard should be had to the
downsides of investor-state arbitration and contemporary international arbitration
proceedings. Second, investor-state mediation should be appraised in light of prearbitration consultations and negotiation.
With respect to the first issue, arbitration has theoretically been regarded as a
swift and cost-effective mechanism to resolve disputes among parties.60 However,
in the context of investor-state arbitration, empirical evidence appears to suggest
the contrary.61 The "sheer expense" of investor-state arbitrations are noted in
recent decisions.
The average costs of an investor-state arbitration
"skyrocketed" 63 from around $1 or 2 million USD before 20076 to around $8
million USD in 2012. 65 In some arbitrations, parties incurred costs of over $30
million USD." The OECD's finding in 2012 corresponds to the research result by
UNCTAD, quoting several examples of high legal costs within the range of $5
million USD to $10 million USD incurred for ISDS cases.6 7 The average length of
an investor-state arbitration was found to be around 3.6 years from the filing of the

57. Id.
58. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Ambiente, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision
supra note 3, at 504.
59. Abaclat, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Ambiente, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9, Decision
supra note 3, at 504.
60.

U.N.

CONF.

ON

TRADE

&

DEV.,

Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 564;
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 570; Bjorklund,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 564;
on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 570; Bjorklund,
INVESTOR-STATE

DIsPUTEs:

PREVENTION

AND

ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION, at 14, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/1 1, U.N. Sales No.
E.10.II.D11 (2010) [hereinafter UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes].
61. Id. at 16-17.
62. David P. Riesenberg, Fee Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine and Policy
Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L. J. 977, 990 (2011).
63. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra, note 60, at 16.
64. David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper
for the Investment Policy Community, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEv. [OECD] WORKING
PAPERS

ON

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

2012/03,

http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2012 3.pdf
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id.
67. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supranote 60, at 17-18.

at

22

(2012),
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request for arbitration to the date of the final award. 68 The UNCTAD shared a
similar view, noting that it would take around 3 to 4 years for a case to be heard
and finally settled.
Regarding the reasons for the high costs of investor-state arbitration, scholars
have noted a number of contributing factors including: 1) limited arbitrator
availability; 70 2) nature and role of the parties' counsel and their approaches to
litigation ' (i.e. attributed to the use of expensive litigation techniques borrowed
from corporate litigation practices); 3) high billing rates of arbitration lawyers; 72 4)
substantial time spent on the selection of arbitrators; 73 5) proliferation of
procedural, jurisdictional and discovery issues; 74 6) expanded use of high-cost
party-appointed experts on a range of issues; 7 5 7) complexity of the legal and
factual issues in international investment law;7 6 8) high damages claims; 77 9)
79
number and length of written pleadings; and, 10) uncertain cost shifting rules.
Investor state mediation, on the other hand, has the potential of offering a
relatively efficient alternative. 80 In some cases, it may assist parties to explore
creative and innovative solutions that may lie outside strict legal remedies."' Such
remedies may be of particular relevance in polycentric, policy issues involving
82
complex issues of force majeur arising from unforeseen natural disasters. As
noted by Fuller, mediation can be of particular benefit in cases where adjudication
has reached its "limits" such as in "polycentric disputes" where there are no clear
issues subject to proofs and contentions. The case of Vattenfall v. Germany,
arising following the Fukushima nuclear disaster and subsequent decision of the
German government to phase out nuclear power production by 2022, arguably

68. Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitration: How Long Does it Take? INT'L J. OF COM. & TREATY
ARB. (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.goldreserveinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/lCS[D-arbitration-

How-long-does-it-take.pdf.
69. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 18.
70. Id. at 16-17.
71. Id. at 20.
72. Id. at 17.
73. Id. at 14.
74. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 18.
75. Id. at 17.
76. Catherine M. Amirfar, Dispute Settlement Clauses in Investor-State Arbitration:An Informed
Approach to EmpiricalStudies About Law a Response to Professor Yackee 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L.

303, 310 n. 17 (2014).
77. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 17.
78. Amirfar, supra note 76.
79. UNCTAD, Investor-State Disputes, supra note 60, at 17.
80. Shahla Ali, Prospects of Utilizing Investor-state Mediation and UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparencyfor Polycentric Environmental Disaster-RelatedDisputes: The Case of Vattenfall v.
Germany, in TRADE DEVELOPMENT THROUGH HARMONIZATION OF COMMERCIAL LAW 137 (Muruga

Perumal
8 1.
82.
83.
84.

Ramaswamy & Jodo Ribeiro eds., 2015).
Id.
Id.
Lon L. Fuller, Mediation: Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 329-30 (1971).
Vattenfall AB, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12.
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raises multi-dimensional issues of public policy and force majeure. 5 From both a
process as well as efficiency perspective, investor state mediation may prove a
viable alternative.
With respect to the second issue, the previous Section indicated that amicable
consultations are rather indeterminate in international investment law and many
investment treaties are unclear or silent with respect to their mandatory nature. 86In
this regard, investor-state mediation presents an alternative solution that can
provide the platform to effectively and expeditiously resolve a dispute prior to
filing an investor-state arbitration claim." In this sense, investor-state mediation
can also be more effective when compared to pre-arbitration consultations as well
as negotiation. To a certain extent, negotiation is an umbrella notion that covers
both the pre-arbitration phase, whereupon an investor-state mediation might take
place, and the arbitration phase, that could be initiated after an unfruitful investorstate mediation.8 8 These initial remarks aim to set the limitations of investor-state
mediation and also set its relation to other forms of alternative dispute resolution in
the international investment law arena. Regardless, the purpose of this article is to
show how the rise of transparency in investor-state arbitration could affect the
dynamics of investor-state mediation. In order to appraise this working hypothesis,
the next Part delineates the IBA Rules on Investor-State Mediation and emerging
models of investor-state mediation clauses in investment treaties. Before however
examining the emerging models of investor-state mediation, it is worth looking at
"quasi-mediation proceedings" that already exist under the auspices of the World
Bank, particularly under the ICSID Conciliation Proceedings.
C. ICSID ConciliationProceedings
Under the ICSID Convention, the "purpose of the Centre shall be to provide
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment disputes between
Contracting States and nationals of other Contracting States in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention."89 Pursuant to this mandate the Centre in 1967
promulgated the ICSID Conciliation Rules 90 and subsequently in 1978 the ICSID

&

85. See Vattenfall AB, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12; NATHALIE BERNASCONI-OSTERWALDER
MARTIN DIETRICH BRAUCH, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE STATE OF PLAY IN VATTENFALL
v. GERMANY
It: LEAVING THE GERMAN
PUBLIC
IN THE DARK 2 (Dec.
2014),
http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/state-of-play-vattenfall-vs-germany-II-leavinggerman-public-dark-en.pdf.
86. See supraSection HA.
87. Jean E. Kalicki, Mediation of Investor-State Disputes: Revisiting the Prospects, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (June 13, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2013/06/14/mediation-of-investor-statedisputes-revisiting-the-prospects/.
88. Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative Methods of Treaty-Based, InvestorState Dispute Resolution 31(1) FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 138, 155 (2007).
89. See ICSID CONVENTION, supranote 7, art. 1(2).
90. The original Conciliation Rules were adopted on Sept. 25, 1967 and were effective as of
Jan. 1, 1968. The Conciliation Rules have subsequently been amended three times. The first amendment
was approved and took immediate effect on Sept. 26, 1984. The second amendment was approved on
Sept. 29, 2002 and was effective on Jan. 1, 2003. The current Conciliation Rules were approved by
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Additional Facility Conciliation Rules.91 Nevertheless, as of December 31, 2016,
ICSID had registered 597 cases, 92 of which merely eight under the Conciliation
93
Rules and two under the Additional Facility Conciliation Rules.
While ICSID Conciliation proceedings encompass many of the core
characteristics paradigmatic to mediation, 94 they also create a rigid arbitration-like
procedural framework. In fact, it has been observed that the Conciliation Rules
provide for
a lengthy process, particularly in the beginning. It can take over four
months to constitute a conciliation commission under the ICSID Rules,
and then another sixty days to have a first session, facts that exacerbate
the perception of ICSID Conciliation as a protracted process that does
little to create momentum. It is natural, therefore, that parties seeking
resolution of their disputes would not opt for a process that is perceived
to simply prolong (or prevent) the production of a binding legal
document.

The limited publicly available information supports the accuracy of the above
statement. In fact, in two recent conciliation cases, the proceedings lasted for about
three years and appear to have taken the form of hard-fought trials.96 Based on the
written vote of the Administrative Council in 2006 and were effective from Apr. 10, 2006: (ICSID
Rules (2006). See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-Convention-ConciliationRules.aspx.
91. The original Additional Facility Conciliation Rules were adopted in 1978. The Additional
Facility Conciliation Rules have subsequently been amended twice. The first amendment was approved
on Sept. 29, 2002 and was effective on Jan. 1, 2003. The current rules were approved by written vote of

the Administrative Council in early 2006 and was effective from Apr. 10, 2006: ICSID Additional
See https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/icsiddocs/ICSID-ConciliationFacility Rules (2006).
(Additional-Facility)-Rules.aspx.
92.

See

THE

ICSID

CASELOAD

-

STATISTICS

(ISSUE

2017-1),

ICSID,

https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID%2OWeb%20Stats%2020171%20(English)%20Final.pdf.
93. See Xenofon Karagiannis v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case No. CONC/16/1; Republic of
Equatorial Guinea v. CMS Energy Corporation and others, ICSID Case No. CONC(AF)/12/2; Hess
Equatorial Guinea, Inc. and Tullow Equatorial Guinea Limited v. Republic of Equatorial Guinea, ICSID
Case No. CONC(AF)/12/1; RSM Production Corporation v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No.
CONC/ 1/1; Shareholders of SESAM v. Central African Republic, ICSID Case No. CONC/07/1; Togo
Electricit6 v. Republic of Togo, ICSID Case No. CONC/05/1; TG World Petroleum Limited v.
Republic of Niger, ICS[D Case No. CONC/03/1; SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft filr
dieTextilindustrie m.b.H. v. Madagascar, ICSID Case No. CONC/94/1; Tesoro Petroleum Corporation
v. Trinidad and Tobago, ICSID Case No. CONC/83/1; SEDITEX Engineering Beratungsgesellschaft
flir die Textilindustrie m.b.H. v. Democratic Republic of Madagascar, ICSID Case No. CONC/82/1;
94. See ICSID CONVENTION, supra note 7, arts. 28-35.
95. See Margrete Stevens & Ben Love, Investor-State Mediation: Observations on the Role of
Institutions 23, www.cedr.com/aboutus/arbitrationcommission/.

-

96. See Republic of Equatorial Guinea v. CMS Energy Corporation and others, ICSID Case No.
CONC(AF)/12/2 (Procedural Details: June 29, 2012, The Secretary-General registers a request for the
institution of conciliation proceedings; July 4, 2012, Following the appointment by the parties, Claus
von Wobeser (Mexican) accepts his appointment as Sole Conciliator; Mar. 15, 2013, The Sole
Conciliator holds a first session in New York; Sept. 16, 2013, Each party files a written statement of its
position pursuant to Article 33 of the ICSID Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules; Oct. 18, 2013
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above, it would appear that ICSID conciliation proceedings cannot readily be
equated to investor-state mediation, as this has recently emerged, and is further
discussed in Part III of this article.

III. TIE EVOLUTION OF INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION

A. The IBA 2012 Rules on Investor-StateMediation
1. Background
The IBA rules for Investor-State mediation ("The Rules") have as their
primary purpose the establishment of a set of concrete measures to be followed in
an investor-state mediation context to increase resort to mediation for investorstate disputes. 97 The State Mediation subcommittee of the Mediation committee,
housed under the IBA, promulgates The Rules.98 Formally adopted on October 4,
2012, The Rules are divided into 12 articles, and facilitate the resolution of
disputes between States and States entities. 99 The Rules establish clear guidelines
for the commencement of mediation and for the appointment of a mediator in
absence of party agreement.

Oct. 19, 2013, The Sole Conciliator visits the place connected with the dispute pursuant to Article 30
(4)(c) of the ICSID Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules; Nov. 1, 2013, Each party files a second
written statement of its position pursuant to Article 33 of the ICSID Conciliation (Additional Facility)
Rules; Mar. 25, 2014 - Mar.27, 2014, The Sole Conciliator holds a hearing on conciliation in New
York; Jan. 12, 2015, The Sole Conciliator declares the proceeding closed in accordance with Article
37(2) of the Conciliation (Additional Facility) Rules; May 12, 2015, The Sole Conciliator renders its
Report); RSM Production Corporation v. Republic of Cameroon, ICSID Case No. CONC/ 1/1
(Procedural Details: Sept. 19, 2011, The Secretary-General registers a request for the institution of
conciliation proceedings; Dec. 6, 2011, Following appointment by the Claimant, J. Caleb Boggs III
(U.S.) accepts his appointment as conciliator; Dec. 23, 2011, Following appointment by the
Respondent, Jean-Pierre Ancel (French) accepts his appointment as conciliator; Feb. 17, 2012,
Following appointment by the Chairman, Marino Baldi (Swiss) accepts his appointment as Commission
President; Apr. 4, 2012, The Commission holds a first session in Paris; Apr. 30, 2012, The Respondent
files a request for the Commission to order the joinder of a third-party to the conciliation proceedings;
May 14, 2012, The Claimant files observations on the Respondent's request of April 30, 2012; June 15,
2012, The Commission decides on the Respondent's request of April 30, 2012; Aug. 9, 2012, The
Commission issues Procedural Order No. I regarding the participation of a third-party to the
proceedings; Aug. 17, 2012, The Commission issues Procedural Order No. 2 concerning the procedural
calendar; Sept. 7, 2012, The Claimant files a statement of facts; Sept. 28, 2012, The Respondent files a
statement of facts; Oct. 24, 2012 - Oct. 25, 2012, The Commission holds a hearing on the merits in
Paris; Dec. 19, 2012 - Dec. 20, 2012, The Commission holds a hearing on the merits in Paris; April 15,
2013, The Commission declares the proceeding closed in accordance with Article (34)(2) of the ICSID
Convention and ICSID Conciliation Rule 30(2); June 11, 2013, The Commission renders its Report).
97. International Bar Association Mediation Committee, State Mediation Subcommittee, IBA
Rules
for
Investor-State
Mediation,
art.
I
(Oct
2012),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=8120ED1 I -F3C8-4A66-BE8 I77CB3FDB9E9F.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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2. Scope and Application
The Rules are designed for mediation of investment-related disputes
00
The Rules apply when the mediating parties
involving States and States entities.
0
have agreed on the rules or authorized a mediator to apply the rules.' o The Rules
02
may be varied or excluded partially or wholly at any time.1 Local provisions of
03
law take precedence over The Rules.'
3. News and Commentary
Wolters Kluwer N.V. commented that The Rules contain mostly standard
clauses seen in other mediation rules, but also contain innovative regulations such
as the clause on "Mediation Management Conference" (Article 9).1'0 It was also
relatively optimistic on the future application of The Rules and the entrance of
05
Herbert Smith Freehills
Mediation into the arena of Investor-State mediation.
commented on the relatively new development of including provisions for cointerest or
mediators, as well as the requirement of disclosure of any personal
06
personal conflict in a "statement of independence and availability."'
B. The emerging EU Model and Investor-State Mediation
A growing number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have
recently integrated provisions for investor-state mediation into their respective
0 7
frameworks as will be discussed below.
The EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA),
0
includes distinct investor-state mediation provisions.' In particular, the investorstate mediation clause reads as follows:
The disputing parties may at any time agree to have recourse to
mediation.

100. See id art.1.
101. See id art. 1(a).
102. International Bar Association Mediation Committee, State Mediation Subcommittee, IBA
at
available
2012),
2
(Oct
art.
Mediation,
Investor-State
for
Rules
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspxDocumentUid=8120ED11-F3C8-4A66-BE8177CB3FDB9E9F.
103. See id art. 3.
104. Id. art. 9; Kalicki, supranote 87.
105. See Munir Maniruzzaman, A Rethink of Investor-State Dispute Settlement, KLuWER ARB.
BLOG (May 30, 2013), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/05/30/a-rethink-of-investor-statedispute-settlement/.
106. See Herbert Smith Freehills, InternationalBar Association launches investor-state mediation
rules (Oct. 23, 2012), http://hsfnotes.com/adr/2012/10/23/intemational-bar-association-launchesinvestor-state-mediation-rules/.
107. See, e.g., Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, EU-Can., Annex 8-D, Oct. 30,
at
available
CETA],
[hereinafter
2016
EU-Vietnam Free Trade
http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf;
Agreement, EU-Viet, art 20, Feb. 1, 2016 [hereinafter EU-Viet. FTA]; Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
Agreement, art 9.5, Feb. 4, 2016 [hereinafter TPP].
108. See CETA, supra note 107.
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Recourse to mediation is without prejudice to the legal position or rights
of either disputing party under this Chapter and is governed by the rules
agreed to by the disputing parties including, if available, the rules for
mediation adopted by the Committee on Services and Investment
pursuant to Article 8.44.3(c).
The mediator is appointed by agreement of the disputing parties. The
disputing parties may also request that the Secretary-General of ICSID
appoint the mediator.
The disputing parties shall endeavour to reach a resolution of the dispute
within 60 days from the appointment of the mediator.
If the disputing parties agree to have recourse to mediation, Articles
8.19.6 and 8.19.8 shall not apply from the date on which the disputing
parties agreed to have recourse to mediation to the date on which either
disputing party decides to terminate the mediation. A decision by a
disputing party to terminate the mediation shall be transmitted by way
of a letter to the mediator and the other disputing party. 0 9
Annex 29-C of CETA sets out Mediation Procedures for disputes between the
Contracting Parties, which could potentially also influence investor-state mediation
proceedings."1 0 These Articles describe the process of initiating the mediation
process, selecting the mediator, the mediation rules, implementation,
confidentiality, time limits, cost allocation, and puts in place a mechanism for
ongoing review of the Procedures."'
Similarly, the EU-Singapore FTA under its Annex 9-E and 9-F sets out a
Mediation Mechanism for Investor-State Disputes and a Code of Conduct For
Arbitrators and Mediators.1 2 These provisions are quite similar to those found in
CETA derive from a common objective of assisting parties to "facilitate the
finding of a mutually agreed solution through a comprehensive and expeditious
procedure.""1 3 The same model is expected to be followed in all future investment
chapters included in EU's FTAs, as is evidenced by the recent conclusion of the
EU-Vietnam FTA, that also includes an investor-state mediation clause.1 4
Further reflecting the trend toward the integration of mediation mechanisms
into investor-state dispute resolution, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
Agreement (TPP)" 5 sets out a provision for mediation under its article 9.18 as
follows:
1. In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the respondent
should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and

109. Id. art. 8.20.
110. Id. at Annex 29-C, art. 1-9.
1Il. Id at Annex 29-C, art 1-9.
112. EU-Sing. Free Trade Agreement, EU-Sing., June 29, 2015 [hereinafter EU-Sing. FTA],
Annex 9-E and 9-F.
113. Id.
114. EU-Viet. FTA, supra note 107, art. 5.
115. TPP,supranote 107, art. 9.18.
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negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding, third party
procedures, such as good offices, conciliation or mediation.
2. The claimant shall deliver to the respondent a written request for
consultations setting out a brief description of facts regarding the
measure or measures at issue.
3. For greater certainty, the initiation of consultations and negotiations
shall not be construed as recognition of the jurisdiction of the
tribunal.116

However, unlike the EU mediation model, the TPP provides little if at
all details on the procedure to be followed in investor-state mediation
cases.
D. The Convention on the Enforcement ofMediated Settlements
The Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements (CEMS)"',
proposed in July 2014 during a session of UNCITRAL, aims to establish
provisions on the enforceability of international commercial settlement agreements
reached through mediation/conciliation." Working Group II ("WGII"), one of six
working groups established by UNCITRAL to perform the substantive preparatory
work, received a mandate in July 2015 to explore the development of either (i) a
guidance text, (ii) model legislative provisions, or (iii) a convention on the
enforcement of mediated settlements.1 9 The aim of such a convention is to build
on the success of the 1958 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("NY Convention") in the development,
20
promotion and use of international mediation worldwide.1 Observers have noted
that if the Convention is adopted with the same enthusiasm as the NY Convention:
[I]t will (i) create a strong international legal framework for mediation,
that will (ii) encourage more parties to use this mechanism and (iii)
result in many more disputes being settled without the time and
expenses of litigation and arbitration, leading to (iv) greater and more
effective access to justice.121
These developments and especially the possibility of the conclusion of the
CEMS, will on the one hand enhance the international enforceability of mediated
settlements but on the other hand may raise serious concerns with respect
transparency. For if CEMS were to be concluded, could it mean that investor-state
mediation would now be convenient method to avoid the high levels of
transparency now paradigmatic to investor-state arbitration? To respond to this
issue, it is first necessary to turn to the current state of transparency in investor-

116. Id., art. 9.18.
117. See generally Shentenawi, supranote 25.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New

York, June 10, 1958.
121. Shentenawi, supra note 25.
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state arbitration.
IV. THE RISE

OF TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION

Transparency in investor-state arbitration has recently entered a completely
new phase,1 22 with the adoption of the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparencyl 2 3
and the conclusion of the United Nations Convention on Transparency in TreatyBased Investor-State Arbitration (known as Mauritius Convention). 124 The basic
characteristics of these instruments are further discussed below. Suffice it to say,
however, the surge in transparency requirements in investor-state arbitration was
caused by generally the same reasons driving the so-called backlash against this
method of international dispute settlement. These reasons were briefly discussed in
the introduction to this article, and among others revolve around public interest
concerns and the nature and sectors where investor-state arbitration cases arise.
The purpose of this Section is to delineate the main tenets of the UNCITRAL
Rules on Transparencyl25 and the Mauritius Convention 26 and thus pave the way
for the next Section that will appraise these developments in light of investor-state
mediation and the proposed Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated
Settlements.

122.

See generally Stephan W. Schill, Editorial: The Mauritius Convention on Transparency, 16 J.

WORLD INv. & TRADE 201, 201-04 (2015) [hereinafter Schill, Editorial];Stephan W. Schill, Editorial:
Five Times Transparency in InternationalInvestment Law, 15 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 363, 369-72
(2014); Lise Johnson, The Transparency Rules and Transparency Convention: A good start and model
for broader reform in investor-statearbitration,COLUM. FDI PERSPECTIVES, July 21, 2014, available

at ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-126-Johnson-FINALI.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2015); Samuel
Levander, Resolving "Dynamic Interpretation":An Empirical Analysis of the UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency,52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 506, 54041 (2014); Luke Eric Peterson, As Transparency
Rules Take Effect, And UN Launches Case Registry, How Much Of ISDS Universe Will Be Laid Open
Through This
New
Portal?, INVEST.
ARB.
REP.,
Apr.
1, 2014, available at
www.iareporter.com/articles/as-transparency-rules-take-effect-and-un-launches-case-registry-howmuch-of-isds-universe-will-be-laid-open-through-this-new-portal/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2015).
123. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (2014), as adopted by Resolution of the General Assembly 68/109, U.N. Doc. A/68/462
(Dec.
16,
2013),
available
at
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-ontransparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf [hereinafter Transparency Rules].
124. See UNCITRAL, U.N. Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration, G.A. Res. 69/116, U.N. Doc. A/69/496 (Dec. 10, 2014), available at
www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/transparency-convention/Fransparency-Convention-e.pdf
[hereinafter Mauritius Convention]; see also UNCITRAL, U.N. Commission on International Trade
Law Approves Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State
Arbitration,
U.N.
Press
Release
UNIS/1J202
(July
10,
2014),
available at
www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2014/unisl2O2.html.
125. Transparency Rules, supranote 123.
126. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124.
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The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency

A.
1.

Background

The UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based investor-State
Arbitration (the "Rules on Transparency"), which came into effect on April 1,
2014, "comprise a set of procedural rules that provide for transparency and
27
accessibility to the public of treaty-based investor-State arbitration."1 The aim is
to facilitate public disclosure of arbitration awards. This follows transparency
trends within other areas of international arbitration (such as ICSID) and can give
28
rise to greater consistency in awards.1
2.

Scope

The Rules on Transparency in general apply to investor-state arbitration under
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, but only for investment treaties concluded on
or after April 1, 2014.129 For investment treaties prior to that date, as well as for
treaties that fall within the above temporal scope, the Rules can apply by
30
agreement of the disputing parties.'
3.

Content

In terms of substance and content, the Rules on Transparency deal with four
main aspects of transparency considerations in investor-state arbitration.' 3 ' In brief,
these are the publication of documents arising from such proceedings, the openness
of investor-state arbitration hearings, the participation of the Contracting Parties to
32
an investment treaty and the participation of amicus curiae.1

127. See
UNCITRAL,

UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration,
(last
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitraltexts/arbitration/2014Transparency.html

visited Nov. 19, 2016).

&

128. See Christina Knahr, The New Rules on Participationof Non-Disputing Parties in ICSID
Arbitration - Blessing or Curse?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 319
(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011); Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, Transparency versus
Confidentiality in International Investment Arbitration - The Biwater Gauff Compromise, 6 LAW
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 97, 97-118 (2007); LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION

141 (2d ed. 2011); Margie-Lys Jaime, Relying Upon Parties'InterpretationIn Treaty-Based InvestorState Dispute Settlement: Filling The Gaps In International Investment Agreements, 46 GEO. 1. INT'L L.

261, 287 (2014). See also ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 48(5); ICSID Convention Arbitration
Rules, rules 37(2) and 48(4) (2006); see also ICSID Arbitration (Additional Facility) Rules, art. 53(3)
(2006).
129. See Transparency Rules, supra note 115, art. 1(1); see also id. art. 1(2); Luke E. Peterson, UN
Working Group Finalizes UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, But They Won't Apply Automatically To
Stockpiles Of Existing Investment Treaties, INVEST. ARB. REP., Feb. 14, 2013, available at
www.iareporter.com/articles/un-working-group-finalizes-uncitral-transparency-rules-but-they-wont-

apply-automatically-to-stockpiles-of-existing-investment-treaties/

(last visited Aug. 27, 2015); Julia

Salasky & Corinne Montineri, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State

Arbitration, 31 ASA BULLETIN 774, 774-76 (2013).
130. See Transparency Rules, supra note 123, art. 1(2), art. 1(9).
131. Id.art.3(1).
132.

Id.
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With respect to the publication of documents arising from investor-state
arbitration, the Rules on Transparency list a series of documents that are subject to
public disclosure, including expert reports and witness statements.1 33 The exhibits
themselves are generally excluded from public disclosure but a table listing all
exhibits should nevertheless be disclosed.1 34 Specific provisions also provide for
the protection of confidential information, that are subject to redaction prior to the
disclosure of documents arising from investor-state arbitration.1 35 The wide scope
of transparency is also linked to oral hearings that are generally open to the public
and through any means, including live transmission on the web.' 3 6 Certainly, parts
of the hearings can be conducted in camera when "there is a need to protect
confidential information or the integrity of the arbitral process."'
The
participation of Contracting Parties and amicus curiae deals with the participation
of non-disputing parties lato sensu.'3 8 Contracting Parties to an investment treaty
usually the investor's home state- can make submissions with regard to "issues of
treaty interpretation"' 39 and following the consultation of the disputing parties, an
arbitral tribunal can also allow submissions "on further matters within the scope of

133. Id. art. 3(2).
134. Id. art. 3(1). Compare U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 29(1) (2004) [hereinafter
U.S. Model BIT 2004], with U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 29(1) (2012) [hereinafter U.S.
Model BIT 2012].
135. Transparency Rules, supra note 115, art. 7(2H7), 7(3)-(4) state:
3. The arbitral tribunal, after consultation with the disputing parties, shall make arrangements
to prevent any confidential or protected information from being made available to the public,
including by putting in place, as appropriate: (a) Time limits in which a disputing party, non-

disputing Party to the treaty or third person shall give notice that it seeks protection for such
information in documents; (b) Procedures for the prompt designation and redaction of the
particular confidential or protected information in such documents; and (c) Procedures for
holding hearings in private to the extent required by article 6, paragraph 2. Any
determination as to whether information is confidential or protected shall be made by the
arbitral tribunal after consultation with the disputing parties. 4. Where the arbitral tribunal
determines that information should not be redacted from a document, or that a document
should not be prevented from being made available to the public, any disputing party, nondisputing Party to the treaty or third person that voluntarily introduced the document into the
record shall be permitted to withdraw all or part of the document from the record of the
arbitral proceedings.

See also Federico Ortino, Transparency of Investment Awards: External and Internal Dimensions, in
TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 119, 132-34
(Junji

Nakagawa

ed.,

2013);

JOACHIM

DELANEY

&

DANIEL

B.

MAGRAW,

PROCEDURAL

TRANSPARENCY 751-76 (2008); Calamita, supra note 22, at 649-50; Bamali Choudhury, Recapturing
Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to the
Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775,786-87 (2008).
136. Transparency Rules, supra note 123, art. 6(3) ("tribunal shall make logistical arrangements to
facilitate the public access to hearings ("including where appropriate by organizing attendance through
video links or such other means as it deems appropriate.")
137. Transparency Rules, supranote 123, art. 6(2).
138. See Jaime, supra note 128, at 287. Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT'L L. 45 (2013).
139. Transparency Rules, supranote 123, art. 5(1).
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the dispute." 4 0 On the other hand, amicus curiae submissions or briefs refer to
submissions of non-state actors, such as NGOs.141 Such third parties are allowed to
42
ensuring that the subject matter of
file submissions under a certain procedure
such submission is within the scope of the dispute, that such submission "would
43
assist the arbitral tribunal in the determination of a factual or legal issue",' does
not "disrupt or unduly burden the arbitral proceedings, or unfairly prejudice any
disputing party'" and that the disputants "are given a reasonable opportunity to
45
Amici are
present their observations on any submission by the third person."
nevertheless not allowed to participate in the arbitration hearing and present oral
evidence.
140. Transparency Rules, supra note 123, art. 5(2).
141. See Lucas Bastin, Amici Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration: Eight Recent Trends, 30 ARB.

INT'L 125, 127-40 (2014); Lucas Bastin, The Amicus Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration, I

&

CAMBRIDGE J. INT'L & COMP. L. 208, 214-21 (2012); Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Transparency
and Amicus Curiae Briefs, 1 J. WORLD INT'L & TRADE 333 (2004); Alexis Mourre, Are Amici Curiae
the Proper Response to the Public 's Concerns on Transparency in Investment Arbitration?, 5 LAW
PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 257, 257-71 (2006); Andrea Bjorklund, The Participationof SubNational Government Units as Amici Curiae in InternationalInvestment Disputes, in EVOLUTION IN
INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 298, 298-316 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011);
Jorge Vifluales, Amicus Intervention in Investor-State Arbitration, 61(4) DISP. RES. J. 72 (2007); J.
Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancing the Procedural Legitimacy of Investor-State Arbitration Through

Transparency and Amicus Curiae Participation,52 MCGILL L. J. 681, 697-705 (2007); Julie Lee,
UNCITRAL's Unclear Transparency Instrument: Fashioning the Form and Application of a Legal
Standard Ensuring GreaterDisclosure in Investor-State Arbitrations, 33 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 439,

493-56 (2013); Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 PENN
ST. L. REV. 1269, 1286-90 (2009); Eparninontas E. Triantafilou, Amicus Submissions in Investor-State
Arbitration After Suez v. Argentina: The Gillis Wetter Prize, 24 ARB. INT'L 571 (2008); Tomoko
Ishikawa, Third Party ParticipationIn Investment Treaty Arbitration, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 373,
373-412 (2010); Eugenia Levine, Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: The

Implications ofan Increase in Third-PartyParticipation,29 BERK. J. INT'L L. 200, 200-24 (2011).
142.

Transparency Rules, supra note 115, art. 4(1)H2) states:
After consultation with the disputing parties, the arbitral tribunal may allow a person that is
not a disputing party, and not a non-disputing Party to the treaty ('third person(s)'), to file a
written submission with the arbitral tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the
dispute. A third person wishing to make a submission shall apply to the arbitral tribunal, and
shall, in a concise written statement, which is in a language of the arbitration and complies

with any page limits set by the arbitral tribunal: (a) Describe the third person, including,
where relevant, its membership and legal status (e.g., tmde association or other nongovernmental organization), its general objectives, the nature of its activities and any parent
organization (including any organization that directly or indirectly controls the third person);
(b) Disclose any connection, direct or indirect, which the third person has with any disputing
party; (c) Provide information on any government, person or organization that has provided
to the third person (i) any financial or other assistance in preparing the submission; or (ii)
substantial assistance in either of the two years preceding the application by the third person

under this article (e.g. funding around 20 per cent of its overall operations annually); (d)
Describe the nature of the interest that the third person has in the arbitration; and (e) Identify

the specific issues of fact or law in the arbitration that the third person wishes to address in
its written submission.

143. Id. art. 4(3)(b).
144. Id. art. 4(5).
145. Id. art. 4(6).
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The above delineation of the Rules on Transparency elucidates the drastic
change that these rules endeavor to make in the field of international investment
law. The limitation of their temporal scope to investment treaties concluded on or
after April 1, 2014, has recently been addressed by the Mauritius Convention
discussed below."'4
B. The Mauritius Convention
1. Background
The United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based InvestorState Arbitration was approved by the UN General Assembly in the Fall of
2014,147 and was opened for signature in Port Louis on March 17, 2015 (hence the
name "Mauritius Convention"). 1 48
2. Scope
Unlike the Rules on Transparency, the Mauritius Convention applies to
investment treaties concluded before April 1, 2014149 and to investor-state
arbitrations initiated under such treaties after the Mauritius Convention enters into
force.150 For the Convention to enter into force, three ratifications are required, but
as of today, Mauritius is the only country that has ratified the Convention.'s5
Furthermore, subject to a reservation stating otherwise, when the host state
(respondent state) but not the investor's home state has ratified the Convention, the
Transparency Rules will apply to an investment treaty concluded before April 1,
2014, at the election of the disputing investor (unilateral offer of application).1 5 2
3. Content
The Mauritius Convention does not include substantive provisions in its body
but merely incorporates by reference the Rules on Transparency discussed above.
The Convention nevertheless adopts a slightly different approach with respect to
its application. Unlike the Rules on Transparency that generally apply to investorstate arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, unless the disputing
parties otherwise agree, the Convention applies to any investor-state arbitration.1 53
Certainly, this broader application is to a certain degree limited by a set of
reservations that are available to the contracting parties that eventually choose to
146. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124.
147. See U.N. Convention on Transparency, supra note 124.
148. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124; States Sign Convention on Transparency, 10(2)
GLOBAL ARB. REv. 7, 7 (2015); Lise Johnson, The Mauritius Convention on Transparency: Comments
on the treaty and its role in increasing transparencyof investor-State arbitration,CCSI Policy Paper,

Sept. 2014, available at http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/12/10.-Johnson-Mauritius-Convention-onTransparency-Convention.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
149.

Mauritius Convention, supra note 124, art. 1(1).

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 2(2).
Id. art. 2(1).
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ratify the Convention. Whether they will also make reservations and thus limit the
application of the Mauritius Convention to certain investment treaties or investorstate arbitration under certain arbitration rules, remains to be seen in the near
future. 154
V. ARE TRANSPARENCY AND MEDIATION ANTITHETIC IN NATURE?
A. Investor-State Mediation as a threat to Transparency?
For cases that continue to raise sensitive issues of a confidential nature,
parties may consider the confidentiality requirements associated with investor state
mediation. Confidentiality has been considered as an essential element in
mediation. It has been conceived that confidentiality encourages parties to speak
155
freely and openly in the mediation while ensuring the integrity of the process.
However, there is always a tension between confidentiality of mediation process
and the administration of justice. When parties wish to litigate on issues related to
topics addressed during mediation, in most cases the courts are not permitted to
156
Only in
rely on mediated discussions unless special circumstances exist.
circumstances where pre-existing information which is admissible in trial is also
disclosed in mediation, or information is shared that is generally available to the
public, or the parties allege breach of duty or professional misconduct of the
157
mediator, can the limits of confidentiality in mediation be said to be reached.
Notwithstanding the general approach to confidentiality within the mediation
process, there have been several examples of non-confidential public sector
resource mediation, which demonstrate the possibilities for transparency in select
investor-state mediation cases. For example, take the mediation involving the
Snake River Basin in the United States involving $200 million USD in damages
and raising over 150,000 water rights claims employed a public mediation
process.158 The case involved legal issues pertaining to treaty and statutory
interpretation of federal and constitutional statutes.159 Parties included an Idaho
Power Company and a plethora of interested federal entities including the
Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of
Energy, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Council of Environmental Quality, and
the Fish and Wildlife Services to name a few.i1o The issues varied from "fishing in

154. The available reservations are of three kinds: (a) the Rules on Transparency will not apply
with respect to a specific investment treaty. Mauritius Convention, supra note 116, art. 3(1)(a); the
Rules on Transparency will only apply with respect to arbitrations under the UNCITRAL Rules.
Mauritius Convention, supra note 116, art. 3(1)(b); the unilateral offer will not apply in cases in which
a state is the respondent. Mauritius Convention, supra note 124, art. 3(l)(c).
155.

ALEXANDER NADJA, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE MEDIATION: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES

245 (2009).
156. Id. at 247.
157. Id. at 282-285.
158. Francis McGovern, Mediation of the Snake River Basin, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 547, 548-53
(2006).
159. Id. at 553.
160. Id. at 553-54.
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general" of particular species like Salmon, to fishing passage, fish rearing and
water flow along with channel maintenance, industrial and municipal pollution,
and recreational uses of the river.' 6 ' The conflict was also riddled with legal issues
pertaining the interpretation of Treaties of 1855162, 1863163 and 1 89 3 ,M and U.S.
federal statutes such as The Endangered Species Act (ESA) '6 5 and the Clean Water
Act' The main issues largely involved how statutes for the maintenance of the
quality of the river could be enforced if the resources were shared and clarifying
the fragile relationship between the federal government and the Indian tribes in
terms of resource management responsibilities. 167
In terms of the mediation process employed in this public sector dispute, a
problem-solving and forward looking approach was taken.' 6 8 The ultimate success
of the mediation was attributed to the focus on "future" and a realistic and
"doable" settlement possibilities. 169 The process lasted for six years reaching
settlements on "water flows, endangered species, resource allocation and
management, and governmental cooperation."' 70 The parties arrived at a settlement
of federal funding in the amount of $200 million USD and an agreement of
cooperative management for maintenance of water quality and flows of creeks and
streams. This creative, multi-pronged settlement was made possible through the
help of a small team of lawyers, stakeholders, and the use of a problem-solving
model, all of which was feasible in the context of mediation, but very likely a
17
result that could not have been achieved through an adjudication process.n
Similarly, the mediation involving the management of the endangered
Allagash river resources employed a public mediation process. 172 The parties - a
group of 23 stakeholders and advisors, including environmentalists, native
sportsmen, Maine residents, and state canoeists - had been embroiled in a long
term conflict with "no prospect of 'victory. -"73 These parties agreed to meet over
a 30 hour mediated deliberation in the backdrop of a retreat at the River Divers
Restaurant in Millinocket, Maine.' 74 The mediator spent considerable time with the
stakeholders individually so as to understand their concerns and ascertain

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 555.
Id. at 548.
Francis McGovern, Mediation of the Snake River Basin, 42 IDAHO L. REv. 547, 548 (2006).
Id.
Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1982), available at

https://www.fws.gov/laws/lawsdigest/esact.html.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
McGovern, supra note 150, at 555.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 562.
Id

172. Jonathan W. Reitman, The Allagash: A Case Study ofa Successful EnvironmentalMediation,
MEDIATECOM (2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/reitmanJ.cfm.

173. Id.
174. Id.
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priorities.' 7 5 At issue was the "original intent"17 6 of the documents entailing the
creation of the waterway as well as a set of related or "tiered" issues. 7 7 Mediation
proved effective in arriving at a "one-text"1 7 8 agreement addressing a diverse set of
interests formulated and signed by all concerned parties. 79
The above examples demonstrate that in some cases, transparent public-sector
mediation can prove effective in resolving complex multi-party disputes at the
domestic level. This experience is useful in considering the potential applicability
of transparent multi-party investor state mediation in a select category of cases.
B. Investor-State Mediation as a supplementary, gap-filling mechanism
Many scholars have begun to consider the potential of investor-state
mediation as a supplementary gap-filling mechanism in the world of investor-state
disputes. 8 0 This is due not only to the rigidity and financial cost associated with
investor-state arbitration as described above, but also due to the often symbiotic
relationship between host and investor, potential "policy costs", relational damage
and possibility for non-compliance.
In terms of relational considerations, the host state in many cases is often
"dependent upon the continued provision by the investor of the needed public
service" while the investor "having submitted substantial capital to the privatized
enterprise, is dependent on the host country for continued revenues." 82 Cases
involving long-term relational commitments are often seen as most conducive to
mediated settlements.
Such relational considerations come in to play when considering the question
of enforcement. When agreements are imposed and not arrived at through mutual
consent, investors often run the risk of a nation choosing not to comply with an
adverse award or repeal a given underlying treaty if the award amount is
considered burdensome.
In addition to relational considerations and the financial costs of the
arbitration process, the "policy cost" of investor state arbitration requiring a "host
country to repeal or modify measures that were implemented for the public
good"'83 are leading potential parties to look beyond arbitration for resolution.
The case of Metalclad v. Mexicol84 is illustrative. The Chief Executive

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Jonathan W. Reitman, The Allagash: A Case Study of a Successful Environmental Mediation,
MEDIATECOM (2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/reitmanJ.cfm.
178. Id.

179. Id.
180. See Timothy Gracious, Investor-State Mediation/Conciliation in India,

MEDIATE.COM (2015),
http://www.mediate.com/articles/TimothyG3.cfm#.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSIID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (May
19, 1997).
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Officer of Metalclad, Grant Kesler, noted that after winning a $17 million USD
arbitral award against Mexico, in hindsight and despite "winning" the case, felt
that "the arbitration had been so dissatisfying that [he] wished the company had
relied on other options to resolve the dispute."'8 5 Such cases illustrate the
increasing openness on the part of parties to look beyond arbitration for resolution
processes that build upon consensual solutions that respect legitimate policy
considerations and preserve on-going relationships.
VI. CONCLUSION

Reconciling the freedom of expression facilitated through confidential
mediation communications and the public interest in transparency is a delicate
balance to strike. Cases do exist of effective transparent public sector mediated
outcomes at the domestic level with high rates of compliance as described in this
paper. Yet, cases also exist requiring a high degree of discretion because they
involve trade secrets, sensitive government protocols, and policy concerns that
may not be effectively mediated in the glare of the public eye. In light of the above
factors, it is suggested that in the early stages of the development of investor-state
mediation, confidentiality be preserved. As the process becomes more fully
established, familiarity is gained, expertise is developed, and selected mediated
cases become public through party consent, the question of transparency in
investor-state mediation can also be re-examined with an eye toward gradual
openness in the long term.

185. Gracious, supra note 180.

WHEN GREEN INCENTIVES Go PALE:
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND RENEWABLE ENERGY
POLICYMAKING
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1.

INVESTMENT LAW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY

The use of renewable sources of energy, along with the implementation of
eco-friendly technologies, plays a pivotal role in addressing the predicaments
caused by climate change. States, the industry, international organizations, and
other stakeholders have been striving to develop and employ new solutions that
allow a shift from the current model, based on fossil fuel production and
consumption, to one based on low-carbon options,' so as to ensure a sustainable
future. This global quest for greener alternatives led to the emergence of an
international market for renewable energy technologies and equipment. 2 Over the
last decade this market attracted gigantic flows of capital. Foreign direct
investment is particularly welcome as it can not only provide fresh funds but also
induce the transfer of knowledge and technology. 4 From a broader perspective,
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attitudes towards renewable energy as the technology to create more sustainable living becomes more
prevalent and easily available to the general public and state governments.
2. See generally, RENEWABLE ENERGY: A GLOBAL REVIEW OF TECHNOLOGIES, POLICIES AND

MARKETS (Dirk Assmann et al. eds, 2006), offering an overview of the changes in technologies,
policies and markets towards renewable energy.
3. See, e.g., Omar Ellabban et al., Renewable Energy Resources: Current Status, Future
Prospects and their Enabling Technology, 39 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REv. 748, 758

(2014).
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The financial viability of investments in renewable energies is frequently
dependent upon public support.6 All over the world, governments have designed
and implemented renewable energy support mechanisms so as to encourage private
7
investment, often in the form of subsidies and incentive tariffs. Among the
8
different available variants, feed-in-tariffs became especially popular. Under this
scheme, the electricity generated from renewable or high-efficiency cogeneration
installations is paid at a fixed minimum price, generally set higher than the market

&

Environmental Policies: Striking a Reasonable Balance Between Stability and Change, 29 LAW
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 451, 452 (1998); see also Anatole Boute, The Potential ContributionofInternational
Investment Protection Law to Combat Climate Change, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 333,

334-35 (2009) (citing Int'l Inst. For Sustainable Dev. [IISD], Foreign Investment: Making It Work for
Sustainable
Development
6
(Sep.
2002),
https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/tradeeeinvestment.pdf [hereinafter The Potential
Contribution];Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.

11, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998); see also Valentina Vadi, Balancing
&

Human Rights, Climate Change and ForeignInvestment Protection, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 189, 193 (Ottavio Quirico

Mouloud Boumghar eds., 2016).
5. Andrew Newcombe, Sustainable Development and Investment Treaty Law, 8(3) J. OF WORLD
INVESTMENT & TRADE 357 (2007) (citing Agenda 21: Report of the United Nations Conference on

Environment and Development,

1 2.23,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.15 1/26/Rev. 1, (June 14, 1992); see also

Markus Gehring & Andrew Newcombe, An Introduction to Sustainable Development in World
Investment Law, in 30 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 3, 9 (Marie-Claire
Segger et al. eds., 2011).
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http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSDNET/Resources/InclusiveGreenGrowth
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BEYOND THE CARBON ECONOMY: Energy LAW IN TRANSITION 183, 186-206 (Donald Zillman et al.

ed. 2008).
8. See, generally, MIGUEL MENDONQA, FEED-IN TARIFFS: ACCELERATING THE DEPLOYMENT
OF RENEWABLE ENERGY (Routledge ed., 2007); MIGUEL MENDON(A ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN
ECONOMY: THE FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK (Routledge ed., 2010) [hereinafter POWERING THE GREEN
ECONOMY]; WILSON RICKERSON, U.N. ENvT. PROG. REP. ON FEED-IN TARIFFS AS A POLICY
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price and guaranteed over a specified period of time. 9
Investments in the energy field are highly capital intensive and require a
lengthy payback period.'o Regulatory risks loom large - the possibility that the
rules in force at the moment the investment was made are altered, threaten the
ability of investors to recover and earn a profit on their investments."
Governments may decide to change the regulatory framework once investments
take place and costs are "sunk."l2 Renewable energy support mechanisms are
designed to attract capital flows into the renewable energy market; thus, they play
a central role in determining both the period of time and the rate of return on the
investment. Changes to economic mechanisms are a critical risk factor surrounding
such investments, since the level of public support is the most important element
influencing expected profits." Therefore, investors seek to ensure the stability of
the regulatory framework that underpins their investments and secure protection
from unwarranted policy changes.
In order to attract cross-border investment, states must provide adequate
security and protection to foreign investors, namely through the creation of
adequate regulatory frameworks. These legal instruments generally take two
forms: investment contracts and international investment treaties.1 4 Investment
contracts provide some consistency through the development of stabilization

9.

MENDONCA, supra note 8, at 8. The European Commission describes this mechanism as follows:
'These systems are characterised by a specific price, normally set for a period of around
several years, that must be paid by electricity companies, usually distributors, to domestic

producers of green electricity. The additional costs of these schemes are paid by suppliers in
proportion to their sales volume and are passed through to the power consumers by way of a
premium on the kWh end-user price. These schemes have the advantages of investment

security, the possibility of fine tuning and the promotion of mid- and long-term technologies
Communication from the Commission: The Support of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources. COM (2005) 627
Final, of 7 December 2005.
10. Yulia Selivanova, The Energy Charter and the InternationalEnergy Governance, 2012
EURO. Y.B. INT'L ECON. L. 307, 315.
11. RORY SULLIVAN & WILLIAM BLYTH, CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND THE
ELECTRICITY
INDUSTRY:
IMPLICATIONS AND
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES,
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2469897 (last visited June 8, 2016); see also Boute,
supra note 4, at 337-38; Nigel Bankes, Decarbonisingthe Economy and InternationalInvestment Law,
30(4) J. OF ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES LAW 497, 502 (2012).
12. Mario E. Bergara et al., PoliticalInstitutionsand Electric Utility Investment: A Cross-Nation
Analysis, 40(2) CALIF. MGMT. REV. 18, 19 (1998); Ralf Dickel, Impact ofLiberalisationon Investment
Performance in the Power Sector, in ELECTRICITY TRADE IN EUROPE: REVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC AND
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 69, 76 (Janusz Bielecki & Melaku Desta eds., 2004).
13. Boute, supra note 4, at 342; see also Anatole Boute, A ComparativeAnalysis of the European
and Russian Support Schemes for Renewable Energy: Return on European Experience for Russia, 4(2)

J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 157, 175 (2011) [hereinafter A Comparative Analysis]; ECONOMIST
INTELLIGENCE UNIT, MANAGING THE RISK IN RENEWABLE ENERGY 10-11 (Oct. 2011),
http://digitalresearch.eiu.com/risksandrenewables/report.
14. See, generally, Peter Cameron, In Search of Investment Stability, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 124 (Kim Talus ed., 2014) (discussing the various models of treaties
and contracts for investment in renewable energy and the attempt to find a stabilizing choice).
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clauses,' 5 but often prove inadequate when dealing with sovereign states.' As a
result, international investment agreements have become especially important over
the past few decades. These legal instruments aim to create a "level playing field"
for investments in the energy sector, and minimize non-commercial risks
associated with such investments.' 7 They can help lower regulatory and political
risks, thus boosting investor confidence and increasing international investments
18
into renewable sources of energy.
The association between investment law and the energy market has a long
history, taking into account the global nature of this area of business.19 Like in
many other fields of the economy, the significant increase in foreign investments
into the energy market, which have taken place over the last decade, would have
been more difficult without the existence of a transnational system of substantive
and procedural guarantees. 20 Currently, the international legal framework
governing foreign investments to the energy market consists of a vast network of
international investment agreements supplemented by the general rules of
international law. 21 These agreements include bilateral investment treaties
("BITs"), regional free trade agreements, and sectorial treaties including
investment obligations. 22 While international investment agreements differ in many
important respects, they are composed by two essential elements: first, they
include a set of standards of promotion and protection of foreign investment;
second, they provide for mechanisms on the settlement of any possible disputes
23
between the foreign investor and the host state.

15. See Thomas Waelde & George Ndi, Stabilizing International Investment Commitments:
International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 31 TEx. INT'L L. J. 215 (1996) (examining
stabilization clauses in international contracts); see also Peter D. Cameron, Stability of Contract in the
International Energy Industry, 27 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 305 (2009) (continuing the
discussion on the importance of stability clauses in international contracts)[hereinafter Stability of
Contract].
16. Bankes, supra note 11, at 498.
17. Kaj Hobdr, Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, 1(1) J. INT'L. DiSP.
SETTLEMENT 153, 155 (2010).
18. BRADLY CONDON & TAPEN StNHA, THE ROLE OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC
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19. Bankes, supra note 11, at 497.
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21. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 448-49 (Kluwer L. Int'l ed., 2009).

22. Examples of BITs include, e.g., US-China BIT, US-Germany BIT, US-UK BIT. Examples of
Regional FTAs include, e.g., NAFTA, CAFTA, ASEAN FTA, EU FTA, etc. Examples of sectorial
treaties including investment obligations include, e.g., ECT, WTO, MAI.
23. See e.g., Christoph Schreuer, Investments, InternationalProtection, MPEPIL 1533,
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see

also,

Marie-France

Houde,

Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in

InternationalInvestment Law 2-3, 11, 13 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Publishing, Working Paper
No. 2004/02, Sep. 2004), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/518757021651; see also, Lise Johnson, Lisa Sachs
& Jeffrey Sachs, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Public Interest and U.S. Domestic Law, 3-4, 8, 16

(Colum.

CIr.

Sustainable

Inv.,

Working

Paper,

May

2015),
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Investment agreements are a form of international law that creates a series of
obligations owed by the host state towards foreign investors.2 4 The numbers of
BITs and multilateral agreements entering into force have increased throughout the
past few decades.25 The Energy Charter Treaty26 ("ECT"), a multilateral treaty
signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998, that establishes a legal framework to
promote long-term cooperation in the energy field, is especially relevant. 27 The
ECT currently has 54 member-states. 2 8 The ECT's investment provisions build
upon the content of BITs as they have developed during the last half-century. 29

http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/201 5/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-

Domestic-Law-FINAL-May-1 9-8.pdf.
24. See, e.g., RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 58-

66, 119-20 (Martinus Nijhoff Publ. ed., 1995); DOLZER, supra note 20; NEWCOMBE, supra note 21, at
449;

M. SORNARAJAH,

THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW

ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT

90-91,

101,

119

(Cambridge Univ. Press 3rd ed., 2010); JESWALD SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 191,

285, 353 (Oxford Univ. Press 2nd ed., 2015).
25. International
Investment
Agreement
Navigator,
UNCTAD
(2015),
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IlA (reports there were less than 500 investment agreements
prior to 1980. Today there are over 3,000).

26. The Energy CharterTreaty, 34 I.L.M. 360 (Dec. 17, 1994) [hereinafter ECT].
27. Id. at art. 3, 9.
28. See Hobdr, supra note 17, at 154-55; Selivanova, supra note 10 (general discussion of the
ECT and its framework in handling disputes); THE LEGAL COUNSEL OF THE IEA, THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY: A DESCRIPTION OF ITS PROVISIONS (Int'l Energy Agency et al., 1994); JULIA DORE,
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: ORIGINS, AIMS, AND PROSPECTS xiv (Royal Inst. Int'l AfE ed., 1995)(
offering a detailed description of the ECT); THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: AN EAST-WEST
GATEWAY FOR INVESTMENT AND TRADE (Thomas Wilde ed., 1996); THOMAS WALDE, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND THE 1994 ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (Univ. of Dundee et al. ed., 1997); MIRIAN
OMALU, NAFTA AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: COMPLIANCE WITH, IMPLEMENTATION, AND

EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (Seymour J Rubin & Dean C.

Alexander eds., 1999); ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY: A READER'S

GUIDE 8 (Int'l Energy Charter, 2002); ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT, THE ENERGY CHARTER
TREATY

AND

RELATED

DOCUMENTS:

A

LEGAL

FRAMEWORK

FOR

INTERNATIONAL

ENERGY

COOPERATION (Int'l Energy Charter, 2004), http://www.ena.It/pdfai/Treaty.pdf; see also Andrei
Konoplyanik & Thomas Wllde, Energy Charter Treaty and Its Role in InternationalEnergy, 24 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 523, 542 (2006) (discussing the number of members that are part of
international organizations); see also Justin D'Agostino & Oliver Jones, Energy Charter Treaty: A Step
Towards Consistency in InternationalInvestment Arbitration, 25 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES L. 225,
237 (2007) (discussing the membership of the ECT); INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY
CHARTER TREATY (Graham Coop & Clarisse Ribeiro eds., 2008); HAMSU YAHAYA, MULTILATERAL
INVESTMENT

TREATIES:

IS

THE ENERGY CHARTER

TREATY

AN

EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT

FOR

PROTECTING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS? (Grin Verlag et al., eds., 2009); ENERGY DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: INVESTMENT PROTECTION, TRANSIT AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (Graham Coop
ed., 2011); THOMAS ROE & MATTIHEW HAPPOLD, SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENTS DISPUTES UNDER THE

&

ENERGY CHARTER TREATY (James Dingemans ed., 2011); Yulia Selivanova, The Energy Charter and
the InternationalEnergy Governance, reprinted in REGULATION OF ENERGY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: WTO, NAFTA AND ENERGY CHARTER 373 (Yulia Selivanova et al. eds., 2011) (discussion of the
ECT and the governance between the members); Tarcisio Gazzini, Energy Charter Treaty:
Achievements, Challenges and Perspectives, in FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR:
BALANCING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 105 (Eric de Brabandere & Tarcisio Gazzini, Brill

Nijhoff, eds., vol. 2, 2014).
29. See Hob6r, supranote 17, at 155.
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While there are differences between the scope and content of the different legal
instruments, there is a shared core content: they normally include the obligation to
treat foreign investors fairly and equitably; provide foreign investors full protection
and security; and not to expropriate foreign investment except under certain
conditions, including the payment of compensation.30 Besides including a set of
standards of promotion and protection of foreign investments, international
investment agreements also contain procedural protections. They typically include
dispute resolution clauses that enable foreign investors to initiate arbitration
t
proceedings against the host state, known as "investor-state arbitrations."" For
instance, Article 26 of the ECT provides investors with the opportunity to file
arbitration claims directly against member-states for violations of protections
under the treaty. 32 The investor is given the option of choosing among:
a) Arbitration before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). Established pursuant to the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (ICSID
Convention), if the contracting party of the investor and the contracting party to the
dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention, or under the rules governing the
Additional Facility of the ICSID, if the contracting party of the investor or the
33
contracting party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the ICSID Convention;
b) Arbitration under the Arbitration Institute of Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce Rules;34 or

c) ad hoc arbitrationunder the Rules of the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules). In such disputes, the foreign investor
brings a claim before the arbitral tribunal alleging that certain acts, or omissions of

30.

See NEWCOMBE ET AL., supra note 21, at 147.

31. See, generally, ARBITRATING FOREIGN

INVESTMENT

DISPUTES:

PROCEDURAL

AND

SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS (Norbert Horn et al. eds., vol. 19, 2004) (overview of arbitration on the

international level with foreign investors); INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION:
LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (Loukas Mistelis et al. eds., 2007);
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, PROTECTION AND ARBITRATION: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL
PERSPECTIVES (Christian Tietje ed., 2008); CHRISTOPHER DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2008); MARIEL DLMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENTS DISPUTES: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., vol. 1, 2008);
ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS (Cambridge Univ. Press ed.,
2009); THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Catherine Rogers & Roger Alford eds., 2009);
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds.,
2011); THOMAS WEBSTER, HANDBOOK OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Sweet & Maxwell ed., 2012);
ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES (Katia
Yannaca-Small ed., 2010); TONY COLE, THE STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Routledge
ed., 2013); LITIGATING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE (Chiara
Giorgetti ed., 2014); JOHAN BILLIET ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS ARBITRATION: A
PRACTICAL HANDBOOK (Maklu Pub. ed., 2016).

32. ECT, supra note 26, art. 26(4)(a)(ii).
33. ECT, supra note 26, art. 26(4)(c).
34. ECT, supra note 26, art. 26.
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organs of the central government or local authorities, resulted in damages to his
investment or violate the host state's obligations under an international investment
agreement. If the host state is a party to the ECT or another international
investment treaty and has consented to investor-state arbitration, the arbitral
tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the claims of the investor against the state for
violation of its obligations under the treaty.
II.

DISPUTES

OVER CHANGES IN RENEWABLE ENERGY SUPPORT MECHANISMS

Over the years, arbitration has become the principal technique for resolving
disputes in the energy sector. International investments in energy represent a
huge percentage of overall investments and, consequently, a substantial part of
international commercial and investment disputes relates to this field. Arbitration
increases are well evidenced by the new era of "mega cases"38 in the oil and gas
industries.3 9 While billion dollar claims were virtually unheard of twenty years
ago, they are now ordinary.40 As a result, energy-related dispute resolution, in
particular international arbitration, is a growing area of practical and academic
interest. 41 Specifically in the area of investor-state arbitration, Whitsitt and
Bankes4 2 arrange energy-related disputes into four categories: disputes involving
significant economic or political structural adjustment in the host state; disputes
triggered by the efforts of states seeking to claim an enhanced share of resource
rents; disputes in which states seek to enhance the environmental or social
regulatory regime within which existing investments operate; and disputes where
the states seek to withdraw economic support mechanisms for a policy measure
that was introduced to support a particular energy or environmental policy. 43
The number of disputes fitting the latter category surged in the last two
years." With a view to increasing the production of clean energy, many countries

35.

Michael Feit, Responsibility of the State under InternationalLaw for the Breach of Contract

Committed by a State-OwnedEntity, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 142, 168-176 (2010); see also Catherine
Yannaca-Small, Definition of Investor and Investment in InternationalInvestment Agreements, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS 7-100

(OECD Publishing ed. 2008).
36.

A. Timothy Martin, DisputeResolution in the InternationalEnergy Sector. An Overview, 4(4)

J. WORLD ENERGY L. BUS. 332, 339 (2011).
37.

ERIC DE BRABANDERE, THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR

130 (Eric de Brabandere & Tarcisio Gazzini eds., vol. 2, 2014) (citing Martin, supranote 36).
38. George Kahale, III, Is Investor-State Arbitration Broken? 9 TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 1, 2832 (2012); see also Julian Cardenas Garcia, The Era ofPetroleumArbitration Mega Cases, 35 HOUS. J.

INT'L L. 537 (2013) (discussing the Occidental v. Ecuador case in regard to mega cases).
39. Kahale, supranote 38, at 31.
40. Kahale, supranote 38, at 28; Garcia, supra note 38.
41. Alexandra Wawryk, InternationalEnergy Law: an Emerging Academic Discipline, in LAW
AS CHANGE: ENGAGING WITH THE LIFE AND SCHOLARSHIP OF ADRIAN BRADBROOK 223, 224-25, 228

(Paul Babie & Paul Leadbeter eds., 2014).
42. Elizabeth Whitsitt & Nigel Bankes, The Evolution of InternationalInvestment Law and Its

Application to the Energy Sector, 51 ALTA. L. REV. 207, 211 (2013).
43. Id. at 211, 213.
44. Id. at 213.
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45
introduced incentives to encourage investment in the renewable energy sector. As
originally intended, the introduction of these mechanisms led a substantial number
46
of companies and individuals making investments in this field. While economic
incentives attracted significant amounts of investment, several countries have
began reducing or eliminating them. Since 2008, Spain has introduced several
measures affecting the renewable energy sector. 47 In 2010, the Spanish government
reduced feed-in tariffs in the solar energy sector and enacted measures that
substantially cut some incentives granted to wind generation. Subsequently, the
Spanish government imposed a limit on the feed-in tariffs of 25 years and imposed
an annual cap on the number of hours of electricity the investors could sell at the
above-market rates.4 8
In 2013, the Spanish government abrogated the feed-in tariff system
altogether. 4 9 Fourteen domestic producers filed a suit against the Spanish
government arguing that such measures generated legal uncertainty and had
retrospective nature. 50 In a ruling handed down in January 2014, the Spanish
Supreme Court rejected the claims holding that investors had assumed a regulatory
risk, were highly sophisticated, and had access to quality technical and legal

45. Id.
46. See Onno Kuik & Sabine Fuss, Renewables in the Energy Market: A Financial-Technological
Analysis Considering Risk and Policy Options, in FINANCIAL ASPECTS IN ENERGY: A EUROPEAN
PERSPECTIVE 33 (Andr6 Dorsman et al. eds., 2011).

47. See Arif Hyder Ali, In the Eye of the Storm: Spain's Nexus to Investment Disputes, 18 SPAIN
ARB. REV. 5 (2013); PABLO DEL Rio & PERE MIR-ARTIGUES, A CAUTIONARY TALE: SPAIN'S SOLAR

PV INVESTMENT BUBBLE I (Global Subsidies Initiative & Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Feb. 2014),
https://www.iisd.org/gsi/sites/default/files/rens_ct spain.pdf; Mejia, The Protection of Legitimate
Expectations and Regulatory Change: The Spanish Case, 21 SPAIN ARB. REV. 113 (2014); CECILIA
OLIVET & PIA EBERHARDT, PROFITING FROM CRISIS: How CORPORATIONS AND LAWYERS ARE
SCAVENGING PROFITS FROM EUROPE'S CRISIS COUNTRIES 7, 26-31 (The Transnat'l Inst. Mar. 7, 2014),

https://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/profiting-from-crisis_0.pdf; Jose Luis Iriarte & Lupicinio
Rodriguez, The increasing number and methods of arbitration claims brought against Spain for its
WORLD
measures,
energy
renewable
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/WWARNewsletter

(2014),
26
REP.
ARB.
Spring20l4.pdf; Charles Patrizia et al.,

Investment Disputes Involving the Renewable Energy Industry Under the Energy Charter Treaty, in
THE GUIDE TO ENERGY ARBITRATIONS 73, 74-76 (J. William Rowley et al. eds., 2015); Joseph M.

&

Tirado, Renewable Energy Claims Under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview, 13(3) OIL GAS

ENERGY L. INTEL. 1, 6-7 (2015); Daniel Behn & Ole Kristian Fauchald, Governments Under Cross-

fire? Renewable Energy and InternationalEconomic Tribunals, 12(2) MANCHESTER J. INT'L ECON. L.
117, 121-22 (2015); Thomas Dromgool & Daniel Enguix, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard
and the Revocation of Feed in Tariffs - Foreign Renewable Energy Investments in Crisis-StruckSpain,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: HORIZONTAL AND SECTORIAL POLICY ISSUES

389, 391-400 (Volker Mauerhofer ed.,2016); Daniel Behn et al., PromotingRenewable Energy in the
EU: Shifiing Trends in Member State Policy Space 9-10 (PluriCourts, Working Paper No. 15-23,
2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract-id=2704333.
48. Joseph Tirado & Jerry Bloom, Renewable Energy Reforms in Europe: Growing Threats to
International Investors, LEXOLOGY (2014), http://cdn2.winston.com/images/content/8/4/v2/84476/IA-

RenewableEnergyReformEurope-6-9-2014.pdf.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also OLIVET, supranote 47, at 6-7, 26, 28, 30-31.
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advice."' In the court's view, investors were not entitled to expect that the

economic regime regulating the retribution of their investments would remain
unchanged. 52 In June 2016, the Spanish Supreme Court rendered another decision,
holding that the 2014 government decree reducing subsidies in the renewable
energy sector did not violate the Spanish Constitution or European Union law. 5
Other European governments have enacted legislative measures, which have
impacted the renewable energy market. In 2011, the Czech Republic introduced a
new 26% retroactive tax on all producers of solar energy and modified its feed-in
tariffs policy. 54 Between 2010 and 2013, the Italian government reduced feed-in
tariffs and eliminated incentives granted to photovoltaic plants situated in
agricultural land. In June 2013, the Romanian Government excluded some
photovoltaic plants from the government's support scheme. 56 In 2014, Bulgaria
imposed a 20% fee on income from wind and solar power installations and limited
the volume of electricity purchased at feed-in tariff rates.5 7 Other countries like
Slovakia, Latvia, Greece, Belgium, the United Kingdom, and France have also
made significant modifications to their support schemes.5 8
National policies for the promotion of renewable energy generation have been
introduced by European states in an effort to achieve national binding targets
mandated under the Renewable Energy Directive.5 9 Economic support mechanisms
were seen as indispensable to kick-start investments in renewable energies due to
the high cost of production. While renewable energy promotion is at the very heart
of the European Union's environmental policy,6 0 the European Union has also
been changing its approach to economic support mechanisms. The Communication
from the European Commission "Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental
Protection and Energy 2014-2020," published in 2014, recommends that subsidies
and exemptions become phased out in a degressive way.61

51.

See Supreme Court Backs Cuts to the Solar Power Producers'Earnings, EL PAis (Jan. 21,

2014), http://elpais.com/elpais/2014/01/21/inenglish/1390306709_143350.html; Iriarte, supra note 47,
at 27.
52. Iriarte, supra 47, at 29.
53. See Reyes Rinc6n, Spain's Supreme Court Backs Renewable Energy Cuts, EL PAiS (June 2,
2016),
http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/06/02/inenglish/1464860925_523010.html?idextemo_rsoc=LKCC.
54. See Anna De Luca, Withdrawing Incentives to Attract FDI: Can Host Countriesput the Genie
Back in the Bottle?, COLUMBIA U. ACAD. COMMONS 2 (Issue No. 125, 2014),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2013/10/No-125-De-Luca-FINAL.pdf; Behn & Fauchald, supra note 47,
at 123-124; Patrizia et al., supra note 47, at 76-77; Tirado, supra note 47, at 8; Behn, supra note 47, at
11-12.
55. Tirado & Bloom, supra note 48, at 8-11; Behn, supra note 47, at 12-14.
56. Tirado & Bloom, supra note 48.
57. Angel Bangachev, New Rules for Wind and Solar Energy Producersin Bulgaria, LEXOLOGY
(Jan.
9,
2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-8e409dc6-4c5e-470d-95994b7feac75905; Vadi, supranote 4, at 197.
58. Behn, supra note 47, at 6.
59. Council Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16-62.
60. Dromgool & Enguix, supranote 47, at 390.
61. Guidelines on State aidfor environmentalprotection and energy 2014-2020, at 1-55, COM
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Several European countries have made legislative changes to their renewable
energy markets, which has resulted in the surfacing of numerous arbitral
proceedings where investors claim that such measures breach the protection
afforded by international investment agreements, namely the ECT. 62 According to
figures from the ICSID, as of December 31, 2015, 17% of all ICSID cases
regarded electric power and other sources of energy.6 3 Forty two percent of the
new cases registered in 2015 related to electric power and other sources of energy,
with the ECT being the legal instrument invoked in 33% of the cases.M In at least
twenty cases initiated in 2015, investors challenged legislative reforms in the
renewable energy sector.6 5 As of June 15, 2016, 43 cases had been initiated
relating to changes in economic support programs in the renewable energy
market.66 This number, however, may not be totally accurate. Arbitral proceedings

&

(June 28, 2014).
62. See Tirado & Bloom, supranote 48; see also Patrizia,supra note 47, at 32-33.
(2016),
63. ICSID Secretariat, The ICSID Caseload - Statistics, Issue 2016-1
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/icsidweb/resources/pages/icsid-caseload-statistics.aspx.
64. Id. at 26.
65. UNCTAD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Review of Developments in 2015, 6 (June 8,
2016), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.orgUpload/ISDS%201ssues%2ONote%202016.pdf.
66. Cases administered by the ICSID: EVN AG v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No.
ARB/13/17 (Dec. 2, 2013); RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited & RREEF Pan-European
Infrastructure Two Lux S.A.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30 (June 6, 2016); Antin
Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.A.r.l. & Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain,
ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31(Aug. 7, 2014); Eiser Infrastructure Limited & Energia Solar Luxembourg
S.A.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36 (July 28, 2014); Masdar Solar & Wind
Cooperatief U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1(July 18, 2014); Blusun S.A., JeanPierre Lecorcier & Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3 (June 12, 2014);
NextEra Energy Global Holdings B.V. & NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain
ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11 (Jan. 23, 2015); InfraRed Environmental Infrastructure GP Limited
others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/12 (Nov. 26, 2014); RENERGY S.A.r.l. v.
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/18 (Feb. 13, 2015); RWE Innogy GmbH & RWE Innogy
Aersa S.A.U. v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/14/34 (Nov. 4, 2015); Stadtwerke Miinchen
GmbH, RWE Innogy GmbH, & others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/1 (Dec. 16,
2015); STEAG GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/4 (Oct. 25, 2016); 9REN
Holding S.a.r.1 v. Kingdom of Spain, ICS[D Case No. ARB/15/15 (Feb. 8, 2016); BayWa r.e.
Renewable Energy GmbH & BayWa r.e. Asset Holding GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/16 (Nov. 6, 2015); ENERGO-PRO a.s. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/19
(Feb. 9, 2016); Cube Infrastructure Fund SICAV & others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/20 (Dec. 8, 2015); Mathias Kruck & others v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/15/23
(Jan. 19, 2016); KS Invest GmbH & TLS Invest GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/25 (Dec. 7, 2015); JGC Corporation v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/27 (Jan. 4,
2016); Cavalum SGPS, S.A. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/34 (Jan. 22, 2016); E.ON
Finanzanlagen GmbH & E.ON Iberia Holding GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/35 (Jan. 21, 2016); OperaFund Eco-Invest SICAV PLC & Schwab Holding AG v. Kingdom of
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/36 (Mar. 28, 2016); Silver Ridge Power BV v. Italian Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/15/37 (Pending until Jan. 16, 2017); SolEs Badajoz GmbH v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case No. ARB/15/38 (Feb. 16, 2016); Belenergia S.A. v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/15/40
(May 18, 2016); Hydro Energy 1 S.A.r.l. & Hydroxana Sweden AB v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case
No. ARB/15/42 (May 3, 2016); Holdings S.A.r.1. & others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/44 (Mar. 31, 2016); Landesbank Baden-Wilrttemberg & others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
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may be administered by institutions that, differently from the ICSID, do not
disclose the initiation of proceedings publicly. Furthermore, they may also be
conducted ad-hoc, with no supervising institution. Due to this lack of transparency,
the exact number of disputes already initiated is unknown and the legal basis on
which such claims are made is not totally clear. In any case, it is safe to say that we
are witnessing a boom in renewable energy arbitration under the ECT, particularly
in Europe. The implementation of the "Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental
Protection and Energy 2014-2020" may create further tension between national,
European and international legal systems and result in additional arbitral
proceeding against member states in the near future. 67
The anatomy of these cases is substantially different from the prototype of
energy-related disputes submitted to arbitration in the past. For years, states have
enacted regulations to protect the environment by limiting environmentally
detrimental investments. Commentators have expressed concern that investors
could initiate arbitral proceedings, claiming that climate-related regulatory
measures breached relevant investment treaty provisions.6 9 Such cases posed a risk

&

&

Case No. ARB/15/45 (June 7, 2016); Eskosol S.p.A. in liquidazione v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/15/50 (Oct. 19, 2016); Eurus Energy Holdings Corporation & Eurus Energy Europe B.V. v.
Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/16/4 (May 2, 2016); ESPF Beteiligungs GmbH, ESPF Nr. 2
Austria Beteiligungs GmbH, & InfraClass Energie 5 GmbH & Co. KG v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/16/5 (July 26, 2016). Cases administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration under the
UNICTRAL rules: Antaris Solar & Dr. Michael G6de v. Czech Republic (PCA Case Repository, May
8, 2013); Cases administered by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce:
Charanne & Construction Investments v. Kingdom of Spain, Case No. 62/2012 (Arb. Inst. Stockholm
Chamber of Comm., 2013); Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain (Arb. Inst.
Stockholm Chamber of Comm., registered 2013); S.A.r.1. v. Kingdom of Spain (Arb. Inst. Stockholm
Chamber of Comm., registered June 2013); Greentech Energy Systems & Novenergia v. Italian
Republic (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber of Comm., registered July 7, 2015); Alten Renewable Energy
Developments BV v. Kingdom of Spain (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber of Comm., registered March
2015). Ad hoc cases under the UNCITRAL Rules: PV Investors v. Kingdom of Spain (UNCITRAL,
registered Nov. 2011); Natland Investment Group NV, Natland Group Limited, G.I.H.G. Limited,
Radiance Energy Holding S.A.R.L. v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); Voltaic
Network GmbH v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); ICW Europe Investments
Limited v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH
v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v.
Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); Mr. Jlrgen Wirtgen, Mr. Stefan Wirtgen,
JSW Solar (zwei) v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, registered June 2013).
67. Ernesto Bonaf6 & G6kqe Mete, Escalated Interactions Between E. U. Energy Law and the
Energy CharterTreaty, 9(3) J. WORLD ENERGY L. Bus. 174, 185-86 (2016).
68. See generally Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, Environmental Regulation, Investment
Protectionand Regulatory Taking in InternationalLaw, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 811 (2001); HELD ET
AL., supra note 8; Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Global Investments and Environmental Protection: The
Battle Lines are yet to Emerge!, 49(2) NILR 195, 197-8 (2002); Julie A. Soloway, Environmental
Regulation as Expropriation: The Case of NAFTA's Chapter 1], 33 CAN. BUS. L.J. 92 (2000); KEVtN
ROSNER, INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR PUBLIC-PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN RENEWABLE ENERGY
PROJECTS IN FRONTIER ECONOMIES (SEI, Technical Report 2016-01, Feb. 2016).
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Investor-State Conflicts and Possible Strategiesfor Minimizing it, 39 ENV'T L. REP. 11147, 1150
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that international investment agreements could have a constraining effect
("regulatory chill") on climate change mitigation measures and restrain the host70
The adoption of climate change-related
state's policy space significantly.
regulatory measures can affect the economic interests of private actors, by
requiring (or not requiring) technological upgrades and specific economic
behavior.7 1 Foreign investors can argue that such measures violate investment
treaty provisions, in particular, the prohibition of unlawful expropriation, and the
fair and equitable treatment standard.7 2
Differently, the new wave of disputes refers to cases where states are reducing
or eliminating the economic incentives which they introduced years ago in order to
73
lure investments into the renewable energy market. Investors are complaining
that such regulatory changes diminish or exhaust the commercial viability of their
investments. 74 Host states argue that support mechanisms have proven too popular
(and therefore, more expensive than anticipated); that they became too generous
because the production costs for the new technology have decreased significantly;
or that they simply cannot afford these initiatives due to the ongoing financial
crisis. 7 5 The crux of the question is whether investors can seek compensation under

70. See, e.g., Soloway, supra note 68, at 92, 95, 104. ERIC NEUMAYER, GREENING TRADE AND
INVESTMENT: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION WITHOUT PROTEcTIONISM 68-78 (Earthscan Publ. ed.,
2001); Kevin R. Gray, Foreign Direct Investment And Environmental Impacts - Is The Debate Over?,
11(3) REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENV'T L. 306. 310-11 (2002); Wallace-Bruce, supranote 68, at
195, 211-13; Jacob Werksman, Kevin A. Baumert & Navroz K. Dubash, Will InternationalInvestment
Rules Obstruct Climate Protection Policies? An Examination of the Clean Development Mechanism,
3(1) INT'L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS POL. L. & EcON. 59 (2003)(discussing the Kyoto Protocol and how
disputes are solved both in and outside of court and the effect on the international arena); Ole K.
Fauchald, InternationalInvestment Law and Environmental Protection, 17(1) Y.B. INT'L ENVTL L. 3,
8, 29 (2007); Stephan Schill, Do Investment Treaties Chill Unilateral State Regulation to Mitigate
Climate Change? 24(5) J. INT'L ARB. 469 (2007); Johnson, InternationalInvestment Agreements, supra
note 70, at 11147, 1150, 1152-53; Kate Miles, ArbitratingClimate Change: Regulatory Regimes and
Investor-State Disputes, 1 CLIMATE L. 63 (2010) (discussing the various international mechanisms
implemented to regulate climate change and the conflicts that have arisen between foreign investors and
host-states); Kate Miles, Sustainable Development, National Treatment and Like Circumstances in
Investment Law, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 265 (Marie-Claire

Segger et al. eds., 2011); Cristina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Going Green: Managing the
Environment Through InternationalInvestment Arbitration,30 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 383, 422 (2015);
Albert Cho & Navroz Dubash, Will Investment Rules Shrink Policy Space for Sustainable
Development? Evidence from the Electricity Sector 38 (World Resources Inst., Working Paper, Sep. 5,
2003), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/tradeinvestment rules.pdf; Aaron Cosbey et al., Clean Energy
Investment. Project Synthesis Report 8, 61, 70 INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 2008),

http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/cei synthesis.pdf.
71. Vadi, supra note 4, at 193.
72. Id. at 194; Schill, supra note 70, at 470-76.
73. Patrizia, supra note 47, at 1.
74. De Luca, supra note 54, at 1-2; Behn & Fauchald, supranote 47, at 120.

75. Bankes, supranote 11, at 502; Whitsitt, supra note 42, at 213-14; James Prest, The Future of
Feed-in Tartffs: Capacity Caps, Scheme Closures and Looming Grid Parity, 2012(1) RENEWABLE

ENERGY L. & POL'Y Rev. 25, 34-6 (2012); DEL Rio, supra note 47, at 12-14; loannis Glinavos, Solar
Eclipse: Investment Treaty Arbitration and Spain's Photovoltaic Troubles, in LESSONS FROM THE
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investment treaties when governments encourage investment via economic support
schemes, but decide to reduce or eliminate them after the investment has been
made. Again, we may have a clash between energy-related policies and investment

law. 76
These disputes raise a classic problem in investment arbitration: how to strike
a balance between foreign investors' reliance on the regulations that underpin their
long-term investments and the host state's right to adapt regulations to new
needs.n The introduction of changes to economic support mechanisms typically
involves governmental measures adopted for public purposes, whether for financial
or other reasons.7 8 The host state intervenes as the regulation of energy production,
distribution, and consumption is a key element of national economic law and
policy. 79 The novelty in this new wave of disputes is that challenged measures
work against the protection of the environment, while in the past they were ecofriendly.8 0 The crux of the question is the following: to what extent can investors
expect that the level of incentives granted initially will be protected by investment
treaties throughout the life of the investment?
III. BETWEEN INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND NATIONAL REGULATORY SPACE
Over the last decade, governments around the world have implemented
policies designed to encourage private investment in renewable sources of
energy.8 1 For various reasons, some of them have recently decided to introduce
changes to those policies. Incentives and other benefits are easy to grant but
difficult to withdraw. Economic support mechanisms may be reasonable in the
initial phases of development because of the environmental and social benefits of
renewable energy. However, they also have disadvantages. Feed-in tariffs, for
instance, can lag behind the technology change they create, thus generating
windfall profits and over-subsidizing the renewable industry.82 As a result, the
regulatory framework underpinning these incentives becomes outdated. This leads
to a paradoxical situation: while feed-in tariffs are frequently praised for creating
certainty, they themselves become uncertain.
Trying to adjust to new scenarios, governments may decide to interfere with

Gurdgiev et al. eds., vol. 18, 2016).
76. See, e.g., JORGE E. VINUALES,
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2012).
77. See DOLZER, supra note 20, at 145-49.
78.
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VI1TUALES, supra note 76, at 30, 50; see also Gray, supra note 70, at 311-13.
Markus Krajewski, The Impact of International Investment Agreements on Energy

Regulation, 2012 EuR. Y.B. OF INT'L EcON. L. 343, 345.
80. See Rachel A. Nathanson, The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment Economic-Support
Systems as Indirect Expropriation Post-Nykomb: A Spanish Case Analysis, 98 IOWA L. REV. 863, 865

(2013).
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RICKERSON, supra note 8, at 2, 24, 63, 187.

82. Lincoln L. Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tarifs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REv. 937, 940
(2013).
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the amount and duration of the support mechanism. Feed-in tariffs guarantee
renewable energy producers a fixed price for their energy over a fixed period of
time. 84 Even though such incentives are designed to reduce financial risk, the truth
is that they are not immune from political risk. As a result, relying on this type of
mechanism makes renewable energy investors particularly vulnerable to policy
changes.8' The cases mentioned above illustrate this possibility. While support
schemes may help to attract foreign investments, subsequent changes to regulatory
frameworks affecting foreign investors might be challenged under international
investment law.
International investment agreements impose certain standards regarding the
protection afforded by host states to foreign investors. However, in some
situations, these canons may conflict with the regulatory power of the host state.
The disciplines of international investment law may "chill" governments from
enacting regulations that might affect foreign investments - in the cases under
analysis, by changing the structure of economic incentives that supported
investments in renewable energies. 8 6 Fundamentally, the notion of regulatory chill
suggests that the investment law and arbitration system may impact the normal
course of policy development and implementation. 8 In some circumstances,
governments may fail to modify, enact, or enforce new regulatory measures
because they are afraid of a perceived risk of having to face arbitration
proceedings.
The protection afforded to investors under international investment
agreements is not absolute. Arbitration tribunals have in the past acknowledged the
host state's sovereign right to regulate.8 9 Host states may try to argue that the
substantial modification or withdrawal of economic support mechanisms was
justified by objectives of public policy, namely, the state's right to adapt the level
and duration of support to avoid overcompensation of investments.90 However,
such arguments may be used to disguise attempts to reduce public debt or decrease
energy prices for consumers in advance of upcoming elections, imposing the
9
financial burden on investors.

1

While investor-state arbitral proceedings are generally confidential, making it
difficult to have a clear picture of the claimants' arguments, they will probably
84. COUTURE ET AL., supra note 8, at vii, xi, 7, 11, 19, 22-23, 34, 50.
85. Kim Talus, Introduction: Renewable Energy Disputes in Europe and Beyond: An Overview of
Current Cases, 13(3) OIL GAS & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE (2015).

Whitsitt, supra note 42, at 213-14, 223-24.
Id. at 211, 213.
See Kyla Tienhaara, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration:A View from Political
Science, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 806 (Chester Brown & Kate
Miles eds., 2011).
89. Whitsitt, supranote 42, at 215, 219, 229-30.
90. Boute, supra note 4, at 176 (citing Case 201/08, Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt
Darmstadt 2009 E.C.R. 1-08343); Anatole Boute, Combating Climate Change through Investment
Arbitration, 35 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 613, 648 (2012) (citing Plantanol GmbH & Co. KG v.
Hauptzollamt Darmstadt, 2009 E.C.R. 1-08343) [hereinafter Boute, Combating Climate Change].
91. Boute, CombatingClimate Change, supranote 90, at 648.
86.
87.
88.
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focus on two standards of protection typically found in international investment
agreements: the prohibition of expropriation and the principle of fair and equitable
treatment. 92
Among the different investment disciplines, protection against expropriation
is a principal cause of action for investors.9 3 While the language of treaties varies,
they generally protect investors from measures involving the transfer of title or
outright physical seizure of an investor's property (direct expropriation); but also
from measures that are not considered direct takings but permanently destroy the
economic value of the investment or deprive the owner of its ability to control it in
a meaningful way (indirect expropriations). 94 The possibility of a direct
expropriation seems only plausible in cases where there is a deprivation of a
foreign investor's acquired rights and the transfer of ownership rights to the state
or a third person through the revocation of feed-in tariffs.95 Allegations of indirect
expropriation are much more likely, as indirect expropriation is by far the most
common form of expropriation in international investment law.9 6
However, drawing the line between the right of host state to regulate in the
public interest and indirect expropriation is quite challenging. According to the
"sole effect" doctrine followed by some tribunals, the "effect" of the governmental
action on the investment is the preponderant factor in assessing whether there has
been an expropriation.9 7 From this perspective, the policy objectives pursued by
the challenged regulatory measures do not alter the legal character of the taking,
requiring compensation in any case. Differently, other tribunals have followed the
"police powers" theory, which recognizes the host states' right to regulate in the
public interest and takes this power into account when assessing the impact of
these measures on the investment.9 8 Arbitration panels have taken into account the
nature, objectives, and character of the measures challenged in order to distinguish
between indirect expropriations and valid regulatory interventions of the host state,
which are not subject to compensation.99 Specifically, in the energy sector, recent
decisions have focused on striking a balance between the host state's right to
regulate in the public interest and the protection of investor's rights by

92. De Luca, supra note 54, at 1; Mejia, supra note 47, at 130; Patrizia, supra note 47, at 77.
93. See Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Expropriation Under the ECT and Other Investment
Protection Treaties, in INVESTMENT ARBITRATION AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 108 (Clarisse
Ribeiro ed., 2006); August Reinisch, Expropriation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 407 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008); ENERGY CHARTER SECRETARIAT,
EXPROPRIATION
REGIME
UNDER
THE
ENERGY
CHARTER
TREATY
(2012),
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/Thematic/Expropriation 2012 en.pdf.
94. U.N. CONE. ON TRADE & DEV., EXPROPRIATION: UNCTAD SERIES ON ISSUES IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS Hl, at 5-12, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/1A/201 1/7, U.N.
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E.12.II.D.7

(2012),
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incorporating notions of reasonableness or proportionality into the decision making
process.
According to some authors, it might be possible for investors to invoke the
101
This scenario seems more likely in
non-expropriation standard successfully.
cases where the economic support measure is completely eliminated. However, it
can also be argued that feed-in tariffs merely entitle investors to fixed prices and
that these may not be traded independently from the main electricity transaction.
From this perspective, since these incentives are incapable of independent
economic exploitation and investors will likely not lose control of their
102
The
installations, any interference may not be considered expropriation.
revocation of feed-in tariffs will normally not amount to an indirect expropriation,
since the investors usually still retain control of their power plants and receive the
profits of the electricity output.10 3 It is uncertain whether arbitral tribunals will
conclude that changes to support mechanisms deprive investors of the use and
benefit of their investment to such an extent as to constitute an indirect
expropriation.
The threshold for establishing an indirect expropriation is high.' Given the
stringent requirements for the qualification of regulatory measures as "indirect
expropriation", investors will probably turn to the fair and equitable treatment
standard.1 0 5 This is the most frequently invoked standard and also the most
06
Still, the
promising against the revocation of economic support mechanisms.1
content of the fair and equitable treatment standard is contentious and may vary
07
Notwithstanding its
depending on the precise way in which it is expressed.i
100. Whitsitt, supranote 42, at 230.
101. See Thomas Wilde & Kaj Hobdr, The First Energy Charter Treaty Arbitral Award, 5
TRANSNAT'L DISP. MGMT. 15 (2005); Boute, Combating Climate Change, supra note 90, at 631-35;
Iriarte, supra note 47, at 26-29.
102. Boute, Combating Climate Change, supra note 90, at 658; Vyoma Jha, Trends in Investor
Claims Over Feed-in Tariffs For Renewable Energy, INv. TREATY NEWS (July 19, 2012),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/trends-in-investor-claims-over-feed-in-tariffs-for-renewableenergy.
103. Boute, supranote 4, at 363; Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 402.
104. Boute, Combating Climate Change, supra note 90, at 631; Bankes, supranote 11, at 507-08.
105. See generally DOLZER, supra note 20, at 130; Catherine Yannaca-Small, Fairand Equitable
Treatment Standard In InternationalInvestment Law (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working

Paper No. 2004/03, 2004); Christoph Schreuer, Fairand Equitable Treatment (FET): Interactions with
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elusive nature, arbitral tribunals and commentators generally agree that
transparency, stability, non-discrimination, due process, and the investor's
legitimate expectations are all key ingredients in defining the fair and equitable
standard.ios
Several arbitral tribunals have concluded that the host state has an obligation
to maintain a stable and predictable legal and business framework in line with the
investor's legitimate expectations.10 Legitimate expectations and the protection of
a stable and predictable legal and business environment are closely linked as they
both relate to the investment framework, which investors legitimately expect.no
Two different approaches have been used in arbitral practice to determine when
investor expectations are reasonable."' The first approach requires the host state to
have made clear assurances to the investor regarding the specific business
relationship; under the second, more permissive approach, expectations can be
created based on assurances provided in generally applicable laws of a country,
and more generally, upon the existing framework at the time of the investment.11
The latter interpretation is frequently used in investment claims regarding changes
in a host state's legal framework.1 13 Tribunals will have to analyze the legal nature
of the normative framework establishing incentives.114 Investors may find it more
difficult to obtain protection when their expectations arise out of general legislative
provisions that are not protected from subsequent amendments, and there are no
specific guarantees of stability specifically addressed to investors." 5
The fair and equitable treatment standard provides an important tenet of
investment protection. Investors build their business cases on the basis of these
economic support schemes. Since public support is vital, support schemes and
tariff commitments often constitute the essential foundations of the investment. 1 6
Investors make decisions on the financial viability of the investment relying upon
the implementation of support. incentives by host states. Therefore, it is not
surprising when an investor expects and relies upon the predictability and stability
of these mechanisms.' 17 The modification or withdrawal of support mechanisms

Equitable Treatment: Today's Contours, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 7, 7-33 (2014); Patrick

Dumberry, The Protection of Investor's Legitimate Expectations and the Fairand Equitable Treatment
Standard UnderNAFTA Article 1105, 31(1), J. INT'L ARB. 47,47-49 (2014).
108.

See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 234; DOLZER, supra note 20, at 119; Andre von

Walter, The Investor's Expectations In International Investment Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW IN CONTEXT 175 (Christina Knahr & August Reinisch, eds., 2007); Roland KlIger,
'Fairand Equitable Treatment' and Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN
WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 241, 251 (Marie-Claire Segger et al. eds., 2011).
109. Krajewski, supranote 79, at 358-59.
110. Id. at 359; see also DOLZER, supra note 20, at 113.
Ill. DUGAN ET AL., supra note 31, at 513.
112. Id.at513.
113. Whitsitt, supra note 42, at 223-24.
114. Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 391.
115. De Luca, supranote 54, at 1-2.
116. Boute, supra note 4, at 364.
117. Cameron, supra note 15, at 326; Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 402.
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might constitute a substantial change of the regulatory conditions and legitimate
expectations contemporary to the investment." 8 In assessing whether the
legitimate expectations of the investor have been met, arbitral tribunals examine
the law at the time when the investment was made and any specific representations
made by the host State to the investor. 119
Another element that arbitral tribunals consider is the investor's own conduct,
namely, whether they diligently assessed the risks associated with their
investment.1 2 0 Investors are under a duty of due diligence to reasonably assess the
risk, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also the political,
socioeconomic, cultural, and historical conditions prevailing in the host State.
Thus, the investor's own conduct constitutes a general limitation to his legitimate
expectations.121
Investors should not reasonably expect that the circumstances existing at the
time the investment was made would remain unchanged. Some tribunals have
acknowledged that legal and economic frameworks are not immutable and must
necessarily evolve.1 22 In order to determine whether the frustration of the foreign
investor's expectations is justified and reasonable, the host state's legitimate right
to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must also be taken into
consideration.1 23 From this perspective, the legitimate expectations and the
requirement of stability of the legal framework do not affect the host state's right
to exercise its sovereign regulatory powers, per se.124 In the cases under discussion,
states may invoke their right to adapt their support regimes in order to avoid
overcompensation. 12 The defendant state's right to regulate may establish a
1 26
limitation to the protective scope of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
However, the exercise of the host state's legitimate right to regulate in the
public interest should not be accepted when the main goal of its measures was to
27
reduce an energy tariff deficit which was, at least in part, its own fault.' While
international investment law is not supposed to force countries to keep in place
subsidy programs that are inefficient and unintended in their consequences,
renewable energy investors may legitimately expect the maintenance of an
"economic equilibrium", at least in terms of the viability of their business. 128
tribunals find that revocation measures constitute a breach of legitimate
expectations and, hence, a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard,

118. Boute, supranote 4, at 364; Mejia, supranote 47, at 131.
119.

DOLZER, supra note 20, at 134.

120. Dromgool & Enguix, supra note 47, at 405-08.
121. Id. at 409.
122. See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV (Neth.) v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Partial Award, 1
305 (Perm. Ct. Arb., Mar. 17, 2006).
123. Boute, CombatingClimate Change, supra note 90, at 647-61; Patrizia, supranote 47, at 79.
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they may decide to award a compensation that takes into account the losses of the
investors, the inappropriate regulation of the state, and the financial limitations of
the country due to the crisis.129 Ultimately, arbitral tribunals have to balance the
legitimate and reasonable expectations of the investor against the right of states to
intervene in the public interest.13 0 Reality is in perennial flux. Arbitral tribunals
assess the suitability of the parties behavior to changing conditions, namely by
examining the reasonableness and correctness of the legal framework initially set
forth by the state and its interest in adjusting regulatory structures to new social
and economic conditions.131 In the end, disputing parties should demonstrate that
their expectations (either of maintenance of the economic mechanisms, or of their
adjustment to new conditions) are legitimate, and that implies that they are
anchored in the reality that surrounded the investment and supervening
developments.
IV.

CHARANNE v. SPAIN:

A FIRST VICTORY

FOR THE HOST STATE

To date, only one award has been rendered in disputes relating to alterations
to economic support programs in the renewable energy market.1 32 On January 21,
2016, the tribunal in Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain ruled in
favor of the validity of the host state's regulatory changes.1 33 The case regarded the
legislation passed by Spain in 2010, scaling back the incentives offered to
investors in the photovoltaic sector. 134 The claimants alleged that such regulatory
measures breached the standards of protection provided for in the ECT, namely the
protection against expropriation and the fair and equitable treatment standard. 3 5
First, the investors argued that Spain, after having attracted its investment in
the area of solar photovoltaic generation through a series of government incentives,
changed the regulatory framework, thereby causing damages to the investments.1 36
The claimants submitted that the regulations introduced in 2010 had such a brutal
impact on the economic value of their investment that this reduction in value
constituted an indirect expropriation of the value and returns of the investment,
even though their ownership rights were not affected.' 3 7 Since the claimants'
investment was not in returns of the photovoltaic installations, but in shares in a
company that generated and sold electricity produced by photovoltaic solar plants,
the tribunal held that the measures taken had to totally or partially deprive the
129. Id.
130. Id. at 411-14.
131. Id.
132. See Charanne B.V. v. The Kingdom of Spain, Arb. No. 062/2012, Final Award (Jan. 21,
2016) [hereinafter Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award].
133. The original award (in Spanish) and an English translation (by MENA Chambers) are
available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/2082. Charanne B.V. v. El Reino de Espafia, Arb. No.
062/2012, Laudo Final (Jan. 21, 2016); Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132; see Bonaf6,
supra note 67, for an analysis of the award.
134. Charanne BV. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1180, 96, 146, 148-49.
135. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, T 277.
136. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1 80.
137. Charanne B.V v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 11 280, 283-84.
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claimants of their rights as shareholders in order to constitute indirect
expropriation.1 38 The tribunal found that claimants' essential complaint was a loss
of profitability of the photovoltaic installations, which in turn reduced the value of
their shares. 13 9 The tribunal emphasized that, notwithstanding the measures, the
investors continue to be shareholders in the company and that the company
continued to operate and earn revenue.' 40 Although the profitability had been
seriously affected, it was not as serious as to be characterized as an expropriation.
Tribunal simple diminution in value of shares cannot constitute an indirect
expropriation.141
The investors also argued that Spain's 2010 regulations constituted a failure
to create stable conditions for investments, including the obligation to accord fair
and equitable treatments, as they created a context of instability and lack of clarity
in the regulatory regime.1 42 In addition, claimants submitted that Spain's actions
caused them to have legitimate expectations that the regulatory regime would not
43
be modified, and that no contract with Spain was necessary to demonstrate this.1
The tribunal commenced its analysis by emphasizing that it was restrained by the
claimants' own pleadings, which expressly excluded the subsequent regulations
from the tribunal's consideration.'" As a result, it limited itself to considering only
the 2010 Regulations. The tribunal found that in that limited context, it was unable
to assess the evolution of the regulatory framework and thus unable to conclude
that Spain had breached its obligation to maintain regulatory stability under Article
10(1) of the ECT.1 45
In relation to the lack of clarity in the regulations, the tribunal noted that the
claimants had not alleged that there was anything ambiguous or difficult to
understand about the 2010 Regulations.1 4 6 As to the question of claimants'
legitimate expectations, the tribunal espoused the general principle of good faith in
international customary law that a state cannot induce an investor to make an
investment, generate legitimate expectations and then later ignore commitments
that generated those expectations.' 47 The Tribunal held that the legitimate
expectations on the part of the investor must: (a) be analyzed using an objective
standard (based on the circumstances), and not the mere subjective belief held by
an investor; (b) be reviewed according to the relevant circumstances, which were
48
those prevailing at the time the investment was made; and (c) be reasonable.1
Additionally, when determining whether the regulatory framework existing at the
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time the investment was made created legitimate expectations, the tribunal made
the following observations:
(a) A State is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of regulatory
flexibility to respond to changing circumstances and the public
interest;1 49

(b) The fair and equitable treatment protection standard does not
contemplate that the law existing at the time the investment is made will
be frozen or will never change;

50

and

(c) An investor cannot have a legitimate expectation in the absence of a
specific commitment on the part of the State made specifically to the
investor(s) that existing regulations are immutable and will not be
modified in order to adapt to market needs and the public interest. 151
The tribunal found that the host state had not infringed investors' legitimate
expectations, because no specific commitments had been given to them.1 52 The
tribunal was of the view that neither the pre-2010 Regulations, nor the literature
distributed by the Spanish government to encourage investment could be seen as
specific commitments. 5 3 Furthermore, the tribunal found that although regulations
may have limited reach, in that they might be directed to a certain portion of the
population, this alone is not sufficient to elevate them to the status of a State's
specific commitment. 54 An example of a specific commitment to claimants may
have been in the form of a stabilization clause in the regulations or a declaration
for the benefit of the investors that the regulatory framework would not be
modified. 15 Finally, the tribunal opined that in order to determine whether there
had been a breach of the fair and equitable standard of treatment relating to
modifying regulations that had been in existence at the time of the creation of the
investment, an investor had to demonstrate that the regulations were made
irrationally, contrary to public interest or that they were disproportionately
applied.1 56

Although the 2010 Regulations could prejudice the interests of the electricity
generators, they were based on objective criteria and could not be considered
irrational or arbitrary.15 7 As the main functions of the 2010 Regulations were to try
to limit the tariff deficit, control the rising cost of electricity to the Spanish
consumer and implement safety measures in relation to the voltage in the system, it
could not be said that the 2010 Regulations were not applied in the public
interest.iss As a result, the tribunal found that the investors had not demonstrated a
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breach of Spain's obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment.15 9
The arbitrator, Guido Santiago Tawil, issued a dissenting opinion on the issue
of the claimant's legitimate expectations.' Whilst he shared the majority's
position that the finding of a violation of an investor's legitimate expectations
should be based on an objective standard (and not the subjective view of the
investor at the time the investment is made), he believed that this must be done on
an analysis of the facts on a case by case basis.1 61 Specifically, he opined that a
finding that legitimate expectations had been created was not limited to situations
where there was a specific commitment, whether of contractual nature or based in
declarations or specific conditions granted by the host State.62 In Mr. Tawil's
view, legitimate expectations could also be derived from a host state's legal regime
existing at the time the investment is made.1 63 He noted that when an investor
fulfills all the current regulatory requirements in order to obtain a specific and
determinable benefit, a host State's subsequent disregard of the investment violates
his legitimate expectations.'
Mr. Tawil believes that Spain's special regulatory regime was specifically
designed to foster a strong incentive to invest (so that the state's objective in
promoting the industry could be fulfilled), and was directed to a precise group of
investors with the means to invest, on the basis that the investor could benefit from
the regime for a definite period of time. 165 He further noted that the existence of
these elements, namely, (i) rules created to foster investment in renewable energy,
directed at a specific number of possible investors, and (ii) a brief time period in
which the benefit was to be obtained, was sufficient to show that legitimate
expectations on the part of the Claimants.1 66 He found that once the claimants
made the investment and fulfilled all of the requirements to obtain the benefits,
then it did not seem legally acceptable to recognize the host State's prerogative to
modify or eliminate the benefit without any legal consequences.' 6 1 Mr. Tawil
disagreed with the tribunal that this was incompatible with a State's right to
modify its laws, as a State never loses that right.' 6 8 However, if in the process of
exercising that right, the State infringes legitimate expectations, he was of the view
69
that it should provide adequate compensation.1
159. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1539.
160. Charanne B.V. v. The Kingdom of Spain, Arb. No. 062/2012 (Dec. 21, 2015) (Arb. Prof. Dr.
Guido Santiago Tawil, dissenting) [hereinafter Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent]. Original (in Spanish)
and English translation (by MENA Chambers) are available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/2082.
Charanne B.V. c. El Reino de Espafia, Arb. No. 062/2012 (Dec. 21, 2015) (Arb. del Prof. Guido
Santiago Tawil, opini6n disidente).
161. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,14.
162. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,114-5.
163. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,¶5.
164. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160, 12.
165. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160, In 7-8.
166. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supranote 160, 19.
167. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supranote 160, ¶ 10.
168. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160, 11.
169. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Dissent, supra note 160,¶ 11.
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This award is the first decision regarding legislative alterations to economic
support programs in the renewable energy market.' 70 Although the award is only
binding for the disputing parties and not on arbitral tribunals in other pending
cases, it offers important insights into how standards of investment protection
might be interpreted and applied in similar disputes. The majority's decision is
consistent with other arbitral tribunals' findings regarding the requirements for
indirect expropriation or violations of legitimate expectations.' 7 ' The decision also
addresses the circumstances in which, in the absence of a specific undertaking, a
host country may exercise its sovereign right to regulate without violating its
international investment law obligations.172 Since Spain had not made any specific
commitments to the investors with respect to the stability of the incentives regime,
the investors could not have expected that the renewable incentives regulatory
framework would remain unchanged for the lifetime of a photovoltaic plant.' 73 In
the tribunal's view, the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment to foreign
investors under the ECT does not require freezing regulatory frameworks or
limiting changes to regulations.1 74 The arbitral panel held that investors did not
demonstrate any principle of international law that prohibits a state from imposing
new rules when it never signed a contract stipulating otherwise.1 75 The tribunal
held that the changes introduced by Spain were reasonable, proportional, made in
the public interest, and not retroactive. 7 6 Such changes maintained all the
fundamental characteristics of the regulatory regime at the time of the investment,
namely the right to a subsidized tariff through the photovoltaic plant's life.' 77
An important aspect of the decision involves the relationship between
investors' expectations and due diligence. In a highly regulated industry such as
energy, investors must exhaustively analyze the applicable framework before they
make their investment.
It is necessary to carry out a due diligence analysis of the
legal framework of the host country on the part of the investors, in order to shape
expectations. 179 The tribunal found that an investor had a duty to conduct due
diligence of the legal framework of the investments, and that if the claimants
would have done so, they should have expected the possibility of changes to the

170. Bonaf6, supra note 67, at 174-75.
171. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, 1 277
(May 12, 2005); Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶ 258
(Sept. 5, 2008); Electrabel S.A. v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award, pt. VII, 1 7 (Nov. 25,
2015).
172. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, ¶ 500.
173. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, ¶ 499.
174. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, JI¶ 503-04.
175. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supra note 132, 1548.
176. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, ¶ 539.
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regulatory regime.'so In the words of the tribunal:
At least that is the level of care that would be expected of a foreign
investor in a highly regulated as the energy sector, where a preliminary
and comprehensive legal framework applicable to the sector analysis is
8
essential to proceed with the investment.'
The degree of investor diligence operates as a factual or interpretive element
in light of which the appropriateness of State action is to be assessed or, relatedly,
82
the scope of protection of investment protection standards is to be determined.'
From this perspective, investor diligence is a key consideration in assessing the
"reasonableness" or "legitimacy" of the expectations that could potentially be
83
"[I]nvestors have a due
protected by the fair and equitable treatment clause.'
diligence obligation, which covers not only. . .the basic regulations applicable to
foreign investment transactions.. but also.. .the entire legal framework potentially
applicable to the investment, and even. . .the potential changes of such framework
84
that are foreseeable at the time the investment is made."'
While the Charanne award offers important lessons, it should be stressed that
it focused only on the 2010 legislative changes, and did not take into consideration
85
In fact, the more significant
further changes introduced to the legal framework.'
are the subject separate
2010
legislative amendments introduced by Spain after
86
not be seen as decisive
should
award
claims filed more recently.' As a result, this
Spain.' 87 According to
against
for the outcome of the other renewable energy cases
cases will be in the
in
these
Behn, the key to understanding the outcomes
88
distinctions between when the claims were initiated and against which state.' The
earlier cases will probably be claiming violations of the ECT according to very
different legislative and regulatory changes compared to the later cases. The timing
of claim initiation will be critical and is likely to create substantial differences in
outcomes.' 89 It is also likely for later claims to be more successful, as they are be
based on the more severe regulatory changes.' 90 Referring to the Charanne award,
180. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132,1 507.
181. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, 1507.
182. Jorge E. Vifluales, Investor Diligence In Investment Arbitration. An Overview of Sources and
Arguments, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
SOURCES AND ARGUMENTS (Andrea Gattini ed.) (forthcoming 2016).
183. Id
184. VtIUALES, supra note 76, at 354-55.
185. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, In 481-83.
186. See list of disputes supra note 55.
187. Ramona Volciuc-lonescu, Energy Charter Treaty Claims: Spain Wins First Solar Case in
Arbitration, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-56483dbfaa32-4f52-a415-1 f52492ad218.
188. Daniel Behn, Spain Wins FirstPV Solar Arbitration:A Word of Caution in Using this Case to
PredictOutcome in the more than Three Dozen Cases to Come, U. OSLO: PLURICOURTS BLOG (Jan. 27,
2016, 9:43 AM), http://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/blog/daniel-friedrich-behn/2016-01-26arbitration-spain.htrnl.
189. Id
190. Id; 3 Takeaways From the First Spanish Solar Arbitration Award, GLOBAL INVESTMENT
PROTECTION (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.globalinvestmentprotection.com/index.php/3-takeaways-from-
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Behn argues that it would have been unreasonable to expect - absent a specific
contractual guarantee between the investor and the state - that the regulatory and
legislative environment governing solar projects would remain static and
9
completely unchanged for the life of the project.m
' However, the author believes
that legislative changes introduced later on, namely in 2013 and 2014, are more
likely to be considered as breaches of the ECT.' 92
The outcome of the Charanne case is an important victory for host states like
Spain who face several claims before international tribunals on fairly similar
facts. 1 93 This is the first decision that analyzes the key problems arising from
changes to economic support mechanisms and helps to shed some light on the
validity of such measures under international law. However, it should be kept in
mind that other respondent states like the Czech Republic and Bulgaria have
adopted slightly different types of measures. Therefore, the takeaways from this
award cannot simply be applied automatically and fully to the other solar energy
disputes. 194 For now, the major lesson offered by the Charanne award is that a
breach of international investment treaties in this context will not be as straightforward as some investors may have initially imagined. 195
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICYMAKING

Energy projects entail large-scale, long-term capital investments. Because
renewable energies are not mature technologies, their development depends upon
public support. Economic support mechanisms need to be maintained in the form
presented at the time the investment is made in order for it to be profitable. 196
Investment decisions in the energy market are surrounded by risks of ex post
regulatory changes by the host state. Feed-in tariffs and similar economic support
mechanisms paved the way for the expansion of the market for green energy but
became a victim of their own success. In response to overgrowth within the
market, several countries have decided to scale down, or eliminate, such incentives
after the investment costs were already sunk. 197 In times of financial crunch feedtariffs become especially easy targets because they are more visible than other
government subsidies.1 98

-
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191. Behn, supra note 188.
192. Id.
193. See list of cases supranote 66.
194. 3 Takeaways From the First Spanish Solar ArbitrationAward, supranote 190.
195. Behn, supranote 188.
196. Edna Sussman, The Energy Charter Treaty's Investor Protection Provisions: Potential to
Foster Solutions to Global Warming and Promote Sustainable Development, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT [N WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 515, 528 (Marie-Claire Segger et al. eds., 2011).
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198. Victor Mallet, Shadow Falls across Spanish solar energy industry, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 1,
2010,
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'

Changes to regulatory frameworks might have a significant impact on what
until recently seemed like an unstoppable move towards a low-carbon model of
development, jeopardizing the credibility of renewable energy policies and
generating high investment uncertainty.'19 These measures may affect the support
for renewable energy in both the present and future. Governments may cut agreed
subsidies for projects built or under construction but also decide not to grant any
support for new projects.2 0 If investors have the perception that governments
might act opportunistically and change the "rules of the game" after the investment
has been made, they will most likely factor in a risk premium in future projects,
20
increasing the costs of eco-friendly policies.
Changes introduced by several countries to their economic support
2 02
Foreign
mechanisms have triggered a wave of international arbitral proceedings.
profitability
the
reduce
they
that
claiming
investors are challenging such measures
of their investments in a way that is inconsistent with the obligations borne by host
203
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from
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can
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of
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expropriation" or a violation of
public support. 205
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expectation
legitimate
frustrating an investor's
expectations are
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and
the impact on investors' rights
based on public
actions
their
to
justify
difficult
significant, states might find it
economic
short-term
or
constraints
budgetary
policy considerations- such as
206
harm.
The network of international investment agreements built over the past few
decades has fundamentally altered the legal framework for investors and host
states in the energy sector. 207 Furthermore, the resort to the investor-state
arbitration mechanism for the settlement of disputes gave arbitration panels a role
199.

Energy 2020: A Strategyfor Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy, at 9, COM (2010)

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal2010),
10,
(Nov.
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203. See JOHN A. VANDUZER ET AL., INTEGRATING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INTO
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 10 (2013) (describing investor concerns over the risk of
arbitrary and discriminatory treatment by host states).
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to play in national and international energy policymaking. Arbitral tribunals
perform a supranational review of state acts, scrutinizing the conduct of public
entities against the standards of treatment prescribed in international investment
agreements. 2 08 The outcome of these proceedings may limit the future legislative
and administrative freedom of maneuver of states, affecting their ability to pursue
public welfare policies. 209 Investor-state arbitration panels have been dealing with
a greater amount of energy disputes, and particularly climate-related issues. While
some years ago investors were claiming that states had enacted environmentfriendly regulations in a way that was detrimental to their investments, the new
wave of disputes refers to cases were states are reducing or eliminating the
economic incentives which they introduced years ago in order to encourage
investments in the renewable energy market. 210 This new category of disputes
basically results from the move from the old to the new production matrix.2 1 In
both sets of cases, the protections afforded to foreign investors by international
investment agreements have the potential to interfere in domestic decision-making
on climate-related issues. International investment agreements protect investors in
general, both those who invest in renewable-energy projects and those who invest
in carbon-intensive industries. Both scenarios will most likely feature in future
investment arbitration proceedings.212
Arbitral tribunals in charge of settling renewable energy disputes have a
complex task ahead of them. As final awards are rendered, they have the potential
to provide guidance for pending cases and similar disputes that will surely arise in
the future,2 13 further defining the parameters of the host states' regulatory powers
with respect to renewable energy investments. 2 14 "[U]nderstanding how arbitrators
are giving effect to the protections for investors, while at the same time balancing
the interests of host states to regulate in the public interest," will play a decisive
role in future renewable energy policymaking. 2 1 5
Tribunals will have to balance the expectations of investors against the right
of states to intervene in the public interest and adjust regulatory structures
according to the specific circumstances that surround those cases. This assessment
will likely focus on whether governments act with consistency, transparency, and
reasonableness when modifying or eliminating the existing incentives regime, and,
above all, whether investors have reasonable and legitimate expectations that were
breached as a result of the state's measures. 216

208. Id. at 209.
209. Id. at 209-10.
210. Id.
211. Jorge E. Vifluales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law: The
Current State of Play, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND INVESTMENT LAW (Kate
Miles ed.) (forthcoming 2016).
212. Miles, supra note 70, at 86.
213. Nathanson, supranote 80, at 865.
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As divergent interpretations persist about when the investors' expectations
deserve protection under the fair and equitable treatment standard, any evaluation
will be deeply dependent upon the specific circumstances and facts of each
particular case. 217 Past arbitral practice allows for diverging interpretations of the
existing investment standards. This divergence is explained by three different
reasons. "First, different international investment agreements adopt different
languages and formulate investment standards in diverse ways.. 218 Second, these
legal instruments normally have a wide scope of application and are not
219
[Lastly],
specifically designed for investments in a particular area or industry.
22 0
Arbitral tribunals
there is no. . . binding precedent in investment arbitration."
can interpret the applicable investment treaties differently and apply them to the
22
specific facts of the case according to their own appreciation. 1 This underlines the
importance of the specific nature and circumstances of each dispute for the
decision. While international investment tribunals do not create precedent that is
binding upon other tribunals, some of the standards of investor protection are
actually primarily shaped by prior rulings and not by reference to other sources of
222
international law or state practice.
Investment treaty arbitration has developed a
223
Still, the
strong, albeit persuasive - that is, non-binding - system of precedent.
approach of different international investment arbitrators to similar issues can vary
considerably, creating a degree of uncertainty regarding the outcome of
22 4
international investment disputes.
This lack of certainty raises the question of the necessity to create a specific
investment regime for low-carbon investments. The last decades witnessed the
225
emergence of what can be called "International Energy Investment Law",
mainly composed of bilateral investment treaties and the ECT. These international
instruments afforded a certain degree of certainty and security to investors,
significantly increasing the availability of funds for investment in renewable
energy projects.226 Against a background of financial crisis, the present wave of
disputes makes the call for a widely adopted multi-lateral energy investment treaty
all the more urgent. Investment treaty analysis and climate change concerns have
developed since the drafting of the ECT and political changes and realignments
have occurred which may require some fine-tuning or adjustments in the ECT
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218. Fernando Dias Simaes, The Role of Investment Arbitration in Water Services Governance,
(2016),
POLICY
WATER
2

http://wp.iwaponline.com/content/ppiwawaterpol/early/ 016/11/28/wp.2016.032.full.pdf.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Boute, Combating Climate Change, supra note 90, at 652.
222. Id.
223.

STEPHAN SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC Law 18

(Stephan Schill ed., 2010).
224.

CONDON, supra note 18, at 93.

225. Krajewski, supra note 79, at 352-54.
226. Sussman, supra note 196, at 528.

2017

INVESTMENT ARBITRATION & RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICYMAKING

279

provisions. 227

The Energy Charter Secretariat has been discussing the benefits of a nonbinding declaration and/or an interpretative note on the promotion of low-carbon
investments. 228 It is argued that such a statement would improve legal certainty in
the application of the ECT, reducing the normative and political risks and
investment related disputes. 229 Moreover, a clear political statement on low-carbon
investments by the Energy Charter Conference would send an important signal to
the international community and to investors on its commitment to sustainable
development and climate change mitigation. The overall objective being the
protection and balance the interests of ECT members and of international
investors. 230
Some authors go farther and argue that the current system is problematic, as it
allows foreign investors to initiate arbitration against the host state without having
first consulted and received some sort of an authorization from their home
government.2 3' In the cases against Spain, it is reported that a number of foreign
states have notified the Spanish authorities, more or less officially, of their concern
regarding the commercial interests of their nationals.2 32 From this perspective,
foreign investors should first seek at least the opinion of its home government, and
preferably its assent, before initiating an international conflict that can grow well
beyond the economic dispute that originated it. The relative lack of practical effect
of many investor-state disputes calls into question whether state-to-state dispute
settlement would be more efficient. 233
In the European context, economic support mechanisms for the promotion of
renewable energy have led not only to the wave of investment arbitration but also
to market distortions and state aid investigations.234 According to Behn and
Fauchald, this is the result of two major sets of conditions. 235 On the one hand,
external conditions, namely, the global financial recession and the unanticipated
227. Id. at 532.
228. See Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2013 Annual Report 25-26,
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/AR/AR_2013_en.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10,
2015); see also Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2014 Annual Report 19,
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/AR/AR_2014-en.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10,
2015).
229. See Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2013 Annual Report 25-26,
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2015); see also Energy Charter Secretariat, Energy Charter 2014 Annual Report 19,
http://www.energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/AR/AR_2014_en.pdf (last accessed Dec. 10,
2015).
230. Energy Charter2013 Annual Report, supranote 228, at 26.
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232. Id.
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Direct Investment (FDI): Basic Elements for an Analytical and Policy Framework 6-7 (Legal Studies
Research
Paper
No.
2015-25,
2015),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin7abstract-id=2570596.
234. Behn & Fauchald, supranote 47.
235. Id. at 127.
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236
On the other hand, an internal condition - the
decline in the cost of solar panels.
regulatory structure established to implement support schemes. While the external
conditions were unanticipated, regulatory structures were inflexible and unable to
237
Because investments were
quickly respond to changing market conditions.
originally over-incentivized, when regulators and legislators realized that feed-in
tariffs were unsustainable, it was too late and drastic emergency-type measures
238
were required to control new investment in the sector.
This is recognized by the European Commission itself, who has stated that:

[R]igid national support schemes were generally unable to adapt rapidly
enough to . .. falling costs, raising profits and creating a rate and scale
of installations in some countries almost excessive in a time of general
economic crisis. The result has been sudden and unpredictable changes
to a number of national support schemes, which will . . . curtail
investment .. 239

The European Commission recognizes that:
Given the prominent role that financial support schemes play in
developing renewable energy today, and given the growing prominence
(and cost) of renewable energy use in the electricity sector, urgent
efforts are needed to reform support schemes to ensure that they are
designed in a cost effective, market-oriented manner. The Commission's
guidance is necessary to ensure that support schemes are adjusted
regularly and quickly enough to take account of falling technology costs
and to ensure reforms make renewable energy producers part of the
energy market . .. to ensure such market interventions are correcting
market failures and not adding or maintaining market distortions ...
Many national reforms have had a negative impact on the investment
climate. Most critical have been changes that reduce the return on
investments already made. Such changes alter the legitimate
expectations of business and clearly discourage investment, at a time
240
when significantly more investment is needed.
The European Commission's concern with renewable energy disputes is
241
In
eloquently evidenced by its own involvement in the arbitral proceedings.

Charanneand ConstructionInvestments v. Spain, the European Commission was
permitted to file an amicus curiae brief.2 4 2 The European Commission is also

243
reported to have sought leave to intervene in other proceedings against Spain

236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Renewable Energy Progress
Report, at 5, 175, COM (Mar. 27, 2013).
240. Id at 9.
241. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132.
242. Charanne B.V. v. Spain, Award, supranote 132, T 56.
243. Namely, Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.A.r.l. & Antin Energia Termosolar B.V.

2017

INVESTMENT ARBITRATION

& RENEWABLE ENERGY

POLICYMAKING

281

and the Czech Republic, 2 44 but there is no further information available. Nondisputing party applications have been filed to intervene in other energy-related
ICSID cases against Spain 245 and Italy, 24 6 yet it remains unclear whether the
European Commission has filed these applications.
The European Commission seeks authorization to take part in the arbitral
proceedings in order to clarify issues concerning the scope and content of
European Law, which are connected to the disputes. Being the "Guardian of the
Treaties", the European Commission possesses a vested interest in becoming
involved in such arbitrations and helping the tribunal to elucidate potential
conflicts of legal rules and principles.24 7 In the different proceedings against the
Czech Republic being arbitrated under the UNCITRAL Rules, the European
Commission is reported to have raised a conflict with the provisions of European
Union Law. According to the Commission, former benefits and incentives
accorded to solar investors could constitute state aid that needed to be eliminated
in order for the Czech Republic to remain in compliance with European Union

&

v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31(Aug. 7, 2014); Eiser Infrastructure Limited
Energia Solar Luxembourg S.A.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36 (July 28, 2014);
and Isolux Infrastructure Netherlands B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain (Arb. Inst. Stockholm Chamber of
Comm., registered 2013); see Luke Peterson, European Commission Wades into Solar Arbitrations
Against Spain, Intervening in One Case a Week Before Final Hearing, INVESTMENT ARBITRATION
REPORTER (Nov. 17 2014), https://www.iareporter.com/articles/european-commission-wades-intosolar-arbitrations-against-spain-intervening-in-one-case-a-week-before-final-hearings;
Valentina Vadi,

Beyond Known Worlds: Climate Change Governance by Arbitral Tribunals?, 48(5) VANDERBILT J. OF
TRANSNT'L L. 1285, 1341 (2015).

244. Antaris Solar & Dr. Michael Gode v. Czech Republic (PCA Case Repository, May 8, 2013);
Natland Investment Group NV, Natland Group Limited, G.I.H.G. Limited, & Radiance Energy Holding
S.A.R.L. v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); Voltaic Network GmbH v. Czech
Republic (UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); ICW Europe Investments Limited v. Czech Republic
(UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. Czech Republic
(UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); WA Investments-Europa Nova Limited v. Czech Republic
(UNCITRAL, registered May 8, 2013); see Luke Peterson, Brussels' Latest Intervention Casts Shadow
Over Investment Treaty Arbitrations Brought by Jilted Solar Energy Investors, INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
REPORTER
(Sept.
8, 2014),
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/brussels-latestintervention-casts-shadow-over-investment-treaty-arbitrations-brought-by-jilted-solar-energy-investors;
Pietro Ortolani, Intra-EU Arbitral Awards vis-a-vis Article 107 TFEU: State Aid Law as a Limit to
Compliance, 6 J. INT'LDISP. SETTLEMENT 118,126 (2015).

245. RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited & RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux S.A.r.1.
v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30 (June 6, 2016); Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief
U.A. v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1(July 18, 2014); NextEra Energy Global Holdings
B.V. & NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain ICSID Case No. ARB/14/11 (Jan.
23, 2015); InfraRed Environmental Infrastructure GP Limited & others v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID
Case No. ARB/14/12 (Nov. 26, 2014); RENERGY S.A.r.l. v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/18 (Feb. 13, 2015); see Decisions on Non-Disputing Party Participation, ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/Decisions-on-Non-Disputing-PartyParticipation.aspx.

246. Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier & Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/14/3 (June 12, 2014).
247. Christina Knahr, The New Rules on Participation of Non-Disputing Parties in ICSID

Arbitration: Blessing or Curse?, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION 319, 320 (Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011).
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law. 24 8 The intervention of the European Commission in the proceedings may,
naturally, raise the technical complexity of the proceedings due to the potential
conflict between obligations arising under BITs and under European Union law.249
Greater policy coordination between the European Union and its member
states is needed. 25 0 The European Commission is currently working to devise a
2 51
In this regard, the design of
European policy on renewable energy promotion.
support schemes is of paramount importance. While economic support
mechanisms have demonstrated important successes, they have also evidenced a
number of policy failures. 2 52 Feed-in tariffs are useful support mechanisms, but
should not be irreversible. These tools must inevitably adapt to changing
circumstances, namely varying costs. However, this is no easy task. Governments
may face significant political resistance if they decide to change or terminate feedin tariffs. Investors always resist any change to regulatory structures that affects
these mechanisms and impacts their investments. As incentives become a key
piece in the overall system, the renewables industry may gain more political
2 53
suasion, making the problem even harder to solve.
The current wave of disputes may be the consequence of insufficient planning
and administrative capabilities. It should be seen as a serious warning for
governments to act cautiously when implementing policies that may have
254
Governments need to
important implications for international investment.
understand renewable energy policies in general - and financial support
mechanisms in particular - as a permanent exercise of re-evaluation and readaptation. Markets change continuously, and so does the market for renewable
energy sources. Policies need to adapt accordingly. The challenge is for
policymakers to adjust quickly and adequately to ever-changing markets in order
to maximize their regulatory frameworks' efficacy and efficiency. Governments
should be aware that making long-term commitments to attract investment may
result in expensive international arbitration claims in the future. Feed-in tariffs
must be designed prudently to allow for flexibility when market conditions change.
Well-designed schemes are in the best interest of both govermments and investors,
because the alternative is an explosion of disputes where everyone loses except the
arbitration industry.2 55 Governments should factor in some flexibility into the
regulatory structure so as to eliminate the risk of legitimate policy decisions giving
rise to legal disputes, while at the same time providing adequate assurances to

248. Peterson, supra note 244; Vadi, supranote 243, at 1340-41.
249. Knahr, supra note 247, at 320.
250. Behn, supra note 47, at 2, 6.

251. Id. at 2.
252. Id.
253.

Davies, supranote 82, at 998.

254. Behn & Fauchald, supra note 47, at 138.
255. Kyla Tienhaara, Does the Green Economy Need Investor-State Dispute Settlement?.
INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Nov. 15, 2015), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/11/28/does-the-green-

economy-need-investor-state-dispute-settlement/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2016).
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investors. 256 Policymakers need to design feed-in tariff schemes that are flexible
enough to accommodate changes in the market without disrupting the stability of
the regime itself. Those who fail to strike this balance risk regulatory collapse. 257
Nevertheless, it should also be added that regulatory risks associated with
renewable energy investment are also evolving. As renewable energy develops and
matures, its costs will sooner or later fall below the price of conventionally
produced electricity. Once this "tipping point" has been reached, feed-in tariffs
will have delivered their promise, and will only be needed on a limited basis, if at
all. 258 As a result, they will be increasingly unnecessary to entice investment in
renewable energies. When this moment comes, investment disputes resulting from
the elimination of such incentives will disappear as well.259
Disagreements in the international energy industry normally lead to high
profile disputes. Once a controversy arises, parties seek to exhaust all options to
reach a settlement before resorting to arbitration. Many disputes are amicably
settled before an arbitral award is rendered. The cases that do reach the award
stage are more likely to reflect investor-state relationships that are beyond
repair.260 The astounding amount of disputes currently pending before arbitral
tribunals signals a failure by governments in adjusting their regulatory structures
without destabilizing the market for renewable energies. Regardless of the final
outcome of these disputes, they indicate a significant level of conflict between host
states and investors. Monitoring the evolution of these disputes is especially
difficult since part of the information is confidential or otherwise unavailable. 261
Whether parties will be able to avoid further confrontation and reach to reasonable
settlements remains to be seen.
In any case, it is important to ensure that bridges between states and investors
are not burned. The transition to a low-carbon model of development requires
long-term cooperation between parties.2 62 Countries will continue to strive to
design and implement energy policies that allow them to face climate change.
Investors are essential partners in this process, and governments need to be able to
encourage them to make their contribution in future ventures. In designing new
policies or adjusting existing ones, governments need to take into account that the
legal framework that supports renewable energy investment is not confined to
national regulations. The legal obligations borne by states towards investors
encompass obligations in domestic law (contract and administrative law) but also
in international law, namely international investment law.2 63 The challenge for
governments is to strike a balance between regulation that discourages foreign

256. Jha, supranote 102.
257. Davies, supra note 82, at 998.
258. POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY, supranote 8, at xxiii.

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Tienhaara, supranote 256.
Stability of Contract, supra note 15, at 313.
Vifluales, supra note 211.
Tienhaara, supra note 255.
Id.
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investment and foreign investment protection that discourages regulation.264
Countries need to adopt a holistic approach to renewable energy
policymaking so as to avoid possible clashes between different legal frameworks.
The different layers of regulation applicable to investments in renewable energies
all serve to protect investments in this field. Legal instruments, international
investment law in particular, can help to mobilize the huge investments required to
265
The challenge is to
transform the energy sector to cleaner forms of generation.
foreign investors
of
the
rights
not
breach
do
that
shape national policies in ways
if host states
be
achieved
only
This
can
agreements.
under international investment
when they
investors
to
foreign
obligations
of
their
the
scope
are truly aware of
2 66
a clear
requires
This
policies.
energy
renewable
design and implement their
may
they
and
how
law
investment
international
of
the
disciplines
understanding of
regulation.
national
upon
impact
or
limit
Investment standards of protection may have a chilling effect on the domestic
regulatory space. While in the past concerns have been voiced that arbitration
awards could end up crystallizing environmentally detrimental rules, now they
may ultimately have an environmentally friendly freezing effect. Governments
should be cognizant of the commitments that they undertake under international
investment treaties. In particular, the fair and equitable treatment standard narrows
down the discretionary space of host states.267 Its application may inhibit necessary
adjustments and changes in the legal framework, which the investor did not expect
268
The
or which are seen as irrational or unjustifiable by the investment tribunals.
risk that host state measures may conflict with investment-backed expectations
may, however, be substantially reduced by governments if they ensure regulatory
transparency and due process.2 69
States can also reduce the risk of overly broad interpretations of investment
disciplines by using more precise language in new investment agreements or
include explicit language that allows them to justify changes to regulatory
frameworks by reference to broad social or environmental objectives. However,
both of these measures only apply to future disputes. As for existing international
investment agreements, states can provide authoritative interpretive guidance as to
the terms of the treaty. A good example of this approach is the interpretive note
issued by the three member-states to the North American Free Trade Agreement
270
(NAFTA) in relation to the fair and equitable treatment standard.

264.
265.

CONDON, supra note 18, at 93.
CONDON, supra note 18, at 93.

266. Id.
267. Krajewski, supranote 79.
268. Id. at 360.
269. Asa Romson, International Investment Law and the Environment, in SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT IN WORLD INVESTMENT LAW 37, 40 (Marie-Claire Segger et al. eds., 2011).
270. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Notes ofInterpretationofCertain Chapter
11 Provisions, GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA, http://www.intemational.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-

commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang-eng (last accessed Dec. 10, 2015).
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The numerous claims over changes in economic support mechanisms that
have surfaced in the past few years provide evidence that states to rethink and
reshape their renewable energy policies. The determination of what is reasonable
for the investor to expect is important for any reform of legal frameworks. Shifts in
both policy and the development of countries make this determination different
from country to country. 271 The creation of efficient and sustainable markets for
renewable sources of energy is a tremendous financial and legal challenge. This
endeavor can only be achieved through a thorough knowledge of the functioning
and possible implications of the economic mechanisms and legal frameworks that
underpin foreign investments in the renewable energy market.

271.

Romson, supra note 269, at 40.
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